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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
 This dissertation is composed of two essays on horizontal divestitures and product market 
relationships. The first essay of my dissertation explores horizontal asset sale activity from 1988-2005, at 
the firm level, utilizing a database of customer, supplier, and rival firms in order to investigate the wealth 
effects of horizontal divestitures on divesting firms, industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers. 
Subsequently, I investigate the impact of horizontal asset sales on changes in operating performance 
around the divestitures for divesting firms, corporate customers, and suppliers. 
 The second essay of my dissertation investigates this topic by exploring quarterly horizontal 
divestiture activity at the industry level by aggregating firm level divestitures by industry using a sample 
of horizontal divestitures from 1979-2010. I explore whether customer (supplier) industry level horizontal 
divestiture activity has implications for the profitability and value of supplier (customer) industries. 
Additionally, I consider whether customer (supplier) industry level divestiture activity influences real 
producers’ prices (input costs) charged (faced) by upstream (downstream) firms. Finally, I determine 
whether industry dependence and barriers to entry play a vital role in changes in supplier (customer) 
industry cash-flow margins and real producers’ prices (input costs) around horizontal divestiture events.  
 What exactly are horizontal divestitures? Horizontal divestitures represent asset sales, spinoffs, or 
equity carve-outs of a subsidiary, division, business line, or asset that operates within the same industry or 
same stage of the production process (along the supply chain) as the firm’s primary line of business. In 
other words, horizontal divestitures signify a reduction or contraction in divesting firm size in its primary 
line of operating activities. 
 Prior research focuses on corporate events that increase relative firm size and its impact along the 
supply chain. These studies investigate events in which the firm increases in size at the same stage of the 
production process (i.e. horizontal takeovers or acquisitions), successive stages of the production process 
(i.e. vertical mergers and takeovers), or unrelated stages of the production process with intersecting 
sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate mergers). This line of research has explored, both, firm level and 
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aggregate industry level horizontal expansion activity on the product market. Another line of related 
research investigates the impact of, firm level, vertical divestitures—an event in which the firm decreases 
its relative size via successive stages of the production process—along the supply chain by exploring 
equity carve-outs and spinoffs. Consequently, the literature fails address the motivations behind 
horizontal contractions or divestitures and the implications on the divesting firms, rival firms, customer 
(downstream) firms, and supplier (upstream) firms. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the 
literature.  
 The first essay entitled “What are the motives and consequences behind horizontal asset sales? 
Evidence from customer, supplier, and rival firms.” explores the firm level motivations of horizontal asset 
sales and the implications for divesting firms, rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers. Using a sample 
of horizontal asset sales, I compare the wealth effects and operating performance of divesting firms, rival 
firms, customer firms, and supplier firms, to determine the relative significance of industry demand 
shocks, financial constraints, diseconomies of scale / efficiency, or financial distress related motivations 
behind horizontal asset sales. Using this approach, this is the first study, to my knowledge, to document 
the product market effects of horizontal divestitures, rather than considering these effects in isolation. 
 Prior research suggests that environmental factors such as the level of product market 
concentration and changes in concentration affect firm financial and operating performance. This essay 
considers how the level and the extent of changes in industry concentration enhance or lessen the wealth 
effects at the announcement of horizontal asset sales. I also consider how these environmental factors may 
affect changes in operating performance around horizontal asset sales. Specifically, I consider how the 
probability of reduced selling power, reduced buyer power, reduced purchasing efficiencies, or enhanced 
product market competition may influence the anticipated gains and losses associated with the primary 
motivations of horizontal asset sales.  
 The second essay entitled “Is your loss my gain? Horizontal divestitures and product market 
relationships.” explores industry level horizontal divestiture activity and the industry-wide repercussions 
for customer (downstream) firms, suppliers (upstream) firms, and rival (side-stream) firms. Using a 
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sample of 46 downstream (35 upstream) industry-level horizontal divestiture events, I conduct a cross-
industry analysis of the product market effect of industry horizontal divestiture activity on supplier 
industries, leading to 274 (35) industry-supplier (industry-customer) pairs from 1979-2010. I empirically 
test whether downstream industry level horizontal divestiture activity diminishes buying power of 
customer (downstream) industries relative to supplier (upstream) industries, enhances the relative 
bargaining position of repositioning customer (downstream) industries, or produces offsetting input price 
increases and decreases by price discriminating suppliers. Additionally, I test whether upstream industry 
level divestiture activity diminishes selling power of supplier (downstream) industries and prompts 
customers to exploit suppliers to negotiate lower input costs, leading to increased profitability. 
Specifically, I test whether supplier opportunism, customer opportunism, or rival opportunism plays a 
role in potential changes in supplier (upstream) industry cash-flow margins, value, and real producers’ 
prices following industry-level divestiture activity. In addition, I investigate whether customer 
opportunism plays a substantial role in the changes of customer (downstream) industry cash-flow 
margins, value, and input costs subsequent to upstream divestiture activity. 
 Prior research documents that customer (downstream) industry-level horizontal acquisition (or 
merger) activity produces buying power relative to supplier (upstream) industries due to downstream 
consolidation (increased market/bargaining power). The enhanced buying power for downstream 
industries adversely impacts the performance of economically dependent supplier industries, leading to 
substantial declines in supplier profitability and supplier prices subsequent to downstream consolidation. 
This evidence suggests that customer (downstream) deconsolidation (horizontal divestiture activity) may 
adversely impact the buying power of downstream firms relative to upstream firms. Therefore, 
downstream horizontal divestiture activity suggests that economic (industry dependence) may enhance 
the economic performance and pricing power of upstream firms favorably. 
1.2. Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay is presented in Chapter 2 and comprises 
an introduction, hypothesis development and literature review, a discussion of data sources, sample 
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formation, empirical methodology, results, and conclusions. The second essay is presented in Chapter 3 
and comprises an introduction, discussion of empirical existing literature, motivation and development of 
testable hypotheses, sample construction, empirical methodology, results, and conclusions. Chapter 4 
discusses overall conclusions. Tables are contained within appendices at the end of the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES BEHIND HORIZONTAL 
ASSET SALES? EVIDENCE FROM CUSTOMER, SUPPLIER, AND RIVAL FIRMS. 
2.1. Introduction 
 What are the motivations behind horizontal assets sales? One line of research contends that asset 
sales are driven by efficiency considerations (Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; 
Warusawitharan, 2008; Yang, 2008) that may be an efficient firm response to changes in optimal firm 
size, a reallocation to higher valued uses, or changing economic conditions. Other lines of research 
suggest that asset sales are determined by financing considerations (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995, 
Gadad and Thomas, 2005) or financial distress (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Brown, James, and 
Mooradian, 1994). A fourth line of thought proposes that asset sales are driven by gains related to 
corporate focus considerations (John and Ofek, 1995). With the exception of Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro 
(1995), very little research considers the role that economic linkages play in these transactions by 
considering the impact on industry rivals, corporate customers, and corporate suppliers. 
 Prior research indicates that managers go to great lengths to expand the horizontal boundaries of 
the firm by undertaking horizontal acquisitions or takeovers to achieve gains related to efficiency, 
bargaining/buying power, or the ability to engage in collusive behavior (Stigler, 1963, Eckbo, 1983, Fee 
and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011; Bernile and Lyandres, 2010). Fee and 
Thomas (2004) and Sharur (2005) document evidence that some of the gains from horizontal mergers can 
be attributed to the buying power motive (Galbraith, 1952), which conjectures that countervailing power 
enables merging firms to pressure suppliers into price concessions (Snyder, 1996, 1998; Stole and 
Zwiebel, 1996). Also, Shahrur (2005) finds evidence to suggest that some horizontal takeovers are 
motivated by efficiency considerations and have positive spillover effects on corporate customers, 
suppliers, and rivals in a subsample of bidders and targets that have a positive combined wealth effect. If 
horizontal expansions have important wealth implications for economically linked firms such as corporate 
customers, suppliers and rivals, then it raises the question of whether or not horizontal contractions (asset 
sales in this case) have implications for industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers, as well. 
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This study investigates the motivations and consequences of horizontal divestitures using a 
dataset of 81 horizontal divestitures.1 Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns indicate the 
wealth effects of horizontal asset sales are driven primarily by reducing pre-divestiture financing frictions 
and scale diseconomies within the firm. I also find mixed evidence regarding divesting firm 
underperformance subsequent to divestiture, providing some support that some firms in financial distress 
engage in horizontal asset sales. This study documents that increased product market competition, 
resulting from substantial horizontal divestiture activity, enhances managerial performance and increase 
firm efficiency. However, I also note that horizontal asset sales reduce divesting firm bargaining power. 
Consequently, suppliers appear to take advantage of this notion by raising input costs, which lessens the 
magnitude of the gains associated with horizontal asset sales. I report that some of the gains from 
horizontal asset sales are more pronounced in concentrated industries and industries that experience a 
large change in industry concentration, leading to lower overhead costs, labor intensity, and wage related 
expenses. However, the gains from horizontal divestitures are less pronounced due to a decrease in 
purchasing efficiencies resulting from higher input costs in industries that have a large decrease in 
industry concentration.  
I present evidence that corporate customers of upstream (supplier) divesting firms experience 
more negative than positive stock price reactions and a significant increase in input costs subsequent to 
upstream divestitures in more concentrated industries, suggesting that divesting suppliers face increasing 
competitive pressures to maintain cash-flow performance and increase input costs for their customers. 
The customer wealth effects are more pronounced in response to upstream divestitures that compose a 
large proportion of the industry. For deals in concentrated industries, the post-divestiture median industry-
adjusted costs of goods sold-to-sales ratio increases temporarily, while it decreases temporarily for deals 
in less concentrated industries. Non-reliant individual customers and customer portfolios experience 
significantly more negative than positive abnormal returns relative to reliant customers. Univariate 
evidence from customer reliant and non-reliant subsamples indicate that horizontal asset sales are less 
                                                     
1 Asset sales, sell-offs, and divestitures are used interchangeably, hereafter. 
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beneficial for non-essential customers than those customers with greater relationship specific investments, 
providing evidence that divesting firms appear to pass along higher input costs from reduced bargaining 
power with suppliers along to customers that are less important to their business. 
I report that suppliers of downstream divesting firms experience significant short-lived increases 
in cash-flow performance in the immediate year subsequent to the divestiture of downstream firms. These 
effects are more pronounced for deals in less concentrated industries and for divestiture deals that do not 
substantially change the competitive landscape. This evidence indicates that suppliers are better 
positioned to take advantage of the reduced size of divesting downstream firms, in more competitive 
industries, by instituting higher input prices post-divestiture: providing evidence in support of the 
purchasing inefficiencies hypothesis. 
I follow Fee and Thomas (2004) and examine the supplier termination retention decision to 
examine whether divesting firms look to increase efficiency subsequent to the divestiture or face 
substantial product market pressures that increase managerial efficiency by terminating inefficient 
suppliers. I document that higher divesting firm abnormal returns are positively related to the supplier 
termination decision, suggesting divesting firms enhance value by terminating inefficient suppliers. I 
document that deals that result in large increases in industry competition in divesting industry increase the 
probability of terminating the supplier subsequent to the deal. Divesting firms seem to be more likely to 
end long-term supplier relationships and those terminate suppliers with higher switching costs, indicating 
that divesting firms increase efficiency and value by breaching implicit contracts with suppliers. 
To shed further light on the gains and losses related to suppliers, this study explores several 
supplier subsamples. I present evidence that downstream horizontal asset sales are detrimental to 
suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier portfolios with lower 
switching costs. Suppliers who report a single large customer in their financial statements experience 
significantly negative stock price reactions at announcement and negative cash-flow performance 
subsequent to the divestiture. To examine this issue further, I follow Fee and Thomas (2004) and find that 
suppliers terminated subsequent to the divestiture event experience significant negative wealth effects and 
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negative cash-flow performance in the years subsequent to the divestiture of downstream firms. In 
contrast, suppliers retained subsequent to the divestiture event experience significant positive changes in 
median industry-adjusted cash-flows. This evidence suggests that divesting firms use horizontal asset 
sales as opportunity to enhance the efficiency of their product market relationships with suppliers, 
terminate contracts with less efficient suppliers and reduce order sizes from suppliers with high switching 
costs. Concentrated suppliers appear to benefit from downstream divestitures, while non-concentrated 
suppliers appear to be disadvantaged by divestitures. Overall, I find that the overall impact of downstream 
horizontal asset sales on suppliers depends on supplier concentration, supplier switching costs, and the 
ability of suppliers to preserve its product market relationship with divesting firms. 
This study makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature. First, the extant 
literature on corporate restructuring tends to concentrate primarily on corporate events that increase 
relative firm size, which may change the dynamics between customer firms and suppliers (Fee and 
Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain; Shenoy, 2012; and Greene, Kini, and Shenoy, 
2013.  The exception to this statement is Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011), who investigate the product 
market implications of vertical divestitures. These studies typically investigate events in which the firm 
increases in size at the same stage of the production process (i.e. horizontal mergers, acquisitions, tender 
offers and takeovers), successive stages of the production process (i.e. vertical mergers and takeovers), or 
unrelated stages of the production process with intersecting sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate 
mergers). In contrast, Jain, Kini, and, Shenoy (2011) investigate customer supplier relationships using 
vertical divestitures (equity carveouts and spinoffs)—an event in which the firm decreases its relative size 
via successive stages of the production process. While the motives and consequences of horizontal 
expansions have been well established, a scarcity of empirical evidence on horizontal contractions exists. 
Therefore, I endeavor to fill a void in this stream of literature by investigating a corporate event that 
decreases relative firm size at the same stage of the production process, horizontal asset sales. Horizontal 
divestitures represent an important area to study because, unlike a vertical or non-horizontal divestiture, it 
does not increase firm focus (in certain situations, a horizontal divestiture may decrease firm focus in a 
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diversified firm) and may have unintended consequences for the divesting in the product market such as 
reduced bargaining power or ability to collude. 
This study extends the line of research that examines the impact of corporate events on product 
market relationships. This is the first paper, to my knowledge, that explores the impact of asset sales on 
customer-supplier relationships. While the extant literature examines the impact of horizontal expansions 
(Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011), vertical expansions (Shenoy, 
2012) and contractions (Jain, Kini, and, Shenoy, 2011), and firm contractions (Slovin, Sushka, and 
Ferraro, 1995) on product market relationships, this study addresses the gap in the literature by examining 
the impact of horizontal contractions on product market relationships. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 
study the intra-industry valuation effects of divestitures (equity carve-outs, spinoffs, and asset sales) on 
corporate rivals, in comparison, this study includes the impact of asset sales on suppliers and customers.  
Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) explore the impact 
of horizontal mergers on product market relationships. Additionally, prior research examines the effect of 
vertical restructuring on product market relationships such as takeovers (Shenoy, 2012)  and carveouts 
and spin-offs (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011), while this study focuses on horizontal asset sales product 
market relationships with respect to divestitures. The primary difference between this study and that of 
John and Ofek (1995) is that this study extends the analysis of sell-offs to include the valuation effects on 
corporate customers, suppliers, and rivals, whereas, John and Ofek (1995) do not. John and Ofek 
concentrate on focus increasing asset sales, whereas my primary event is horizontal asset sales (events 
that may potentially decrease firm focus in the case of a diversified or multiple segment firm). In contrast 
John and Ofek’s (1995) study, this study also examines the wealth effects of horizontal divestitures and 
also entails substantially larger sample of asset sales (my sample is more than 1.7 times the size of John 
and Ofek’s sample). To my understanding, there exists no prior studies that investigate the impact of 
horizontal asset sell-offs on corporate customers and suppliers. 
Second, this study adds to the nexus of the industrial organization and corporate finance literature 
that explores how changes in market structure influence firm value. Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur 
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(2005) document evidence of purchasing efficiencies arising from increased countervailing power from 
horizontal mergers. In contrast, I report evidence consistent the notion that horizontal asset sales result in 
the divesting firm’s decreased ability to counteract the market power of powerful suppliers as a 
consequence of reduced firm size. Additionally, I present evidence consistent with the idea that some 
divesting firms become exposed to increased competitive pressures resulting from divestiture deals in 
concentrated industries and those deals that compose a large percent of the industry. These divestiture 
deals reduce the probability of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2001) subsequent to the divestiture event and improve cost efficiency for the 
divesting firm.  
Third, I document the roles that customer (supplier) switching costs and market structure play in 
customer (supplier) wealth effects at announcement of upstream (downstream) asset sales. I provide 
evidence that high supplier switching costs have negative wealth implications for suppliers at 
announcement of downstream horizontal divestitures. This evidence complements that of Fee and 
Thomas (2004) who document high supplier switching costs negatively impact the wealth of suppliers at 
announcement of downstream horizontal mergers. In addition, I report that customers with low switching 
costs (less reliant) or low relationship-specific investments experience negative wealth effects at 
announcement of upstream horizontal divestitures. I also report that customers (individual suppliers) with 
less market power (those in less concentrated industries) demonstrate a significant negative reaction at 
announcement to upstream (downstream) horizontal divestitures, whereas, Fee and Thomas (2004) report 
that concentrated suppliers respond negatively at announcement to horizontal mergers due to reduced 
bargaining power. 
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the source of gains of asset sales. Prior 
literature suggests that gains related to asset sales come from financing consideration (Lang, Poulsen, and 
Stulz, 1995), corporate focus considerations (John and Ofek, 1995), and efficiency considerations (Hite, 
Owers, and Rogers, 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002). Using multivariate regression analysis, 
I that pre-divestiture labor intensity, overhead costs, and financing constraints are positively related to 
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divesting firm abnormal returns suggesting that a reduction firm bureaucracy and financing frictions are 
the primary source of gains for horizontal asset sales. In addition, I note that managers use horizontal 
divestitures as an opportunity to increase the efficiency of the firm’s contracts with corporate suppliers 
and customers, similar to the way in which horizontal mergers are used as an opportunity to terminate the 
merging firm’s relationship with inefficient suppliers (Fee and Thomas, 2004). In particular, some of the 
gains from asset sales are achieved through the reduction of the firms’ labor intensity, overhead costs, and 
wage related expenses in concentrated industries that may be suffering from corporate bureaucracy, 
suggesting that the gains come from the disposition of human capital rather than physical capital. 
The remainder of this chapter continues as follows. Section 2.2 develops the hypotheses that are 
empirically tested and discusses the relevant literature. Section 2.3 discusses the data sources, sample 
formation requirements, and empirical methodology. Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 provides 
a summary of the findings and concluding remarks. 
2.2. Hypothesis development and related literature 
 This section of the paper develops the hypotheses for the entire sample of divestitures. In 
particular, I motivate the industry demand hypothesis, financing hypothesis, diseconomies of scale / 
efficiency hypothesis, and financial distress hypothesis. 
2.2.1. Industry demand considerations 
 Prior research indicates that asset sales are events that transfer assets to higher valued uses due to 
differential productivity among industry firms (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001, 2002). More specifically, 
firms divest less productive assets, divisions, or subsidiaries to more proficient firms in the industry, 
resulting from an industry demand shock. Consequently, I posit that industry demand shocks generate a 
positive reaction from the divesting firm. Industry competitors may respond positive or negatively in 
response to the event. For instance, less efficient rivals may react negatively in response to a more 
efficient firm post-divestiture or positively in response to information of positive demand shocks for their 
less productive divisions. Corporate customers are likely to respond positively in response to a more 
efficient divesting firm and a higher valued subsidiary or division in the hands of a more capable 
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producer. I conjecture that corporate suppliers may react positively or not at all in response to an industry 
demand shock. Suppliers may face a more valuable and productive customer post-divestiture due to a 
more efficient parent and subsidiary. Alternatively, suppliers may face a more efficient customer that is 
able to increase its value without increasing its demand for inputs. 
It is well established that prior studies use Tobin’s Q a proxy for firm growth 
prospects/managerial productivity, therefore, I employ the variable Tobins_Q in the year prior to the 
divestiture as a proxy for the demand conditions for firm assets. I define Tobins_Q as the ratio of the 
firm’s market value of assets to the book value of firm assets: price at fiscal year-end close (Compustat 
item 199) * common shares outstanding (Compustat item 25) plus total assets (Compustat item 6) less 
book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) scaled by total assets (Compustat item 6). 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) surmise that there is a greater likelihood that less productive firms will 
sell segments to more productive producers. Thus, if managerial productivity is low for the divesting 
firm, then there will be a greater demand for the firm division sold.  
2.2.2. Financing considerations 
The financing hypothesis contends that assets sales deliver funds when different sources of 
funding are too costly due to agency costs of debt or information asymmetries that make equity sales 
unappealing (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). Several studies argue that financing considerations are 
important in divestiture decisions (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Colak and Whited, 2007; Jain, Kini, 
and Shenoy, 2011). Lang Poulsen and Stulz (1995) find that firms selling assets 1) are likely poor 
performers, 2) have considerable leverage likely driven by its financial condition rather than another firm 
having comparative advantage in operating assets, and 3) respond positively to asset sales planning to use 
proceeds to pay down debt. 
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) document that industry financing conditions influence the choice to 
vertically divest rather than internal financing constraints. Given that the divesting firm and the asset, 
subsidiary or division are in the same industry, industry financing conditions can be ruled out since both 
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are equally affected. However, internal financing constraints of the parent firm could still explain 
horizontal divestitures.  
Therefore, I postulate that financing constraints in the fiscal year prior to the divestiture produce a 
positive reaction from divesting firms. Industry rivals may face a more competitive firm that can take 
advantage of investment opportunities eliciting a negative reaction. However, industry competitors with 
similar or worse financing constraints will receive information on how to resolve financial constraints of 
their own, resulting in a positive contagion effect and, therefore, a positive stock price reaction. 
Eliminating financing constraints suggests that divesting firms can take advantage of investment 
opportunities leading to increased demand for inputs. Therefore, suppliers may react positively to the 
reduction of financial constraints. Customers, similarly, may respond positively to divesting firms who 
overcome financial constraints due to higher quality products or new offerings. I follow Jain, Kini, and 
Shenoy (2011) and proxy financing constraints with the variable NEED_FOR_FUNDS as the difference 
between capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) and the sum of operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat item 13) and change in net working capital (Compustat item 4 less Compustat item 5) in the 
year prior to the divestiture announcement.  
2.2.3. Diseconomies of scale/Efficiency 
Several papers suggest that managerial and coordination costs linked to diseconomies of scale 
influence firm size. Coase (1937) conjectures that firm size varies over time in response to: changes in 
marketing costs and diminishing returns to management. Rosen (1982) posits that firm management is 
subject to scale economies, but there exists diminishing returns to management because managers lose the 
ability to govern as firm size increases. Rosen indicates that there is a compromise between scale 
economies and the ability to manage effectively. Warusawitharana (2008) develops a model of asset 
purchases and sales and postulates that firm profitability and size play a role in a firm’s decision to 
engage in asset sales. Warusawitharana posits that a decrease in profitability leads to a decrease in 
optimal, proposing that the least profitable firms downsize via asset sales. Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
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examine acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s and document that firms reduce size (downsize) by 
efficiently reacting to economic changes by engaging in divestitures.  
Consequently, I conjecture that the elimination of firm scale diseconomies is positively related to 
the gains from abnormal returns and operating performance resulting from new efficiencies. However, 
Industry rivals may react negatively or positively to news of horizontal divestitures depending on 
contagion or competitive effects. For instance, industry rivals with greater scale diseconomies may 
respond negatively (positively) in response to facing a more efficient rival (to information on how to 
eliminate scale diseconomies of its own). Yet, the effect of divestitures on corporate suppliers is not as 
clear. Corporate suppliers may respond negatively or not all to the elimination of scale diseconomies 
(downsizing) due to lower input demand bringing about fewer orders. Customers may react negatively or 
not at all to scale diseconomies. For example, the divesting firm may use the divestiture as an opportunity 
to renegotiate contracts with their customers to become even more efficient. Alternatively, customers may 
respond positively to improved coordination from decreased divesting firm size. Therefore, the net effect 
on customers is ambiguous. 
I explore two specific proxies related to scale diseconomies: input costs and labor intensity to 
pinpoint the potential gains associated with horizontal divestitures. Fee and Thomas (2004) proxy input 
costs with the ratio of cost of goods sold-to-sales for input related scale economies and labor related 
factors with the employee to sales and selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales ratios. Several 
measures of firm size include value added, employees, revenues, or assets (Canback, Samouel, and Price, 
2006). Canback, Samouel, and Price surmise that the number of employees is a good proxy for firm size 
and diseconomies of scale should be linked to human frailty. As such, they identify bureaucratic failure as 
a cause of increased coordination costs. Therefore, I use the employee to sales ratio, selling, general, and 
administrative expense (also linked employee and salary related cost), and the number of parent firm 
employees as to proxy for the coordination costs associated with diseconomies of scale. 
To determine whether divesting firms extend their efforts to increase efficiencies from not only 
inside the firm but also outside of the firm, I examine the divesting firm’s contracting relationships 
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between customers and suppliers. To explicitly test these contracting relationships, I consider both 
supplier and customer switching costs. With respect to suppliers, I hypothesize that divesting firms will 
opportunistically seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers with high switching costs. 
Hence, I predict that suppliers with high switching costs will react negatively to horizontal asset sales. 
With respect to corporate customers, the outcome is not so straightforward. On the one hand, divesting 
firms may see the divestiture as an opportunity to adjust prices upward on customers with high switching 
costs, and customers may react negatively. On the other hand, divesting firms may want to appease and 
assure customers essential to their business (those with high switching costs) that quality and service 
subsequent to the divesture will not decline but choose to exploit customers less essential to their survival 
(those with low switching costs). Therefore, customers with high switching costs may react positively or 
negative to horizontal asset sales. In the end, this is an empirical matter. I proxy supplier low and high 
switching costs using suppliers with suppliers a single large customer and more than one large customers. 
Suppliers with multiple large customers is defined as suppliers that disclose more than one large public 
customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Suppliers with a single large customer is 
defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment 
Database. I proxy customer switching costs using a measure a measure of customer reliance in the spirit 
of Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi (2011). Reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales 
(to the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is 
greater than 2.5%. Non-reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting 
firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or 
equal to 2.5%. 
2.2.4. Financial distress considerations 
Other researchers postulate that asset sales are motivated by financial distress or financial 
constraint considerations. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) posit that asset sales by financially distressed firms 
may be sold at a discount relative to financially healthy firms. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) 
empirically investigate asset sales conducted by financially distressed firms and document significantly 
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lower returns to shareholders when asset sales proceeds are used to repay debt compared to when the 
proceeds are retained by the firm. The financial distress hypothesis postulates that distressed firms will 
likely sell assets at a significant discount relative to healthy firms. Thus, I anticipate divesting firms to 
react negatively to financial distress. Industry rivals may react positively or negatively at announcement. 
For instance, rivals may face a more financially healthy rival and elicit a negative competitive effect. 
Alternatively, rivals in financial distress may elicit a contagion, indicating information on how other 
distressed firms can sell assets to resolve issues of financial distress. Corporate customers and suppliers 
may react negatively in reaction to the asset sale as a result of the firm’s financially distressed state. Prior 
literature indicates that on average industry rivals and suppliers react negatively to firms in financial 
distress and that customers may be the source of financial distress (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Hertzel, Li, 
Officer, and Rodgers, 2008).  
I eliminate firms with negative book values of equity from consideration in the year prior to the 
divestiture announcement; therefore, I do not specifically consider distressed firms. However, I use the  
variable, Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) as a proxy for firm financial distress or financial health. 
Following Altman (1968), I define ALTMAN_Z_SCORE as the sum of 3.3 * earnings before interest and 
taxes scaled by total assets, 0.99 * net sales scaled by total assets, 0.6 * market capitalization at fiscal 
year-end scaled by total liabilities, 1.2 * current assets scaled by total assets, and 1.4* retained earnings 
scaled by total assets. I expect a negative relation between the ALTMAN_Z_SCORE and wealth effects 
and operating performance.  
Table 1 summarizes the possible underlying motivations driving horizontal asset sales and 
specifies the conjectured reactions of a horizontal sell-off on the divesting firms, in addition to their 
customers, suppliers, and rivals. Panel A presents the general hypotheses for the entire sample. While the 
different reactions can occur in multiple outcomes, the respective source of gains/losses has a unique 
result with respect to the way in which individual firms are anticipated to be influenced by the divestiture. 
I take advantage of this point to differentiate the reactions derived from industry demand, diseconomies of 
scale/efficiency, and financial distress hypotheses. 
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2.2.5. Product market considerations 
 This section addresses the potential tradeoffs arising from firms conducting horizontal 
divestitures and the consequences arising from product market effects from these deals that may reduce or 
enhance the potential gains from restructuring activities. 
2.2.5.1. Monopolistic collusion considerations 
 Stigler (1964) asserts that monopolistic collusion allows merging firms to collude with industry 
rivals and restrict production to customers earning the monopoly price. Eckbo and Wier (1985) theorize 
that events that decrease the probability of horizontal mergers would potentially result in lost monopoly 
rents to merging firms and industry rivals. Eckbo (1983) contends that under collusion engendered by 
merging firms, monopoly rents are detrimental to customers and suppliers. By implication, a horizontal 
divestiture may reduce the firm’s size and hinder the divesting firm’s potential to collude with industry 
rivals. Consequently, I expect that a horizontal divestiture will lead to increased output by the divesting 
firm and its former subsidiary or division by the acquiring firm. Therefore, customers will receive 
potentially lower input prices and higher quantities of goods and services. On the one hand, suppliers of 
the divesting firm may receive higher orders from the parent firm and the divested subsidiary under the 
control of the acquirer. On the other hand, suppliers may receive decreased quantities ordered from the 
divesting firm since the new acquirer may source its inputs from alternative suppliers. These effects are 
likely to be more detectable in concentrated industries in which the divesting firm operates and from 
divestitures that result in large changes in industry concentration. Divesting firms in less concentrated 
industries will likely have less monopoly power and customers in more concentrated industries will be 
more able to reap the benefits from the divestiture. 
The monopolistic collusion hypothesis proposes that horizontal integration (mergers, acquisitions, 
or expansions) facilitates collusion between industry rivals leading to limited output and elevated price to 
the detriment of customers. The potential for advantages in a horizontally integrated framework calls into 
consideration of whether horizontal divestitures lead to the degradation of these advantages. Since 
monopolistic collusion is more likely to be observed in concentrated industries than non-concentrated, I 
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anticipate a decreased probability of collusion amongst rival firms in concentrated industries. Thus, the 
monopolistic collusion hypothesis predicts that divesting and rival firms would suffer and that customers 
would profit provided that the dominant outcome of an inadequate monopoly is increased production and 
decreased prices. The effects of a surge in downstream output and input utilization would positively affect 
suppliers; however the significance of these effects remains ambiguous. 
 Considering that concentrated industries are more likely to exhibit pricing discretion, there may 
be an alternative outcomes. The effect under the monopolistic collusion hypothesis may be less 
pronounced in less concentrated industries for product market counterparts. If divesting firms in less 
concentrated industries have less pricing discretion or ability to limit output, then the effects on product 
market customers would be less of change in production and prices relative to concentrated industries, 
assuming less concentrated industries are not as susceptible changes in market forces than concentrated 
firms. Whereas, divesting firms in more concentrated industries may have a greater ability to adjust to 
more efficient prices as they move prices closer to marginal costs. 
To capture the effects customer concentration, I explore customer concentration by examining 
both concentrated industries and less concentrated industries as follows. Non-concentrated customers 
classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to 1800. 
Concentrated customers identifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is 
greater than 1800. 
2.2.5.2. Monopsonistic collusion considerations 
Blair and Harrison (1993) argue that, in an imperfectly competitive product market, a 
monopsonist will have the ability to restrict production in the output market, leading to higher prices and 
reduced output compared to the perfectly competition case. Chen (2007) argues that employing 
monopsony power results in decreased economic efficiency, indicating that the use of monopsonistic 
power is detrimental to consumer welfare. Given that horizontal mergers or acquisitions potentially 
increase the industry concentration of buyers and may lead to increased monopsony power as proposed by 
Eckbo (1983). Again, Eckbo and Wier (1985) conjecture that events that reduce the likely of horizontal 
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mergers would potentially result in lost rents to colluding firms, merging firms and industry rivals. By 
inference, this notion raises the concern of whether or not horizontal divestitures lead to reduced market 
power and, therefore, monopsony rents for divesting firms and industry rivals.  
Drawing on these studies, I refer to the monopsonistic collusion hypothesis as the concept that 
horizontal divestitures potentially decrease the anticompetitive behavior of divesting firms and their 
product market rivals. This hypothesis asserts that rivals no longer are able to profit at the expense of 
suppliers due to decreased probability of coordination amongst competitors to obtain lower input prices. 
The monopsonistic collusion hypothesis proposes that industry rivals will react negatively to news of 
decreased potential for collusion. Eckbo (1983) argues that under collusion engendered by merging firms, 
monopoly rents are unfavorable to customers and suppliers. A reduction in monopsonistic collusion will 
result in an improvement in economic efficiency for customers and suppliers. Customers will receive 
increased production quantities. Suppliers will likely receive increased production and higher prices due 
to reduced buyer power. These effects will most likely be revealed in industries in which there is greater 
competition amongst suppliers and divesting industries that experience a large change in industry 
concentration. 
To capture the effects supplier concentration, I, similarly, investigate supplier concentration by 
examining both concentrated industries and less concentrated industries as follows. Non-concentrated 
suppliers classifies suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to1800. 
Concentrated suppliers classifies suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 
1800. 
2.2.5.3. Purchasing inefficiency/countervailing power considerations 
 The theory of countervailing power conjectures that economic power leads to economic power 
(Galbraith, 1952). More specifically, the group that is bound by the economic power of a dominant group 
offsets that position by augmenting its own economic power in relation to the power of the dominant 
group, thus revealing countervailing power. In this framework, a large customer uses its bargaining power 
relative to its suppliers’ bargaining power; consequently, suppliers cut their selling prices to its buyers. If 
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countervailing power serves as a channel to constrain buying power and selling power, then what is the 
implication of relaxing this constraint, in this case buyer size, on buying power? Intrinsic in the theory of 
countervailing power is the concept that horizontal divestitures of downstream firms or buyers relax the 
channel that limits or keeps in check upstream firms’ or suppliers’ selling power. More specifically, 
horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power, to the point in which it diminishes the boundaries 
on suppliers’ selling power, resulting in moderated buying power for a given divesting firm relative to its 
suppliers.  
In a theory of dynamic countervailing power, Snyder (1996) finds that large buyers achieve lower 
prices from colluding sellers, and that the profitability of all buyers improves at the detriment of the 
supplier after a merger of another firm due to merger induced competition amongst suppliers (Snyder, 
1998). Hence, in the context of reduced buying power, countervailing power theory suggests adverse 
consequences for not only the horizontally divesting firm, but for industry rivals as well. Thus, I expect 
industry rivals to respond negatively to news of a horizontal divestiture. I anticipate that a reduction in 
countervailing power will lead to a potential reduction in corporate customer welfare and an improvement 
in supplier bargaining power, especially, for concentrated suppliers. Consequently, concentrated suppliers 
may opportunistically raise input prices on less powerful divesting firms. Ultimately, this may lead to 
higher prices but a conceivably lower quantity; therefore, the effects may be ambiguous for suppliers. The 
divesting firms will no longer be able to pass lower input prices along to their customers. Therefore, 
customers may see an increase in their input costs. If divesting firms pass along these potentially higher 
costs, these firms may decide to pass these costs along customers with high or low switching costs. On 
the one hand, customers with high switching costs may have a strong customer-supplier relationship, and 
thus, divesting firms may pass these costs along to customers with lower switching costs (non-essential 
customers). On the other hand, divesting firms may act opportunistically and pass these costs along to 
those customers with high switching costs. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. These effects may be 
more pronounced in less concentrated industries in which the divesting firm operates and divestitures that 
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result in substantial changes in the industry Herfindahl index. I proxy customer switching costs using the 
approach defined in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.5.4. Product market competition hypothesis 
Extant literature discusses the role that product market competition plays in mitigating conflicts 
between shareholders and management (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958). Several papers conjecture that 
increased product market competition may serve as an efficient tool to abate managerial slack or 
ineffectiveness (Hart, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Allen and Gale, 2000). Hart (1983) posits that 
product market competition unequivocally decreases managerial slack by assuming that managers attempt 
to obtain a profit target, consequently, managers face stiff competition and must work diligently to reach 
those targets. However, Scharfstein (1988) conjectures product market competition potentially makes the 
incentive problem worse and reduces managerial effort. Nickell (1996) uses a sample of U.K. 
manufacturing firms and shows that greater competition results in fewer monopoly rents. Monopoly rents 
provide opportunity for company stakeholders such as managers and employees to capture monopolistic 
rents with slack or lack of effort. Nickell (1996) finds evidence that an increase in product market 
competition is related to an increase in productivity. Nickell finds that increased competition leads to a 
decrease in costs and managerial slack and an increase in innovation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
postulate that weak governance firms prefer to enjoy the quiet life by circumventing cognitively difficulty 
behaviors that may include bargaining with suppliers and unions over input prices and wages, 
respectively, and attempting to enhance labor productivity (Giroud and Mueller, 2010).  
By implication, if horizontal divestiture activity increases product market competition, then I 
expect that divesting firms in concentrated industries or industries that experience large reductions in 
concentration will undergo improved performance from increased susceptibility to product market 
competition. This hypothesis stipulates that horizontal divestitures potentially increase competition and 
reduce the probability that managers will be able to enjoy “the quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003), therefore increasing managerial incentives to negotiate lower prices from suppliers or lower 
wages from unions and improve productivity. Therefore, I anticipate that suppliers may experience an 
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adverse stock price reaction and reduced cash-flow performance as a result of horizontal divestitures, in 
concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated industries or industries that experience a large change 
in industry concentration.  
With respect to customers, increased competition may pressure managers to maintain cash-flow 
performance despite a reduction in size or to reduce prices in the face of increased competition, therefore 
the outcome is ambiguous. Thus, customers may react positively or negatively to news of horizontal 
divestitures. Industry rivals may react positively, as a result of increased competitive pressure that 
incentivizes managers to decrease managerial slack, or negatively in response to a more efficient rival. 
Therefore, if a rival is more concentrated than the divesting firm, I anticipate that positive reaction will 
indicate a contagion effect, whereas, a negative reaction would indicate a competitive effect. 
Additionally, I consider the effect of increased product market competition on the supplier 
retention termination decision. I conjecture that managers subject to increased competition will likely 
terminate ineffective suppliers, reducing supplier profitability and value. To capture the impact of product 
market competition, I proxy suppliers with high and low switching costs in a similar manner to the one 
outlined in Section 2.2.3. I also attempt to capture the economic effects of product market competition by 
examining supplier retention versus termination decisions by divesting firms. Retained suppliers are those 
suppliers that were listed as suppliers before and after a divestiture deal. Terminated suppliers are those 
suppliers that were listed as suppliers before a divestiture deal but not after. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the testable hypotheses that incorporate product market considerations. In 
particular, Panel B presents the predicted effects of the monopolistic collusion, monopsonistic collusion, 
purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power, and product market competition hypotheses on divesting 
firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers. 
2.3. Data 
 In this section, I discuss the data sources and sample formation requirements employed to identify 
my sample of horizontal divestitures. I also offer the relevant features of my final sample of horizontal 
divestitures. 
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2.3.1. Sample construction 
 This study depends on several data sources for my empirical investigation. I initially obtain my 
preliminary sample of horizontal divestitures from the universe of divestitures proposed from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC). I employ the data on firm-level customer-supplier relationships 
established by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) using the Compustat Customer Segment database.2 Similar to 
other studies, I acquire financial security data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
and accounting data from Compustat. 
 To simply the analysis and limit the scope of this study and number of predictions, I focus 
primarily on asset sales. Thus, my sample of divestitures excludes equity carve-outs and spin-offs over 
the period 1987-2005. My initial sample of divestitures is acquired from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. This study eliminates divestitures that are described by the 
following (1) parent firms are private firms, limited partnerships, financial and regulated firms 
[Compustat historical Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000-6999, 4000-4099, 4500-4599, or 
4800-4999], Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), foreign firms, or joint ventures, (2) information on 
the parent firm is not accessible on Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) directly following the 
divestiture, (3) concurrent announcements are made such as quarterly earnings; issues of equity, preferred 
stock or warrants; mergers and acquisitions; termination of technical agreements; share repurchases; 
private placements, dividends; and executive turnover, (4) parent firms simultaneously announce an intent 
to spin off or carve out a unit in addition to divesting assets (5) the announcement date of the proposed 
divestiture cannot be determined via a search of newswires and newspapers, Lexis-Nexis or Wall Street 
Journal searches, (6) the parent firm does not have data available in Compustat on both a consolidated and 
industry–segment basis (7) parent and acquirer are not U.S. based, (8) the parent and divestiture target do 
not have matching SIC codes in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database,  (9) the parent SIC code in SDC 
Mergers and acquisitions database does not match historical standard industry classification codes in 
Compustat (10) divestiture is considered an equity carve-out or spin-off, (10) the parent has less than $20 
                                                     
2 I am indebted to Lauren Cohen and Andrea Frazzini for generously sharing their data. 
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million in sales (in constant 1987 dollars), and (11) the ratio of the deal value to total assets is less than 
0.1%.3 These last two restrictions facilitate the collection of transaction information from news stories 
and maintain the relative meaningfulness of these deals in the product market. 
 As a consequence of these limitations placed on the sample, there are 81 transactions that met the 
sample construction conditions from 1988 to 2005, and summary statistics for these divestiture deals are 
displayed in Table 2. The number of transactions does not vary substantially compared to other studies 
considering that horizontal divestitures represent a subcategory of divestitures. In general, divestitures 
may also be conglomerate or vertical in nature. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) report a final sample of 
93 asset sales. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) examine 179 sell-offs. Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
examine 139 asset sales. As shown in Panel A, there is some degree of variability in the incidence of 
deals, relative size of the transactions, and number of employees by year. Roughly sixty-five percent of 
the divestiture activity occurs from 1999-2005 in the sample. The average (median) ratio of 
subsidiary/unit net transaction value (transaction value less advisor fees) to parent total asset value one 
year prior to the divestiture is 17 (2.5) percent for this sample of deals, which suggests that this sample is 
relatively smaller and skewed upward compared to the average (median) ratio of subsidiary/unit net 
transaction value of 18 (11) percent reported by Mulherin and Boone (2000). Thus, horizontal divestiture 
deals appear to be about the same size as general divestiture deals, on average. The typical net transaction 
value (deal value less advisor fees) is $172.87 million. The average divesting firm in the sample has 
roughly $10.8 billion in market capitalization, $7.4 billion in total assets, and 37,400 employees. Market 
capitalization, total assets, and transaction values are reported in 2003 dollars. 
 Panel B of Table 2 reports the accumulated deals into broad industries established by Fama and 
French (1997).4 Petroleum and natural gas, healthcare, electronic equipment, pharmaceutical products, 
and restaurants, hotels and motels industries generate the most divestiture activity in my sample. 
Divestitures in these industries comprise 72.87 percent of the divestitures in the sample. Additionally, the 
                                                     
3 Berger and Ofek (1999) restrict their sample of asset sell-offs to sales at least $100 million in 1984 (the initial year 
in the sample). 
4 One hundred percent of the divesting firms in this sample are all focused reporting one business segment. 
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petroleum and natural gas industry dominates other industries in the sample accounting for 29.63 percent 
of the divestiture activity in the sample. The relative transaction value of deals reported in electronic 
equipment industries (0.92) appear to be much greater than the relative transaction value of deals reported 
in the other industries. 
 Panel C of Table 2 reports the frequency of divestiture deals by deal characteristics. With respect 
to method of payment or deal consideration as reported by SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and 
news stories, 38.27 percent of the deals were paid via a cash transaction. Stock based and mixed (cash and 
stock based) methods of payment compose 3.70 percent and 3.70 percent, respectively. However, the 
method of payment was unknown for 54.32 percent of divestiture deals. Panel C also describes the deals 
based on whether the deal was an intra-industry transaction versus an inter-industry transaction between 
seller and buyer.  I document a greater proportion of intra-industry deals, 53.09 percent, between sellers 
and buyers, than inter-industry deals, 46.91 percent. 
2.3.2. Identifying corporate rivals, suppliers, and customers 
 This study follows Fee and Thomas (2004), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Hertzel, Li, Officer, and 
Rodgers (2008), and Bernile and Lyandres (2013) by employing the firm’s reported information regarding 
material corporate customers obtained from the Compustat Customer Segment Files to identify firm 
suppliers and customers of the divesting firms, and their industry rivals. SFAS No. 131 mandates firms to 
disclose specific financial information the existence of customers whose purchases comprise at least 10 
percent of the firm’s consolidated annual sales. Obtaining the identifying characteristics of each firm’s 
major customers from the Compustat Segment Files and linking these major customers to corresponding 
firms on CRSP and Compustat databases facilitates the creation of a sample of firms’ primary customers. 
Once firm i is classified as a major customer of firm j, the database is inverted and firm j is classified as a 
supplier of firm i.5 To identify suppliers of divesting firms, I match the parent (divesting) firm’s name to a 
customer firm’s name (from or on the Compustat Customer Segment Files) in the fiscal year-end prior to 
the divestiture announcement date. I include customers of the divesting parent firm. For the typical deal in 
                                                     
5 See Cohen and Frazzini (2008) for a more comprehensive description of the matching algorithm employed. 
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the sample, I identify 0.52 customer firms and 1.21 supplier firms with the required data to compute 
announcement period abnormal returns. This is similar to the average deal in the sample of Fee and 
Thomas (2004), who identify 0.40 customer firms and 1.09 supplier firms with the required data. 
 Table 3 describes the sample distribution of 140 corporate customers and suppliers of firms 
proposing horizontal assets sales between 1988 and 2005 by industry  The mean supplier market 
capitalization is $1.47 billion (in 2003 dollars), and the mean customer market capitalization is $41.15 
billion (in 2003 dollars) Thus, the mean divesting firm’s market capitalization is more than 7.34 times 
greater than its suppliers’ market capitalization, whereas, the typical customer firm in the sample has a 
market capitalization more than 3.81 times greater than the typical divesting firm in the sample. The 
relative size of the event firm in question and the supplier firm is similar to that of Fee and Thomas 
(2004) (8.57 times), while the relative size of the event firm in question and the customer firm is 
somewhat smaller compared to that of Fee and Thomas (2004) (6.93 times). This indicates that the 
database may be more efficient in testing hypotheses linked to purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing 
power rather than the reduced monopsonistic power, since I am more likely to capture less powerful 
customers and more powerful suppliers. The industries with the largest proportion of matches of 
customers and suppliers are the electronic equipment, petroleum and natural gas, wholesale, computers, 
machinery, and communications industries, respectively. The greatest proportion of customer firms come 
from the petroleum and natural gas industry, while the greatest proportion of supplier firms come from 
electronic equipment industry. This industry distribution of customers and suppliers is somewhat similar 
to that of divesting firms, with the exception of the healthcare industry. 
 The data employed to identify industry rivals for the divesting firms is also from the Compustat 
industry segment files. I identify rivals as any firm (excluding the parent, customer, or supplier firm) 
which reports the same historical four-digit SIC code as the parent firm with at least $5 million in market 
capitalization to reduce the impact of very small rivals, since I am examining asset sales of parent firms 
with at least $20 million in sales (in 1987 dollars). For the typical deal in the sample, I identify 67.63 
(50.84) single and multiple-segment (single-segment only) rival firms with the required data to compute 
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announcement period abnormal returns that is not substantially lower than comparable studies.6 Fee and 
Thomas (2004) consider the impact of horizontal mergers on single-segment and single and multiple 
segment rivals, whereas, Shahrur (2005) excludes them from his sample and considers only single-
segment rivals because they increase the power of the sample. I include single and multiple segment 
rivals to determine if horizontal asset sales have a differential impact on pure play firms versus diversified 
firms in the same industry, however, I consider that the results from the single-segment rival sample result 
in more power. 
2.3.3. Computing announcement period abnormal returns 
 Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004), I use standard event study methodology to 
compute abnormal returns for the parent, in addition to any firm classified as an industry rival, supplier, 
or customer of the divesting parent firm. The market model parameters are calculated over the 200 trading 
day period beginning at day -240 in relation to the announcement date. I require a minimum of 100 
trading over the trading days over the estimation period for a firm to be incorporated in the sample. 
Cumulate abnormal returns (CARs) are computed over the three-day window centered on the 
announcement date, and all significance tests are executed employing standardized prediction errors in 
accordance with similar studies. 
 With the purpose of investigating the cross-sectional differences, I consider each rival, customer, 
and supplier as one observation in the computation of abnormal returns. The returns of rivals, customers, 
and suppliers may be subject to event induced cross-sectional correlation (Eckbo, 1983; Fee and Thomas, 
2004; Shahrur, 2005; Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011). Consequently, I document results considering all 
rivals, customers, and suppliers, respectively, as equally weighted portfolios for each transaction. The 
equally weighted strategy is put forth to take into consideration the contemporaneous cross-sectional 
dependence in returns. I compute the abnormal returns to the parent rival, supplier, and customer 
portfolios for the same event windows as for the parent firm. 
2.3.4. Measuring changes if operating performance 
                                                     
6 Fee and Thomas report 75.55 industry competitors per average deal in their sample of merging firms. 
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 Following Fee and Thomas (2004), I utilize a matching-firm methodology so as to compare 
industry-adjusted pre- and post-divestiture operating performance and to account for mean reversion in 
operating performance metric. For completed divestiture deals, I explore the changes in operating 
performance for divesting firms and their customers and suppliers. I select matching firms for each of the 
divesting firms and their customers and suppliers contingent on industry, asset size, and preceding 
operating performance consistent with Barber and Lyon (1996) and performed by Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) and Fee and Thomas (2004). 
  This study performs the following matching algorithm. I begin with all firms on Compustat that 
are not included in the sample (i.e., parent, supplier, or customer) that have cash-flow (defined as 
operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12) data available for 
the same years as the firms in the sample (i.e., matching firms are obligated to have accessible data for the 
same time window around the divestiture as the firms in the sample). I identify the firms with same two-
digit SIC code as a sample firm, asset size at the close of year-1 relative to the divestiture between 25 
percent and 200 percent of the sample firm, and cash-flow to sales between 90 percent and 110 percent of 
the sample firm in the same year. I select the matching firm from these firms with the cash-flow to sales 
ratio nearest in magnitude to that of the sample firm. However, if no matching firm fulfills this 
requirement, I lessen the industry restrictions to necessitate only a match of the one-digit SIC code. Yet, if 
there continues to be no match, I remove the industry matching condition and match on size and 
performance. Ultimately, if I obtain no match after removing the industry matching condition, I eliminate 
the size restriction and match solely on performance. Considering the 221 firms in which an industry 
counterpart is pursued, 110 have matches at the two-digit level, 24 at the one digit level, 9 retaining size 
and performance, and 12 retaining only performance. 
 Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004), I predominantly measure operating performance 
using the cash-flow to sales ratio.  This ratio is computed for the sample firms and for the matching firms 
for one year preceding the divestiture and for each of the three years following the year in which the 
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divestiture is completed.7 For a given year, I delineate the industry-adjusted performance measure as the 
sample firm’s ratio less the benchmark ratio. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Fee and Thomas 
(2004), I concentrate on median values as a result of skewness and the underlying effect of outliers when 
employing accounting ratios. Other measures of operating performance include the cost of goods sold-to-
sales ratio, the employee to sales ratio, and selling, general and administrative expenses to sales ratio. 
2.4. Empirical results 
 In this section, I investigate the announcement period wealth effects of horizontal divestitures and 
changes in operating performance around horizontal divestitures in both univariate and multivariate 
frameworks. I develop univariate and multivariate analyses in an approach that improves the ability to 
differentiate amongst non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. 
2.4.1. Abnormal returns for all divestitures 
Table 4 documents the mean (median) abnormal returns for the samples of divesting firms, rival 
firms, corporate customers and suppliers. In Panel A of Table 4, I present the announcement period 
abnormal returns for the divesting firms in my sample. Panels B and C of Table 4 documents the 
abnormal returns to industry rivals at the divestiture announcement for single-segment portfolios and 
single- and multiple-segment industry rival portfolios, respectively, to capture any potential differential 
effects between pure-play versus diversified rivals. Panels D and E of Table 4 report the abnormal returns 
for individual customers firms (available for cross-sectional tests) and customer firm portfolios 
(constructed per divestiture transaction), correspondingly. Panels F and G in Table 4 report the abnormal 
returns for individual suppliers and supplier portfolios, respectively.  
For the total sample of horizontal divestitures, I report a mean (median) positive abnormal return 
of 1.58% (0.79%) to parent firms over the three-day window, significant at the 5% level using a t-test 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) on standardized prediction errors, and significantly more positive than 
negative abnormal returns, using a sign test. This evidence of positive mean abnormal returns is in 
                                                     
7 I compute this ratio for each year following the divestiture completion date, as well to be consistent with similar 
studies. Currently, I assume that each divestiture deal is completed within the three years following the divestiture 
proposal date. 
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accordance with prior divestiture studies using asset sales (Hite, Owers, and Rogers, 1987; John and 
Ofek, 1995; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro, 1995; Mulherin and Boone, 
2000; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2003). I present statistically significant (at the 10% level) mean 
abnormal returns of -1.09% for single segment rival portfolios for the entire sample, while the single- and 
multiple-segment rival portfolios earn a significant mean (median) abnormal return of -1.49% (-0.52%) at 
the 5% level. The evidence from Panel B and C is inconsistent with that of Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro 
(1995), who examine the impact of asset sell-offs of industry rivals and document a 0.04% mean excess 
return that is statistically insignificant. This inconsistency may be limited to the nature of horizontal asset 
sales, which produce a competitive effect amongst rivals. 
For the full sample of corporate customers of divesting firms, individual customer firms 
experience a median abnormal return of -0.96% at the 10% level of significance at announcement, and the 
individual and portfolio of customer firms experience significantly more negative than positive abnormal 
returns at 10% level of significance, at least. However, the parametric t-tests for customers report no 
significance for mean abnormal returns. For the entire sample of deals and subsamples of deals of 
downstream firms, individual suppliers and supplier portfolios have no significant share price effects to 
the divestiture announcement.  
To summarize the stock price reactions for the entire sample of divestitures, I find that divesting 
firms react positively; rivals and corporate customers respond negatively; while suppliers fail to generate 
share price reactions distinguishable from zero. The adverse reaction by only the single- and multiple-
segment industry rival portfolios sample indicate that horizontal sell-offs produce a competitive effect for 
industry rivals. The results for the entire sample of divestitures are consistent with the diseconomies of 
scale/efficiency hypothesis, which suggests that horizontal asset sales result in the divesting firm 
improving its efficiency by eliminating firm scale diseconomies and utilizing the divestiture as an 
opportunity to renegotiate contracts with their customers to become even more efficient. In addition, the 
divestiture results in the divesting firm improving its competitive position relative to its rivals. 
2.4.2. Abnormal returns for divestiture subsamples 
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In the spirit of Fee and Thomas (2004), I also present in Table 4 the abnormal returns for multiple 
subsamples of deals in which the product-market influence is anticipated to be noticeable. To distinguish 
Fee and Thomas (2004) capture large merger induced changes in industry concentration, resulting from 
horizontal acquisitions, as an increase greater than 100 in industry Herfindahl and a Herfindahl of 2000, 
respectively, for their sample. I employ a subsample of deals in which the pre-divestiture industry 
Herfindahl Index is greater than 1800, (Ind. Herf > 1800), to evaluate the impact of divestitures in 
concentrated industries.8 I also use a subsample of deals in which the pre-divestiture industry Herfindahl 
Index is less than or equal to 1800, (Ind. Herf <= 1800), to evaluate the impact of divestitures in less 
concentrated industries. Consistent with prior studies, I compute the Herfindahl Index as the sum of the 
squared market shares of the firms that operate in the industry (4-digit SIC code). To capture divestiture 
induced deals that produce a substantial change in industry Herfindahl or concentration (increased 
competition), I observe those deals that decrease the industry Herfindahl by more than 100 (∆ Ind. Herf. 
< -100). I also capture the deals that do not produce a substantial change in industry Herfindahl or 
concentration by observing those deals that do not decrease the industry Herfindahl by more than 100 (∆ 
Ind. Herf. >= -100). 
2.4.2.1. Abnormal returns for concentrated vs non-concentrated industries 
For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, Panel A of Table 4 documents that 
divesting firms experience a statistically significant average (median) abnormal return of 2.32% (1.04%) 
at announcement, in contrast, Panels B presents statistically significant mean (median) abnormal returns 
to single-segment rivals of -1.99% (-2.01%) at the 10% level of significance. In contrast for the 
subsample of deals in non-concentrated industries, Panel C of Table 4 presents mean (median) 
statistically significant single- and multiple-segment industry rivals of -1.51% (0.45%) at the 10% level of 
significance at announcement, indicating differential competitive effects for single segment and 
diversified rivals. Also for the subsample of deals in less concentrated industries, a sign test in Panel D of 
                                                     
8 An industry Herfindahl of 2000 is also used in untabulated results but reduces the number of observations in the 
subsample, decreasing the statistical power of the sample. The results are qualitatively similar but inferences are 
more difficult to substantiate. 
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Table 4 indicates that corporate customers experience significantly more negative abnormal returns than 
positive, at the 10% level of significance: suggesting that divestitures occurring in less concentrated 
industries are considered worse news for corporate customers than those that occur in more concentrated 
industries. For the subsample of deals in more concentrated industries, Panels F and G in Table 4 indicate 
no significant share price effects for corporate suppliers at announcement. To summarize the subsample 
of deals in concentrated industries, I find that divesting firms react positively at announcement, in 
contrast, single-segment rivals in concentrated industries respond negatively at announcement. However, 
diversified rivals react less negatively compared to diversified rivals in non-concentrated industries. 
Customers react less negatively compared to deals in less concentrated industries. Suppliers generate no 
significant reaction at announcement.  For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, the evidence 
partially supports the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power 
hypotheses and, to a lesser extent, the monopolistic collusion hypothesis, which suggests that divesting 
firms may potentially subject themselves to improvements in efficiency in concentrated industries, but 
customers in less concentrated. 
2.4.2.2. Abnormal returns for deals for deals with large declines in industry concentration vs. deals with 
no large decline in industry concentration 
To shed light on divestiture induced changes in industry concentration and, thus, its impact on the 
competitive landscape that divesting firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers face in response to this event, 
I compare deals that result in a large decrease in industry concentration (increasing degree of competition 
in the divesting industry) to those deals that do not result in a large decrease in industry concentration. In 
addition, by examining deals resulting in a large change in industry concentration, I can separate the 
effects for the product market competition, purchasing efficiency, monopolistic collusion and 
monopsonistic collusion hypotheses. For the subsample of divestiture deals that result in a large drop in 
industry concentration, Panel A of Table 4 reports that divesting firms earn a marginally significant mean 
(median) abnormal return of 2.50% (1.19%), which appears to be more positive than the subsample of 
deals that do not experience a large change in concentration. Also for the subsample of deals in industries 
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that do not experience a large decline in concentration, I find that divesting firms earn a slightly more 
positive than negative abnormal returns in response the event, at the 10% level of significance. For the 
subsample of deals that undergo a large reduction in industry Herfindahl, Panel B of Table 4 presents 
marginally significant mean abnormal returns to single-segment rivals of -1.87% at the 10% level of 
significance. In comparison for the subsample of deals in industries that do not experience a large decline 
in concentration, Panels C of Table 4 presents slightly significant mean (median) abnormal returns to 
single- and multiple segment rivals of -1.62% (-0.92%) at the 10% level of significance. These results 
reinforce the evidence of differential competitive reactions from single segment and diversified industry 
rivals at announcement of horizontal asset sales. For deals in industries that experience a large decline in 
industry concentration, Panels D and E of Table 4 report that individual customers and customer 
portfolios experience unfavorable median abnormal returns of -1.07% at announcement and significantly 
more negative than positive abnormal returns at the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
However, Panels F and G of Table 4 report no significant share price reactions for individual suppliers 
and supplier portfolios at announcement for this subsample of deals. The results for this subsample of 
deals indicates that horizontal divestitures potentially increase competition in the divesting industry, thus, 
reducing the likelihood that managers will be able to enjoy “the quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003). Accordingly, this increase in competition incentivizes managers to negotiate lower prices from 
suppliers or lower wages from unions and improve productivity. However, these improvements may be 
offset by a decline in buying power, suggesting that divesting firms experience waning bargaining power 
with suppliers. 
To summarize for the subsample of divestiture deals that result in a large decrease in industry 
concentration, divesting firms respond positively; single-segment rivals respond significantly; corporate 
customers react adversely, and suppliers do not react at all at announcement. These results provide mixed 
evidence to support the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power 
hypotheses. 
2.4.3.1. Abnormal operating performance for all divestitures 
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In this subsection, I provide additional tests for the hypotheses linked to the entire sample such as 
the industry demand hypothesis, financing hypothesis, diseconomies of scale hypothesis, and financial 
distress hypothesis using operating performance of the divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I report 
median industry-adjusted operating performance changes for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers in 
Table 5 using median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Panel A of Table 5 reports changes in median 
industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales for divesting firms. Panels B and C of Table 5 report changes in 
median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales for individual customer and customer portfolio, respectively. 
Changes are presented from the year preceding the divestiture to each of the three years subsequent to the 
divestiture, in addition to the median of the three year post-divestiture period.9 I use the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test to determine significance for changes in operating performance. I document evidence of 
significant operating performance deterioration for the entire sample of divesting firms.  
For the entire sample of deals, Panel A of Table 5 reports sign tests that indicate that divesting 
firms experience significantly more negative changes abnormal cash-flow margin during the post-
divestiture period and for the first two years immediately following the divestiture 10% level of 
significance, at least. Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate no significant changes in median industry-
adjusted cash flow margins for individual customers and customer portfolios, respectively. Panels D and 
E of Table 5 report, for the entire sample of deals, that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios 
experience a transitory increase in abnormal cash-flow margin in the immediately year subsequent to the 
divestiture of 3.75% and 4.01%, respectively, at the 10% level of significance. With respect to the results 
for the entire sample, one reason for the inconsistency between the positive abnormal returns and negative 
cash-flow performance is that some of the divesting firms may be motivated to conduct horizontal 
divestitures due to financial distress (but not all), but this effect may only be significant in the initial years 
subsequent to the divestiture and not beyond that. Investors of the divesting may perceive these negative 
cash flows to be short-term but place the firm in an overall better financial position. However, financial 
distress would not necessarily explain why suppliers experience a temporary increase in operating 
                                                     
9 See Fee and Thomas (2004) for a more detailed description. 
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performance. The increase in supplier operating performance may be attributed to a reduction in financing 
constraints for divesting firms or to suppliers taking advantage of the reduced bargaining power of 
divesting firms subsequent to the divestiture, which may also explain why divesting firms have negative 
cash flow performance subsequent to the divestiture. Finally, another explanation for the divergence in 
the results may be that the efficiency gains may offset adverse cash flow performance in the long term. In 
Section 2.4.4.1. below, I attempt to trace the sources of the gains of the divesting by examining other 
measures of operating performance to explain the positive abnormal returns for the entire sample. 
In sum for the entire sample of deals, divesting firms’ operating performance declines; customers’ 
operating performance does not change; and suppliers’ operating performance improves. This evidence 
provides mixed evidence in support of the financial distress hypothesis, diseconomies of scale hypothesis, 
and industry demand and financing hypothesis for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers, respectively. 
For the most part, these results are consistent with John and Ofek (1995) who note the underperformance 
(using operating margin performance) of a sample of 46 firms (56.8% the size of my sample) that divest 
non-focus increasing assets as a comparison sample to their sample of focus increasing firms. John and 
Ofek (1995) primarily focus their analysis on focus increasing asset sales, whereas, non-focus increasing 
asset sales is this study’s primary focus. 
2.4.3.2. Abnormal operating performance for deals in concentrated vs. non-concentrated industries 
For deals that occur in more concentrated industries, Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the median 
divesting firm experiences a statistically significant decrease in cash-flow margins of 1.39% during the 
post-divestiture period, significant at the 10% level, which is most prominent in the year immediately 
following the divestiture. Moreover, sign tests indicate more negative than positive changes in abnormal 
operating cash-flow margin during each of the years subsequent to the divestiture and general post-
divestiture performance of at least the 10% level of significance. For deals in concentrated industries, 
Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate no significant changes in operating performance for corporate 
customers. So far the results indicate that the reduced operating performance for divesting firms cannot be 
attributed to a decrease in monopoly rents, since customers fail to experience any favorable increases in 
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operating performance due to increase quantities or reduced prices. Additionally, the results for the 
operating performance of the divesting firm rules out the notion that divestitures in concentrated 
industries enhance competition and thus managerial productivity. For deals in less concentrated 
industries, Panels D and E of Table 5 indicate that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios improve 
cash-flow margins in the year immediately following the divestiture and for the post-divestiture period, in 
general, by at least 5.06%, at the 10% level of significance. For deals in more concentrated industries, 
supplier post-divestiture performance is lower relative to that in less concentrated industries. Since 
supplier operating performance appears to increase subsequent to deals in less concentrated industries 
relative to deals in more concentrated industries, the evidence rules out the monopsonistic collusion 
hypothesis, which suggests that suppliers benefit from higher prices subsequent to divestiture deals in 
more concentrated industries. The evidence from this subsample appears to support the purchasing 
inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis, which suggests that divesting firms are unable to switch 
to more efficient suppliers. As a result, horizontal divestitures in concentrated industries erode the 
bargaining power of divesting firms resulting lower operating performance because suppliers experience 
an improvement in bargaining power. The improvement in cash flow performance for suppliers is more 
pronounced for deals in less concentrated industries because suppliers can more readily exert their 
increased market power over less powerful divesting firms. 
Overall for deals in concentrated industries, operating performance declines for divesting firms; 
there is no change in operating performance for customers; and supplier performance is more negative or 
does not change. However, suppliers experience improvements in operating performance subsequent to 
deals in less concentrated industries due to a deterioration in divesting firm buying power. Thus, the 
evidence for the changes in operating performance in concentrated industries relative to non-concentrated 
industries seems to be most consistent with the purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power 
hypothesis. 
2.4.3.3. Abnormal operating performance for deals that result in large declines in industry concentration 
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Similar to section 2.4.2.2. above, this section of the paper further investigates the impact of 
divestiture induced changes in industry concentration and its effect on the competitive environment with 
respect to the operating performance of divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I compare the change in 
operating performance of these stakeholders by examining divestiture deals that result in a large decrease 
in industry concentration (increasing degree of competition in the divesting industry) to those deals that 
do not result in a large decrease in industry concentration. For deals that occur in industries that do not 
experience a large change industry Herfindahl or concentration, sign tests in Panel A of Table 5 suggest 
that divesting firms display slightly more negative than positive changes in abnormal operating cash-flow 
margin during the first two years subsequent to the divestiture, which disappears thereafter. For deals that 
occur in industries that do experience a large change in industry Herfindahl or concentration, sign tests in 
Panel A of Table 5 suggest that divesting firms display significantly more negative than positive changes 
in abnormal operating cash-flow margin during the third year subsequent to the divestiture and during the 
post-divestiture period in general that are significant at the 5% level of significance. For deals that occur 
in industries that do experience a large change industry concentration, Panels B and C of Table 5 present 
no significant changes in abnormal cash-flows margin for corporate customers. 
For deals that occur in industries that experience a large change industry concentration, Panel D 
of Table 5 indicate that individual suppliers experience significantly more negative than positive changes 
in abnormal cash flow margin in the second year subsequent to the divestiture. The evidence indicates 
that suppliers react more negatively, with respect operating performance, for deals that result in a large 
decrease in industry concentration relative to those deals that do not result in a large change in 
concentration, as shown in Panels D and E of Table 5. The results fail to support the monopolistic and 
monopsonistic collusion hypotheses, which posit that divesting firms are no longer able to earn 
monopsony or monopoly rents as a result of reduced market power since suppliers experience adverse 
rather than favorable operating performance and customers fail to experience significant positive 
performance subsequent to divestitures in industries that experience a large change in concentration. 
However, the evidence is mixed in favor of the product market competition hypothesis. On the one hand, 
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operating performance is negative for divesting firms in industries that experience a large change in the 
competitive environment. On the other hand, suppliers experience adverse operating performance 
subsequent to deals in industries that experience a large change in the competitive landscape, which 
suggests that divesting firms appear to negotiate with these suppliers more aggressively due to enhanced 
competitive pressures. Alternatively, these could also indicate that divesting firms in industries that 
experience a large change in concentration suffer greater purchasing inefficiencies with respect to 
suppliers, leading to negative performance due to a greater incapability to shift to more efficient suppliers. 
In turn, suppliers may achieve higher prices from divesting firms at the expense of selling lower 
quantities to divesting firm post-divestiture—leading adverse supplier performance. 
To summarize deals that compose a large percentage of the industry, divesting firms display a 
delayed negative reaction, in general; customer performance does not change; and supplier performance 
deteriorates temporarily. Overall, the evidence, for these deals, is consistent with the purchasing 
inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis and, to a much lesser extent, product market competition 
hypothesis. 
2.4.3. Identifying sources of losses/gains 
In the subsequent section, this study attempts to trace the sources of gains/losses or 
improvement/deterioration in abnormal returns and cash-flow performance to the divesting firms by 
investigating the variation in alternative measures of operating performance such as: cost of goods sold 
(Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12); selling, general, and administrative expense (SG&A) 
(Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item 12); employees (Compustat item 29) to sales (Compustat 
item 12), and the wage-to-sales ratio.10 Table 6 documents the sources of gains/losses in abnormal returns 
and cash flow performance to the divesting firms and measures significance of performance using 
Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests and sign tests. 
2.4.4.1. Identifying sources of losses/gains for all divestiture deals 
                                                     
10 I take the product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) and the national average wage obtained 
from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu and Tüzel, 2014). 
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For the entire sample of divestitures, Panel A of Table 6 presents sign tests that indicate divesting 
firms experience slightly more positive (43) than negative (27) changes in median industry-adjusted 
operating cost of goods sold-to-sales during the post-divestiture period (year-1 to median post-
divestiture), at the 10% level of significance. This suggests that more firms experience abnormal increases 
in input costs than those that experience abnormal decreases in input costs. Also for these deals, Panel B 
of Table 6 reports that the median divesting firm experiences a 1.15% transitory increase in median-
industry adjusted SG&A expense-to-sales, at the 10% level of significance in the third year subsequent to 
the divestiture. This evidence indicates that there is slight and temporary increase in overhead costs. Panel 
C of Table 6 indicates that, for the entire sample, the median divesting firm undergoes a marginal decline 
(10% level of significance) of median industry-adjusted employee to sales of 0.03 but experiences no 
significant changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted wage-to-sales in the year immediately 
following the asset sale. However, Panel D of Table 6 indicates no detectable changes in median industry-
adjusted average wage-to-sales. Also, changes in customer median industry-adjusted cost of goods sold-
to-sales subsequent to the upstream divestiture are not statistically significant (not reported in tables).  
Panels E and F of Table 6 document the evidence from the changes in individual customer and 
customer portfolio median industry-adjusted cost of goods sold-to-sales in order to investigate the 
influence of upstream divestitures of customers’ input costs subsequent to the divestiture. For the entire 
sample of divestitures, there are no statistically distinguishable changes in median industry-adjusted cost 
of goods sold-to-sales following the upstream divestiture. 
Summarizing the analysis of the sources of gains/losses for the entire sample of deals, I document 
that abnormal input and overhead costs negatively impact operating performance of the median 
divestiture around the announcement of horizontal asset sales, which slightly offsets the reduction of 
median industry-adjusted employees-to-sales. One interpretation for these results is that divesting firms 
attempt to reduce financial distress via horizontal asset sales, but this interpretation does not explain the 
temporary increases in supplier cash flow performance. Another explanation for these results is that 
divesting firms attempt reduce scale diseconomies and financing constraints by reducing the firm’s labor 
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intensity, but horizontal divestitures also subjects the firm to temporary side effects such as increases in 
input and administrative costs in the near term. In conjunction with the results from divesting firm 
abnormal returns, the results indicate that the positive abnormal returns can be attributed primarily to 
gains from labor related efficiencies `and that the market perceives these gains to be greater than the 
reduced abnormal cash flows (resulting from input and overhead costs) in the long-run. 
2.4.4.2. Identifying sources of losses/gains for deals in concentrated vs. non-concentrated industries  
In the following section, I trace the sources of changes in operating performance by likening the 
subsample of deals that occur in concentrated industries to those that occur in less concentrated industries. 
For subsample of deals in concentrated industries, Panel B of Table 6 documents that divesting firms 
experience a statistically significant 0.39% decrease in SG&A expense margin during the post-divestiture 
period at the 10% level of significance and more abnormal reductions in SG&A expense-to-sales than 
abnormal increases during the second year following the divestiture and the general post-divestiture 
period (year-1 to median post-divestiture). For the subsample of deals that occur in less concentrated 
industries, the median divestiture results in an economically and statistically significant increase of 1.59% 
in SG&A expense-to-sales post-divestiture at the 10% level of significance. Also for the subsample of 
deals that occur in less concentrated industries, the median divesture experiences a statistically and 
economically significant increase of, at least, 2.00% in SG&A costs during the second and third years 
subsequent to the divestiture and significantly more increases in abnormal SG&A expense-to-sales than 
decreases in abnormal SG&A expense-to-sales in the third year subsequent to the divestiture. For the 
subsample of deals that occur in less concentrated industries, Panel C of Table 6 the median divesting 
firm experiences an economically and statistically significant decrease of 0.06 in industry median-
adjusted employees-to-sales during the post-divestiture period at the 10% level of significance, which is 
most noticeable during the first year subsequent to the divestiture. The results indicate that divesting firms 
in concentrated industries are able to improve their efficiency with respect to overhead costs and labor 
intensity, suggesting that efficiency gains come primarily from labor related factors despite the overall 
adverse cash flow performance. These efficiency gains in operating performance help to support the 
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positive abnormal returns exhibited by the divesting firms in concentrated industries and, perhaps, offset 
the decline in operating performance stemming from the increase in input costs attributed to a loss in 
bargaining power with suppliers. 
For the subsample of deals in concentrated industries, individual customers and customer 
portfolios experience a significant increase in median abnormal input costs of 1.59% at the 5% level of 
significance, whereas for the subsample of deals in non-concentrated industries, individual customers 
experience significantly more negative than positive changes in costs of goods sold to sales in the third 
year subsequent to the divestiture. Taken in conjunction with the increase supplier cash flow performance 
subsequent to deals in less concentrated industries and the decrease in divesting firm cash flow 
performance subsequent to deals in concentrated industries, this evidence suggests that divesting firms in 
concentrated industries appear to share increased input costs with their customers in response to 
increasing purchasing inefficiencies stemming from reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Overall the 
evidence from this customer subsample fails to support the monopolistic and monopolistic collusion 
hypotheses but also provides direct evidence for the purchasing inefficiency hypothesis and indirect 
evidence in support the product market competition hypothesis. 
Post-divestiture overhead costs appear to be declining in concentrated industries while increasing 
in less concentrated industries, which may make it difficult to detect changes in abnormal overhead costs 
for the entire sample. In other words, the evidence may support two competing effects. For instance, 
horizontal divestitures may increase the firm’s susceptibility to competitive pressures with enhance 
managerial incentives to increase firm value but also come at a cost in the form of reduced bargaining 
power with suppliers. Furthermore, post-divestiture labor intensity (employee to sales) for deals in 
concentrated industries appears to decline more than deals in non-concentrated industries. For deals in 
concentrated industries, these changes in operating performance seem to enhance operating performance 
and serve as a source of gains for divesting firms compared to less concentrated industries. For deals in 
concentrated industries, post-divestiture customer input costs increase temporarily, while post-divestiture 
customer input costs decrease temporarily for deals in less concentrated industries. To summarize the 
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comparison of deals in concentrated industries and less concentrated industries, the evidence tends to 
favor the product market competition and purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power hypotheses. 
2.4.4.3. Identifying sources of losses/gains for deals with large declines in industry concentration vs. 
deals with no large decline in industry concentration 
Next, I attempt to identify the sources of gains/losses by comparing various measures of 
operating performance for divestiture deals that in large changes in industry Herfindahl to those that do 
not result in a large change in industry concentration. A sign test in Panel A of Table 6 suggests that 
divesting firms experience significantly more abnormal increases in input costs than abnormal decreases 
in input costs, at the 5% level of significance, during the post-divestiture period. For the subsample of 
deals in industries that do not experience a large change in industry Herfindahl, divesting firms undergo a 
1.59% increase in median industry-adjusted SG&A expenses to sales in third year following the 
divestiture and significantly more positive changes in median industry-adjusted SG&A expense-to-sales 
in the second year subsequent to the divestiture.  
For the subsample of deals that experience a large change in industry Herfindahl, divesting firms 
realize a transitory 0.03 decrease in employee to sales at 5% level of significance, and a sign test indicates 
that divesting firms experience significantly more negative changes in median industry-adjusted 
employees-to-sales during the post-divestiture period (year-1 to median post-divestiture), at the 5% level 
of significance. Therefore, these results suggest that divestiture deals that result in a large reduction in 
industry concentration (potentially improving competition) reduce or maintain normal input costs, 
overhead costs, labor intensity, and wage expenses, in contrast, divestiture deals that do not result in a 
large reduction in industry concentration increase or maintain normal input costs, overhead costs, labor 
intensity, and wage expenses. The evidence in this subsample suggest that the source of the positive 
abnormal returns may be likely attributed to the reduction of financing constraints and labor-related 
factors and/or scale diseconomies. The observable gains appear to be enhanced by substantial changes in 
the competitive environment, which seem to enhance managerial efficiency and effort to bring down 
labor-related and overhead costs. The market appears to perceive that the efficiency changes may 
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outweigh the increases in abnormal input costs in the long-run, suggesting that fixed costs and labor 
intensity may be more important factors when downsizing firms to alleviate financing constraints and 
diseconomies of scale. Overall for this subsample of deals, the evidence appears to substantiate the 
product market competition hypothesis and suggest that these deals may be motivated by financing 
constraints and firm scale concerns. 
2.4.4. Corporate customer abnormal returns and changes in operating performance: customer 
concentration and switching costs 
The subsequent section investigates the influence of customer market structure and switching 
costs on corporate customer financial and operating performance. By examining customer concentration, I 
can further explore the monopolistic collusion hypothesis, which suggests that customers in more 
concentrated industries are likely to respond more positively to horizontal divestitures compared to those 
in less concentrated industries due to the decreased capacity of industry rivals and divesting firms to 
coordinate a reduction in output and higher prices. In contrast, investigating customer switching costs 
allows me to further test the diseconomies of scale/efficiency and purchasing inefficiency/countervailing 
power hypotheses. The diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis suggests that divesting firms will 
utilize horizontal divestitures, also, as an opportunity to improve the efficiency of contracting 
relationships by adjusting prices upward on customers with high switching costs. Alternatively, divesting 
firms may prefer to satisfy and assure customers vital to their business (customers with high switching 
costs) that quality and service subsequent to the divesture will not decline but choose to take advantage of 
customers less vital to the divesting firm’s survival (customers with low switching costs). With respect to 
the purchasing inefficiency hypothesis, divesting firms may pass along potentially higher input costs to 
their customers. Customers with high switching costs may have a strong customer-supplier relationship, 
and thus, divesting firms may pass these costs along to customers with lower switching costs. Then again, 
divesting firms may act opportunistically and pass these costs along to those customers with higher 
switching costs. 
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Table 7 presents the performance differences for several subsamples of corporate customers: non-
concentrated customers versus concentrated customers; and reliant customers (high switching costs) 
versus non-reliant (low switching costs) customers. Panels A and B of Table 7 compares the performance 
differences of individual customers and customer portfolios between non-concentrated customer 
industries and concentrated customer industries, respectively, in order to evaluate the impact of customer 
market structure on customer gains/losses. Panels C and D of Table 7 compares the performance 
differences of individual customers and customer portfolios between reliant and non-reliant customers.  
2.4.5.1. Customer concentration 
First, the role of customer concentration of customer financial and operating performance is 
examined. Individual non-concentrated customers react adversely at announcement experiencing median 
abnormal returns of -1.07%, at the 10% level of significance. Although non-concentrated individual 
customers and customer portfolios experience more negative than positive abnormal returns than 
concentrated customers, the difference in abnormal returns and operating performance around the 
divestiture announcement is negligible. The performance differences between the concentrated and non-
concentrated customer subsamples are not significant and fail to support the monopolistic collusion 
hypothesis, which indicates that customers in more concentrated industries are likely to react more 
positively to horizontal divestitures from upstream firms compared to those in less concentrated industries 
due to the decreased capacity of industry rivals and divesting firms to coordinate a reduction in output and 
higher prices. 
2.4.5.2. Customer switching costs 
Panels C and D of Table 7 compare the performance differences of individual customers and 
customer portfolios between non-reliant customers and reliant customers, respectively, in order to assess 
the impact of customer switching costs on customer gains/losses. Non-reliant individual customers and 
customer portfolios experience significantly (at the 10% level) more negative median abnormal returns 
and more negative than positive (at the 5% level) abnormal returns than reliant customers. The difference 
in abnormal returns for these subsamples at divestiture announcement is insignificant. None of the 
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customer subsamples display significant changes in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales nor any 
significant differences in operating performance between reliant and non-reliant customers. The evidence 
from the reliant and non-reliant customer subsamples suggests that, perhaps, horizontal asset sales are less 
beneficial for non-essential customers than those with strong customer-supplier relationships. With 
respect to the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis, the results suggest that divesting firms choose 
to satisfy and reassure customers vital to their business that quality and service subsequent to the 
divesture will not decline but, instead, opt to take advantage of customers less important to the divesting 
firm’s survival.  Additionally, the evidence indicates some support for the purchasing inefficiency / 
countervailing power hypothesis, which indicates that divesting firms choose to maintain strong 
customer-supplier relationships with customers with higher switching costs (relationship specific 
investments) and pass along potentially higher costs to customers that are not as invested in divesting 
firm’s business. Overall, the evidence is slightly consistent with the diseconomies of scale/efficiency and 
the purchasing inefficiency/countervailing power hypotheses. 
2.4.6. Supplier abnormal returns and changes in operating performance: supplier concentration, 
supplier retention decisions, and supplier switching costs 
The following section investigates the impact of supplier concentration, supplier retention, and 
supplier switching costs on supplier performance. By examining supplier concentration, I can extend our 
investigation of the monopsonistic collusion hypothesis, which posits that the benefits of reduced 
monopsony rents will most likely be revealed in less concentrated supplier industries. Supplier switching 
costs allow me to continue examining the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis, which indicates 
that divesting firms will opportunistically seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers with 
high switching costs. I also investigate the decision to retain a supplier subsequent to the divestiture rather 
than terminating the relationship subsequent to the event to help us further explore the product market 
competition hypothesis, which suggests that managers subject to divestiture induced increased 
competition will likely terminate ineffective suppliers, reducing supplier profitability and value. 
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Table 8 presents the results of logit analysis of the supplier termination decision and the 
performance differences for several subsamples of suppliers. The logit analysis in Panel A of Table 8 will 
allow me to further investigate the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis to determine if the gains 
from the divestiture are linked to supplier termination decision. In addition, the logit analysis of the 
supplier termination decision allows me to explore whether substantial changes in industry concentration 
or industry concentration influences the supplier termination decision by divesting firms to investigate the 
product market competition hypothesis. Lastly, the logit analysis can provide additional insight on 
whether cash deals mitigate financing frictions and, thus, the decision to terminate suppliers. Panels B and 
C of Table 8 compares the performance differences of individual suppliers and supplier portfolios 
between non-concentrated supplier industries and concentrated supplier industries, respectively, to assess 
the impact of supplier market structure on supplier performance.  Panels D and E of Table 8 compare the 
performance differences of individual suppliers and supplier portfolios between terminated and retained 
suppliers, respectively, to assess supplier retention decisions and efficiency motivations. Panels F and G 
of Table 8 presents the performance differences between suppliers that report a single large customer and 
those that report more than one large customer for individual suppliers and supplier portfolios, 
respectively, in order to evaluate supplier switching costs. 
2.4.6.1. Logit analysis of supplier of termination decision: multivariate evidence 
First, in Panel A of Table 8, I present the results of the logit regression in which the dependent 
variable is a binary variable that is equal to one if the supplier is terminated in the year following the 
divestiture and zero otherwise. I include only firms that have non-missing individual abnormal returns for 
divesting firms and suppliers. Explanatory variables of the logit regression include divesting firm 
abnormal returns, divesting firm deal characteristics, product market relationship characteristics, and 
environmental factors. Deal characteristics include relative size of the transaction and method of payment. 
Product market relationship characteristics examined are supplier switching costs and the length of the 
relationship between the customer and supplier. I also incorporate environmental factors that describe the 
competitive landscape such as: supplier industry concentration; divesting firm industry concentration; and 
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deals that result in large changes in industry concentration. Divesting firm abnormal returns are the three-
day mean cumulative abnormal returns centered on the divestiture announcement using the market-model. 
Suppliers with single large customer is defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer 
in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Supplier industry concentration is a binary variable which 
is equal to one if the supplier industry Herfindahl is greater than 1800 and zero otherwise. Relative deal 
size is the ratio of deal transaction value to the market value of common equity in the year prior to the 
divestiture. Cash is a binary variable that is equal to one if the method of payment was cash and is equal 
to zero otherwise. Relationship duration is the number of years in which there has been a consistent 
reported customer-supplier relationship in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Industry Herf > 
1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture 
Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change 
in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100.  
The primary variable of interest, ∆ Industry Herf <-100, is significant and positive, suggesting 
that divestitures that result in a more competitive environment are more likely to lead to the termination 
of a supplier relationship post-divestiture. However, Industry Herf >1800 is not significant, which 
suggest that the degree of change in the competitive environment and not the level of concentration is 
important to the supplier termination decision. This finding authenticates the product market competition 
hypothesis, indicating that divesting firms eliminate less efficient suppliers post-divestiture due to 
increased product market pressures. I also show that variable Divesting firm abnormal returns is positive 
and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that divesting firms’ gains at announcement are positively 
associated with the supplier termination decision. This finding supports the notion that the value 
perceived by investors at divestiture announcement may be driven by not only asset sales assets but also 
by eliminating inefficient or less essential suppliers.  
Relationship duration is positive and significant, at the 5% level of significance, which suggests 
that the greater the length of the supplier customer relationship the more likely the divesting firm is to 
sever ties with the supplier. In addition, Suppliers with single large customer is positive and significant at 
48 
 
 
 
the 10% level of significance suggesting that divesting firms are more likely to terminate suppliers with 
high switching costs or those that depend solely on the divesting firm. Collectively, the results with 
respect to Relationship duration and Suppliers with single large customer in the logit regression and 
univariate results for the industry-adjusted employee-to-sales ratio indicate that the divesting firm is 
increasing efficiency and value by breaking implicit contracts with various stakeholders, suppliers of 
labor and inputs. These results also help to substantiate the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis. 
Cash is negative and significant, which suggests that cash deals lessen the probability of 
terminating a supplier relationship. This result may suggest that the divesting firm has improved its 
liquidity and loosened its financial constraints, such that it is more likely to retain suppliers than terminate 
them. Supplier industry concentration and Relative deal size are insignificant and suggest that neither 
supplier market power nor the size of the divestiture deal influence the likelihood of the divesting firm 
terminating the supplier subsequent to the divestiture deal.  
Overall, I make several findings from the logit multivariate analysis. I find that deals that result in 
large increases in the competitive environment in the divesting industry increase the probability of the 
supplier being terminated subsequent to the deal. In addition, higher divesting firm abnormal returns are 
positively associated with the supplier termination decision, suggesting divesting firms create value by 
eliminating less essential suppliers. Divesting firms also appear to be more likely to terminate long-term 
supplier relationships and those suppliers with greater switching costs, which suggests that divesting firm 
attempt to increase efficiency and value by breaking implicit contracts with suppliers of labor (refer to 
section 2.4.4.1. or Panel C of Table 6) and inputs. Jointly, these results support the product market 
competition hypothesis and, indirectly, the diseconomies of scale / efficiency hypothesis. 
2.4.6.2. Supplier concentration: univariate results 
Next, the role of supplier concentration on supplier stock price and operating performance is 
assessed. Sign tests in Panel B of Table 8 indicate that non-concentrated individual suppliers experience 
slightly (at the 10% level) more negative than positive abnormal returns than concentrated individual 
suppliers, but the difference in abnormal returns at divestiture announcement is insignificant. Sign tests in 
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Panel B of Table 8 indicate that, not only do, concentrated supplier portfolios experience slightly (at the 
10% level) more positive than negative abnormal returns than non-concentrated supplier portfolios, but 
the difference in median abnormal returns of 2.09% at divestiture announcement is marginally significant 
as well. The evidence is inconsistent with the notion that non-concentrated suppliers are more likely to 
receive the benefits of reduced monopsony rents and, thus, fail to support the monopsonistic collusion 
hypothesis. However, the results indirectly support the idea that concentrated suppliers are more able to 
exploit divesting firms and take advantage of reduced countervailing power by temporarily improving 
supplier profitability relative to non-concentrated suppliers. Hence, I identify indirect evidence in support 
of the purchasing inefficiency/reduced countervailing power hypothesis. Overall, evidence from Panels B 
and C of Table 8 indicates that concentrated suppliers compared to non-concentrated suppliers benefit 
from downstream divestitures, while non-concentrated suppliers appear to be disadvantaged by 
downstream horizontal asset sales. 
2.4.6.3. Supplier retention versus termination: univariate results 
Subsequently, the financial effects of retention and termination decisions on suppliers are 
evaluated, similar to Fee and Thomas (2004). Panels D and E of Table 8 reports that though terminated 
individual suppliers experience substantial deterioration in post-divestiture median industry-adjusted 
cash-flow margins of -12.08%, the retained individual suppliers experience significant improvement in 
post-divestiture median industry-adjusted cash-flow margins of 5.46%. The difference in post-divestiture 
median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales of 17.54% between terminated and retained individual 
suppliers is highly significant. Panel E of Table 8 indicates that terminated supplier portfolios experience 
significant adverse mean (median) abnormal returns of -3.36% (-1.83%) at divestiture announcement, 
whereas retained supplier portfolios insignificant abnormal returns at divestiture announcement. Although 
terminated supplier portfolios experience trivial changes in median abnormal operating performance, 
retained supplier portfolios experience a significant boost in cash-flows of 5.91%. Similar to the evidence 
in Panel D, Panel E of Table 8 indicates that the difference in cash-flows between terminated and retained 
supplier portfolios is 12.94% and is decidedly significant. In conjunction with the results from the logit 
50 
 
 
 
regression in Panel A of Table 8 in which ∆ Industry Herf <-100 is significant and positively associated 
with the supplier termination decision, the evidence suggests divestitures that result in a large reduction in 
industry concentration are more likely to terminate a supplier relationship post-divestiture. This finding 
validates the product market competition hypothesis, indicating that divesting firms eliminate less 
efficient suppliers post-divestiture due to increased product market pressures. The results from the 
supplier retention and termination subsamples are similar to those of horizontal mergers (Fee and 
Thomas, 2004) but seem to be somewhat larger in magnitude (perhaps due to the difference in sample 
sizes). The results in Panels D and E of Table 8 substantiate support for the product market competition 
hypothesis. 
2.4.6.4. Supplier switching costs: univariate results 
Next, the role of switching costs on supplier performance is assessed. Panels F and G of Table 8 
indicate that individual suppliers and supplier portfolios with a single large reported customer experience 
adverse median abnormal returns of -1.77% and -2.27%, respectively, at the 10% level of significance, 
while suppliers with multiple large customers do not experience a significant reaction at announcement. 
Also, the difference in mean abnormal returns between suppliers with a single large customer and 
suppliers that report more than one large customer for individual suppliers and supplier portfolio is at 
least 2.21% at the 5% level of significance. In addition, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that the 
difference in median abnormal returns between suppliers with a single large customer and suppliers that 
report more than one large customer for individual suppliers is 1.96%. Panel G of Table 8 documents that 
supplier portfolios with multiple large customers experience more improvements in median industry-
adjusted cash flows than supplier portfolios with a single large customer, however, the difference in cash 
flows around the divestiture announcement is negligible. The evidence from the proxies for supplier high 
and low switching cost subsamples suggest that downstream horizontal asset sales are detrimental to 
suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier portfolios with lower 
switching costs. In sum, these results tend to support the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis, 
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which designates that divesting firms resourcefully seek to improve contracting efficiencies with suppliers 
by taking exploiting those with high switching costs. 
2.4.7. Divesting firms: multivariate results 
For completeness, Table 9 reports the multivariate regressions that explain divesting parent firms 
abnormal returns and changes in median industry adjusted changes in operating performance. The 
dependent variable for Columns (1) – (12) in Table 9 is the abnormal returns for divesting parent firms at 
announcement. In Column (1), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture TOBINS_Q. The estimated 
coefficient on TOBINS_Q is negative and significant, which is the anticipated sign under the industry 
demand hypothesis. It suggests that low productivity firms/performing firms have higher abnormal 
returns at the announcement.  
In Column (2), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture NEED_FOR_FUNDS. The 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant, which is the anticipated sign under the financing 
hypothesis. It indicates that firms with high financial constraints have higher returns at announcement. In 
Column (3), the independent variable is the pre-divestiture ALTMAN_Z_SCORE. The coefficient on 
ALTMAN_Z_SCORE is negative and insignificant. Therefore, I fail to document evidence in support of 
the financial distress hypothesis. 
In Column (4), the independent variable is pre-divestiture COGSSALE. The coefficient is positive 
and insignificant and fails to support the diseconomies of scale hypothesis. In Column (5), the 
independent variable is pre-divestiture EMPSALE and the coefficient is marginally significant and 
positive, suggesting evidence in favor of the diseconomies of scale hypothesis. In Column (6), the 
independent variable is pre-divestiture WAGESALE. In Column (7), the independent variable is pre-
divestiture SGASALE. The coefficient on SGASALE is positive and marginally significant, which provides 
additional support for the diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypothesis.  
In Column (8), I include the indicator variable for significant concentration in addition to the 
indicator for divestitures that result in substantial decreases in industry concentration, Ind. Herf.>1800 
and ∆ Ind. Herf <-100, respectively. The coefficients on Ind. Herf.>1800 and ∆ Ind. Herf <-100 are 
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positive insignificant. In Column (9), I include variables pertaining to deal characteristics REL_SIZE, 
CASH, and, SAME_INDUSTRY. REL_SIZE is the net transaction value of the asset sale scaled by the 
prior year’s market value of equity. The coefficient on REL_SIZE is positive and significant, suggesting 
that larger transactions signal more positive news to shareholders. CASH is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the deal was all cash deal, and equal to zero otherwise. CASH is positive and significant 
suggesting that cash transactions are positive signals by sellers, which is consistent with Slovin, Sushka, 
and Poloncheck (2005). This may also indicate that cash deals help to reduce firm financing constraints. 
SAME_INDUSTRY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the division/segment/business unit was 
sold to an acquirer with same four-digit SIC code and equal to zero, otherwise. I anticipate the coefficient 
on SAME_INDUSTRY to be negative due to the fact that this type of deal would just redistribute market 
power amongst firms in the same industry and offset the gains via the divestiture. The coefficient on 
SAME_INDUSTRY is negative and insignificant. 
In Column (10), I omit the variables NEED_FOR_FUNDS and COGSSALE due to 
multicollinearity with SGASALE and EMPSALE, respectively. I omit WAGESALE because it is 
mechanically related to EMPSALE. The coefficients on EMPSALE and SGASALE are significant and 
positive, while t-statistics suggest that firms with higher labor intensity are more important to value 
creation for divesting firms than overhead costs. However, both coefficients support the diseconomies of 
scale/efficiency hypothesis and to a lesser extent the financing hypothesis due to the influence of 
SGASALE on financial constraints.  
In Column (11), I add the variables NEED_FOR_FUNDS and COGSSALE and omit the variable 
SGASALE. NEED_FOR_FUNDS is significant and positive, which provides strong support the financing 
hypothesis. COGSSALE is significant and negative, which suggest that divesting firms with high input 
costs leads to lower abnormal returns. This evidence suggests that horizontal divestitures may subject 
divesting firms to higher rents from suppliers.  
In Column (12), I replace the variable EMPSALE with WAGESALE. WAGESALE and 
NEED_FOR_FUNDS are both positive and significant, while COGSSALE is negative and significant. 
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However, SGASALE is no longer significant, which likely due to the multicollinearity. These results are 
consistent with those from Columns (10) and Column (11). Therefore the multivariate results in Table 8 
allow us to evaluate the relative importance between the hypotheses and identify the sources of value 
creation and destruction.  
Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns present strong support for the financing 
hypothesis and diseconomies of scale/efficiency conjectures. These results also indicate that firms with 
higher pre-divestiture input costs will likely result negative abnormal returns. This result suggests further 
corroboration of purchasing inefficiencies / countervailing power hypothesis as well. These results also 
indicate that cash deal consideration adds value for divesting firms by potentially mitigating divesting 
firm financing constraints. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the upstream and downstream product market impact of a sample of 
horizontal asset sales from 1988 through 2005. I construct a data set that identifies corporate customers, 
suppliers, and rival firms from a sample of firms proposing horizontal asset sales. I employ this data set to 
explore the announcement related stock price reactions and post-divestitures changes in abnormal 
operating performance. Multivariate analysis of divesting firm abnormal returns at announcement suggest 
that the gains from horizontal asset sales arise from the elimination of divesting firm bureaucracy and 
relaxation of financing constraints. In addition, I document that environmental factors matter when 
considering horizontal divestitures. I present evidence that substantial divestiture activity promotes 
positive changes in the competitive environment, which enhances managerial incentives to increase firm 
productivity and reduced factor costs. However, I urge mangers, who ponder undertaking horizontal asset 
sales, to consider the risks associated with this event such as potential erosion of purchasing efficiencies 
that may arise from reduced bargaining power relative to powerful suppliers. The evidence indicates that 
horizontal asset sales tend to be wealth generating events for divesting firms, but the analysis of 
stakeholder wealth effects suggest that these events are perceived as bad news for less competitive rivals, 
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customers less essential to the divesting firm’s production process, and suppliers with high switching 
costs. 
Multivariate analyses of divesting firm abnormal returns present strong support for the financing 
and diseconomies of scale/efficiency hypotheses. The evidence indicates that firms with high pre-
divestiture labor intensity and financing constraints are associated higher abnormal returns at 
announcement. However, firms with higher pre-divestiture input costs are inversely related to abnormal 
returns at announcement. This evidence suggests that horizontal divestitures may reduce firm 
countervailing power, leading to bargaining disadvantages with suppliers and, thus, increased input costs. 
This study complements prior studies on countervailing power (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; 
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011), indicating that substantial horizontal deconsolidation activity may 
weaken divesting firm countervailing power relative to powerful suppliers. 
Next, this study provides evidence that the competitive landscape matters when considering 
horizontal asset sales. Divestiture deals that compose a large percent of the industry enhance competition, 
are associated with reduced abnormal labor intensity and employee related expenses, but are exposed to 
increased abnormal input costs relative to deals that do not compose a large percent of the industry. In 
contrast, divestiture deals in more concentrated industries result in positive abnormal returns from 
increased efficiency gains despite rising overhead costs and decreased cash flows for divesting firms. 
However, divestiture deals in less concentrated industries result in suppliers experiencing improved 
abnormal cash flows around the event, while less divesting firms suffer decreased abnormal cash flows. 
These results supplement prior studies that suggest enhanced industry competition diminishes the 
prospect of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and 
Mueller, 2001). 
For the entire sample of horizontal asset sales, this study documents a positive stock price 
reaction by divesting firms at announcement, a competitive effect (negative abnormal returns) for industry 
rivals at announcement, a negative stock price reaction corporate customers respond negatively, and a 
statistically insignificant stock price reaction by suppliers at announcement of the divestiture deal. Thus, 
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the investigation of the wealth effects of horizontal sell-offs indicates that parent firms experience 
positive wealth effects, but these gains do not extend to corporate customers and suppliers as they do with 
vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011). 
Next, I report the significant role that customer switching costs have on corporate customer 
wealth effects (performance) at announcement (around the announcement) of upstream divestitures. I find 
that customers less reliant on divesting firms experience significantly more negative median abnormal 
returns and more negative than positive abnormal returns than reliant customers. This evidence suggests 
horizontal asset sales are less beneficial for non-essential customers than those with strong customer-
supplier relationships.  
Finally, this study also underscores the importance of how supplier retention and termination 
decisions and supplier switching costs affect supplier wealth effects (performance) at announcement 
(around the announcement) of downstream divestitures. Multivariate logit analysis of the supplier 
termination decision indicates that divesting firm abnormal returns, large changes in divesting firm 
industry competition, high supplier switching costs, and length of the supplier divesting firm relationship 
are positively associated with the supplier termination decision. Divesting firm wealth effects are 
positively linked to the decision to end a supplier relationship, which support the efficiency view of 
divestitures. Decreases in divesting firm industry concentration appear to motivate managers to sever ties 
with suppliers, suggesting that these deals provoke managers cut ties with inefficient suppliers and, also, 
reduces the chance of managers being able to live the “quiet-life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2001). Particularly, divesting firms are more likely to sever long-standing supplier 
relationships and relationships with suppliers that are uniquely dependent on the divesting firm 
subsequent to the horizontal divestiture deal. However, cash deals appear to mitigate divesting firm 
financing constraints and are negatively associated with supplier termination decision. Divesting firms 
appear to create value by breaching long-term implicit contracts within the firm (employees) and outside 
of the firm (with suppliers). My evidence from the supplier retention and termination subsamples 
complement those of horizontal mergers (Fee and Thomas, 2004) but the magnitude of the performance 
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differences seem to be somewhat larger (perhaps due to the difference in sample sizes). Terminated 
suppliers experience substantial deterioration in post-divestiture median industry-adjusted cash-flow 
margins, while retained suppliers experience significant improvement in post-divestiture median industry-
adjusted cash-flow margins. This study also presents evidence that downstream horizontal asset sales are 
detrimental to suppliers with high switching costs but are beneficial to the cash flows of supplier 
portfolios with lower switching costs. These suppliers appear ex-ante more reliant on divesting upstream 
firms and are expected to face larger switcher costs than suppliers that report more than one important 
customer in their financial statements.   
57 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: IS YOUR LOSS MY GAIN? HORIZONTAL DIVESTITURES AND PRODUCT 
MARKET RELATIONSHIPS. 
3.1. Introduction 
An increasing body of literature in financial economics explores the sources of value creation of 
certain corporate events by exploring product market relationships along the supply chain, rather than 
exploring these events in isolation. For instance, one stream of literature examines the sources of value 
creation resulting from horizontal takeovers and mergers (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; 
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Another stream explores the sources of value creation resulting from 
vertical takeovers (Shenoy, 2012). More recently, Greene, Kini, and Shenoy (2013) examine sources of 
value creation resulting from conglomerate acquisitions. This research often debates whether or not the 
value derived from the aforementioned corporate events is from efficiency considerations or from 
market/buying power considerations. Generally, this line of research indicates that increased buying 
power resulting from acquisitions may serve as one particular source of value creation in the product 
market. In a related paper, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) document that market power motivations (i.e. 
collusion, foreclosure) are not primary driving forces behind vertical divestitures and that 
customer/suppliers/rivals experience positive information transfer effects. 
The extant literature focuses mostly on corporate events that increase relative firm size that alters 
the dynamics between customers and suppliers (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; Bhattacharyya 
and Nain, 2011; Greene, Kini, and Shenoy, 2013), with exception of Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011). These 
papers largely study events that potentially improve buyer/bargaining power relative to 
customers/suppliers. In effect, the prior research only explores events in which the firm grows in size at 
the same stage of production (i.e. horizontal mergers/takeovers, tender offers), successive stages of stages 
of production (i.e. vertical mergers or takeovers), or unrelated stages of production with overlapping 
sources of supply (i.e. conglomerate mergers). In contrast, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) examine 
customer supplier relationships using vertical divestitures—an event in which the firm reduces its size via 
successive stages of the production process. Therefore, I attempt to fill a void in the literature by 
58 
 
 
 
examining product market relationships through an event that reduces firm size at the same stage of 
production process, horizontal divestitures.11 This study examines the impact of upstream and 
downstream horizontal divestiture activity on product market relationships. 
To date, little to no research, theoretical or empirical, discusses the consequences of a decrease in 
relative firm size at a specific stage of the production process. What happens to buying power as firm size 
decreases at the same stage of the production process? Therefore, this study explores four hypotheses 
related to horizontal divestitures: the customer expropriation hypothesis, the pivotal buyer repositioning 
hypothesis, the waterbed effect hypothesis, and the supplier expropriation hypothesis. The customer 
expropriation hypothesis posits that suppliers, in the presence of incomplete contracts (Williamson, 
1985), behave opportunistically following large downstream divestiture activity and increase input prices 
as a result of reduced customer bargaining power, given relaxed countervailing power considerations 
(Galbraith, 1952). Expanding the extant literature on buyer power and the literature on pivotal buyer 
theory (Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Raskovich, 2003; and Adilov and Alexander, 2006), I investigate the 
pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis. The pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis conjectures that 
pivotal buyers have an incentive to reverse their pivotal position, by reducing their size and thus 
eliminating potential cross-subsidization of suppliers and non-pivotal buyers (Raskovich, 2003) 
subsequent to downstream divestiture activity. Next, I extend the literature on waterbed effects 
(Majumdar, 2005; Inderst and Valletti, 2011) by exploring the waterbed effect hypothesis, which 
postulates that downstream divestiture activity promotes asymmetric buyer power among customers and 
engender lower prices for more powerful customers while increasing input prices to competing customers 
in the years following downstream divestiture activity. Lastly, I complement the work of Bhattacharyya 
and Nain (2011) by investigating the supplier expropriation hypothesis, which postulates whether 
                                                     
11There are several respects in which a horizontal divestiture differs from that of a vertical one; some of these 
differences include: stage of production, competitive effects, contracting environment, scale of production, and 
motivations. The first and foremost distinction that I emphasize is that a horizontal divestiture, typically, represents a 
separation of a subsidiary, division, or business unit at the same stage of production as that of the parent firm. In 
contrast, a vertical divestiture represents a separation of a subsidiary, division, or business unit at a successive or 
preceding stage of production relative to the parent firm. 
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customers take advantage of economically dependent suppliers following significant upstream horizontal 
divestiture activity. 
I employ an empirical strategy, which strongly resembles that of Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011). 
I conduct a cross-industry analysis of the product market impact of 46 (35) downstream (upstream) 
industry-level horizontal divestiture events on supplier (customer) industries, resulting in 274 (35) 
industry-supplier (industry-customer) pairs on profits, value, and producers’ prices (profits, value, and 
input costs) over a sample period from 1979-2010. In contrast to Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I 
concentrate on cases in which firms reduce their size vis-à-vis suppliers, whereas, their focus is on cases 
in which firm size increases via horizontal acquisition activity. In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Nain 
(2011) investigate the product market effects of a 141 downstream horizontal merger events on supplier 
industries that result in 1,155 merger industry-supplier industry pairs. 
I document considerable evidence in support of the supplier expropriation hypothesis, suggesting 
that upstream horizontal divestiture activity has an adverse effect on supplier industry selling power 
(positive impact on customer industry buying power). I report evidence that opportunistic customers of 
dependent supplier industries experience favorable changes in abnormal cash flow margins (4.9%), 
abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (2.3%), and declines in abnormal costs-of-goods sold 
margin (2.3%) relative to customers of non-dependent suppliers. Supplier dependence captures the 
highest quintile in which a supplier industry’s output sold to a customer industry as a percentage of its 
total output sold. I also present some evidence that certain supplier industry barriers to entry (capital 
expenditures) contribute to increase customer industry profitability, value and decreased input costs. I 
also find moderate evidence in support of the pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis, indicating that 
pivotal buyers reduce their size via downstream divestiture activity and, therefore, exploit suppliers that 
are dependent on their pivotal position and eliminate cross-subsidization of suppliers and non-pivotal 
buyers. I find that suppliers with a pivotal buyer suffer a decrease in abnormal cash flow margin (10.1%) 
and abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (3.1%) relative to suppliers with a non-pivotal buyer. I 
also present minor evidence that suppliers with pivotal buyers endure an unfavorable price decrease 
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(0.2% per month) in the years subsequent to a downstream divestiture. These results suggest that pivotal 
buyers exhibit opportunistic behavior and take advantage of suppliers subsequent to substantial 
downstream divestitures. However, I find little to moderate evidence in support of the waterbed effect, 
while I present little to no evidence to corroborate the customer expropriation hypothesis with respect to 
downstream divestiture activity. 
This study makes several contributions to the recent stream of financial economics literature that 
explores the impact of corporate events on buying power. This is the first study to explore, to my 
knowledge, the implications of reducing firm size on customer-supplier relations at a specific stage of the 
production process by examining producers’ prices, profitability, and value. In particular, I employ the 
methodology by Bhattacharya and Nain (2011), who take the “direct approach” in examining the effect of 
horizontal mergers on product prices. I contribute to the industrial organization literature that examines 
the motives and consequences of buying power and waterbed effects. This study is similar to another 
closely related study by Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011), who examine the product market effects of 
vertical divestitures. The primary distinction between this study and that of Jain, Kini, and Shenoy is that 
I focus on same (within) industry divestitures that occur at the same stage of production conducting 
industry level analysis, whereas, Jain, Kini, and Shenoy focus on divestitures that occur in successive 
stages of the production process conducting firm-level analysis. In addition, this study examines the 
industry level impact of horizontal divestiture activity, which allow for cleaner tests of the industry level 
impact on upstream/downstream firms compared to a similar approach studying vertical divestitures at the 
industry level. For instance, the analysis vertical and horizontal divestitures allow one to examine 
different hypotheses. Horizontal divestitures allow one to investigate the impact of potential changes in 
buying power or market concentration on the ability to collude amongst rivals, using specific collusion 
hypotheses (i.e., monopolistic or monopsonistic). In contrast, vertical divestitures facilitate the ability to 
examine the ability to collude by exploring the impact on the coordination mechanism (Jain, Kini, 
Shenoy, 2011).  
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Next, I add to the line of research that explores the linkages along the supply chain and corporate 
finance. In particular, I look to extend the literature that investigates the influence of major corporate 
restructuring events and product market interactions. Finally, I contribute to the industrial-organization 
literature that examines the relationship between buying power, buyer size, and industry structure by 
distinguishing the relative impact of horizontal divestitures on countervailing power and pivotal buyer 
positions within the customer and supplier industry context. This is the first study that explores the effect 
of horizontal divestitures on countervailing power. In addition, this is the first to study how a type of 
divestiture (horizontal in my case) may influence the pivotal buyer relationship, if any exists. In the 
industrial organization literature, few studies consider the impact of a reduction in buyer size on the 
customer-supplier relationship. Hence, this study takes one of the first steps towards shedding light on 
that relationship. I introduce and examine the buyer repositioning hypothesis, which to my knowledge is 
the first paper to do so. This is also the first paper to empirically examine waterbed effects in the 
corporate finance literature and in the context of horizontal divestitures. In comparison, the prior literature 
on waterbed effects focuses predominantly on merger events. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I illustrate the relevant 
existing empirical literature. In Section 3.3, I motivate and develop my testable hypotheses. In Section 
3.4, I discuss my sample construction, empirical strategy and results. In Section 3.5, I conclude my 
discussion. 
3.2. Existing Literature 
In this section, I discuss related empirical literature that examines the impact of certain corporate 
restructuring events along the supply chain with an emphasis on buyer power or market power theories. 
The empirical literature appears to be largely biased in examining the influence of corporate restructuring 
events on non-financial stakeholder relationships such as customers, suppliers, and rivals within the 
corporate finance and industrial organization literature. Most studies related to corporate restructuring and 
product markets are biased towards examining the effects of horizontal mergers and acquisitions on 
market power or economic efficiencies along the supply chain (Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005; 
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Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Other related papers examine buyer/market power (i.e. collusion, market 
foreclosure, etc.) and efficiency motives along the supply chain along the supply chain in vertical mergers 
and takeovers (Kedia, Ravid, and Pons, 2011; Shenoy, 2012), conglomerate acquisitions (Greene, Kini, 
and Shenoy, 2013), and vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011). 
Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) execute cross-industry analyses of the product market impact of 
horizontal acquisitions on supplier industries via effects on profits and prices and document evidence in 
line with the generation of buying power via consolidation downstream.12 They document strong 
evidence that horizontal acquisitions generate buying power and impact the performance of economically 
dependent supplier industries, resulting in large drops in both supplier profits and supplier prices (real 
producers’ prices in the three years subsequent to downstream consolidation activity. Bhattacharya and 
Nain’s (2011) findings suggest that horizontal mergers countervail upstream market power, indicating 
that these mergers create bargaining power for merging firms to counteract bargaining power held by 
suppliers. They propose consolidation in one industry prompts countervailing consolidations in industries 
that share product market linkages as a potential transmission mechanism for mergers waves. In a recent 
study, Ahern (2012) finds that industry economic dependence is an important consideration for the 
division of gains between the target and acquiring firm in mergers. Fee and Thomas (2004) find evidence 
consistent with the notion that buying power of customer firms relative to suppliers serves as key source 
of gains in horizontal mergers. Shahrur (2005) shows that horizontal mergers and tender offers tend to 
generate significant positive abnormal returns for rivals, suppliers and corporate customers suggesting 
evidence in support of the efficiency hypothesis, however, they find that buyer power is a source of gains 
in imperfectly competitive industries. 
Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2011) compare market reactions of horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate mergers to investigate motives for vertical integration. Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2011) 
document evidence that vertical mergers create value in noncompetitive market environments and 
                                                     
12 Downstream industries refers to customer industries along the supply chain, while, upstream industries refer to 
supplier industries along the supply chain.  
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evidence in support of market foreclosure theories, suggesting that vertical mergers of dominant firms 
shut out rival firms. In contrast, Shenoy (2012) explores efficiency (i.e. underinvestment in relationship-
specific investments and hold-up concerns) and market power theories (i.e. collusion or market 
foreclosure) as sources of value and creation behind vertical takeovers by examining the impact 
announcements of vertical takeovers along the supply chain. Shenoy documents strong evidence in 
support of the efficiency hypothesis and weaker evidence in support of the collusion hypothesis, 
suggesting that firms undertake vertical mergers in order mitigate hold-up problems and underinvestment 
in relationship-specific assets and to a lesser extent collude with rivals. Greene, Kini, and Shenoy (2013) 
document evidence that conglomerate acquisitions create value from acquirers with segments that have 
overlapping suppliers with those of target, leading to reduced suppliers prices and positive wealth effects. 
Overall, the evidence is mixed evidence in support of both efficiency and market power theories (i.e. 
market foreclosure, collusion, etc.) as sources of value creation behind vertical mergers and takeovers.  
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) investigate how product market considerations and financing 
considerations influence the vertical divestiture decision and choice of divestiture (equity carve-outs or 
spin-offs). Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) find evidence that parent firms experience positive wealth 
effects on announcement. These wealth effects are linked to efficiency motives derived from corporate 
focus and holdup consideration, while, anti-competitive motives such as collusion or foreclosure do not 
appear to be a factor in the decision of the method to vertically disintegrate. In addition, Jain, Kini, and 
Shenoy (2011) find that the wealth effects are also passed along to rival firms, supplier firms, and 
customer firms, largely support efficiency explanations in vertical divestitures. Overall, they infer that 
vertical divestitures appear to be good news for non-financial stakeholders along the supply chain. 
Another stream of literature considers the impact of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on product 
markets. Chevalier (1995) examines the influence of leveraged buyouts on product market competition in 
the local supermarket industry, encouraging entry and expansion by supermarket chains. She finds that 
LBOs in the local supermarket industry increase the industry rivals’ returns and thus stimulates softer 
product market competition in that industry. 
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The emerging stream of literature that explores the effect of certain types (i.e. vertical, horizontal, 
conglomerate) restructuring activities such as mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers generally associate 
buyer/market power themes with horizontal and vertical mergers or takeovers along the supply chain, 
while some of the evidence appears mixed between efficiency and market power explanations. Prior 
literature fails to address horizontal divestitures in the corporate finance literature, to my knowledge. In 
addition, extant research overlooks the influence of horizontal divestitures on product markets 
relationships. Hence, the effects of horizontal deconsolidation remain largely unexplored, and I attempt to 
fill this gap in the literature by investigating the impact of customer industry horizontal divestitures on its 
supplier industry operating performance and producers’ prices.13 
3.3. Hypothesis development  
In this section, I develop and discuss the implications of the supplier opportunism/expropriation, 
pivotal buyer repositioning, and rival opportunism/waterbed effect hypotheses on supplier industry cash 
flow margins and producers’ prices. Lastly, I investigate the implications of customer 
opportunism/expropriation on customer industry cash flow margins. There are other potential 
explanations of supplier profitability and pricing and customer profitability such as collusion, agency, and 
market foreclosure theories, among others. In this study, I test implications that are specific to customer 
(supplier) industry horizontal divestitures and have direct repercussions for firms in supplier (customer) 
industries. I summarize hypotheses and empirical predictions in Table 10. Panel A of Table 10 contains 
the hypotheses and predictions for my sample of downstream divestitures. Panel B of Table 10 contains 
the hypotheses and predictions for my sample of upstream divestitures. 
3.3.1. Supplier opportunism/expropriation hypothesis 
There are several means in which divesting firms may diminish their buying power. A divesting 
firm may lose its ability to pool its purchases across divisions or business units, thus impeding its ability 
                                                     
13 I use “horizontal divestiture event,” “horizontal deconsolidation,” “industry divestiture event,” and “industry 
deconsolidation interchangeably throughout the remainder of this study to describe my event of interest. Similarly, 
downstream deconsolidation is used interchangeably with customer deconsolidation, downstream divestitures, or 
customer divestiture event. In contrast, upstream deconsolidation is used interchangeably with supplier 
deconsolidation, supplier divestiture event, or upstream divestitures. 
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to demand price concessions or quantity discounts from its suppliers. Whereas in the case of horizontal 
acquisitions, Fee and Thomas (2004) and Bhattacharya and Nain (2011) find evidence of efficiency 
increasing buying power. Alternatively, a divesting firm may demonstrate a moderated capacity to use 
buying power to limit purchases to monopsony levels, leading to elevated input prices that may rise to or 
above marginal cost. Williamson (1985) argues that an incomplete contracting environment can promote 
opportunistic behavior. As a result of a divesting firm’s reduced ability to negotiate lower input prices 
from suppliers, suppliers in industries that have a relative bargaining advantage vis-à-vis customer 
industries are poised to exploit their customers’ diminished ability to negotiate lower input prices and 
potentially raised input prices. 
If horizontal divestitures do diminish buying power, I anticipate this outcome to be revealed in 
the operating performance of supplier industries. If a customer industry is heavily dependent on a 
particular supplier industry for a key input in its production process, a significant horizontal divestiture 
will likely lessen the divesting customer industry’s bargaining power relative to its supplier due to the 
customer’s reduced size and ability to negotiate price concessions for volume purchases. Therefore, I 
postulate that suppliers of dependent customer industries will enjoy a greater increase in operating 
performance after downstream deconsolidation (horizontal divestiture event in a customer industry) 
relative to suppliers of non-dependent customer industries. Therefore, my first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1. Suppliers of dependent customer industries experience greater favorable changes in 
abnormal cash flow margins in the two years following an announcement of downstream deconsolidation. 
Improvement in operating performance, while in line with selling power enhancement, is not a 
conclusive substantiation of reduced buying power. On the one hand, alternative isolated aspects such as 
decreases in production costs or wages may constitute an increase in profitability of supplier industries. If, 
on the other hand, the increase in operating performance is linked to diminished buying power, I assume 
that this effect will be highlighted in the form of improved selling prices in the supplier industry. 
Therefore, my second hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 2. Suppliers of dependent customer industries experience larger increases in selling prices 
(real producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation. 
Efficiency-improving divestitures bias the results against supporting my hypothesis for a 
reduction in buying power. However, production efficiencies can decrease marginal costs of production, 
resulting in lower selling prices and increased production.  Similar to the case of horizontal mergers 
(Bhattacharya and Nain (2011), efficiency-improving horizontal divestitures can raise the productive 
efficiency downstream and can bring about a decrease in marginal costs of production, thus lowering 
selling prices and increasing output levels. Alternatively, if deconsolidation permits divesting firms to 
produce the same output with fewer inputs then the demand for inputs, and thus, prices should decline. 
Efficiency-enhancing divestitures can end in perceived decreases in selling prices. The reduction in 
supplier selling prices would not be explainable by diminished selling power, thus any increase in 
producers’ prices would support the supplier opportunism hypothesis. 
Next, I consider countervailing power in the context of horizontal divestitures. The theory of 
countervailing power posits that economic power results in economic power (Galbraith, 1952). In 
particular, the group that is subject to the economic power of a dominant group counteracts that position 
by enhancing its own economic power relative to the power of the dominant group, thus exhibiting 
countervailing power. In this context, a large customer employs its bargaining power relative to its 
suppliers’ bargaining power; as a result, suppliers decrease their selling prices to its buyers. If 
countervailing power serves as a mechanism to constrain buying power and selling power, then what is 
the consequence of relaxing this constraint, in this case buyer size, on buying power? Inherent in the 
theory of countervailing power is the notion that horizontal divestitures of downstream firms or buyers 
relax the mechanism that constrains or keeps in check upstream firms’ or suppliers’ selling power. More 
specifically, horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power, to the extent in which it eases the 
restrictions on suppliers’ selling power, resulting in diminished buying power for a given customer 
industry relative to supplier industries.  
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In a model of dynamic countervailing power, Snyder (1996) shows that large buyers (customers) 
achieve lower prices from colluding sellers, and that the profitability of all buyers improves at the 
expense of the supplier after a merger of another firm due to merger induced competition amongst 
suppliers (Snyder, 1998). Hence, in the absence of buying power or erosion thereof, countervailing power 
theory suggests adverse consequences for not only a horizontally divesting customer firm, but for all other 
customer firms in their industry, as well. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes countervailing power 
as these theories designate, then customer industries that enjoy some degree of noncompetitive pricing 
(resulting from industry concentration and firm size) prior to deconsolidation should experience greater 
increases in price from opportunistic supplier industries, ex post. Therefore, the observable effect of 
reduced countervailing power should be more pronounced (or easy to detect) in customer industries with 
higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation, since this type of customer industry 
will be less likely to counteract supplier market power.  Hence, my third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes buying power then customer industries with 
higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will undergo larger price increases in 
selling prices following downstream deconsolidation. 
Next, I consider how barriers to entry may play a role on the impact of horizontal divestitures. 
Industry demand characteristics that may influence barriers to entry are often highlighted as impediments 
to competitive practices in the theory of industrial organization. Oligopoly theory conjectures that barriers 
to entry serve as a mechanism to preserve a collusive environment reducing the risk of entry. There exists 
empirical evidence that the concentration of buyers negatively influence supplier profitability, in support 
of the theory of countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952; Lustgarten, 1975; Schumacher, 1991; Patatoukas, 
2011).14 Traditional textbooks in economic theory suggest that barriers to entry afford the ability to 
                                                     
14 Lustgarten (1975) finds evidence between the relationship of supplier concentration and buyer concentration, 
confirming that structural factors such as the number of firms and barriers to entry are a factor in determining 
oligopolistic relationships. Schumacher (1991) finds evidence that buyer power concentration reduces the 
profitability of concentrated suppliers. Patatoukas (2011) finds evidence to suggest that research on the underlying 
factors of customer-base concentration should be examined simultaneously with the features and dynamics of 
upstream and downstream ﬁrms and industries. 
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influence market prices (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). In order to distinguish between industry demand 
considerations and the conjectured deterioration of buying power, I must demonstrate that downstream 
divestitures that improve demand effects upstream simply owing to enhanced efficiencies ought to have 
no impact on prices of supplier industries with lower impediments to entry. Similarly, downstream 
divestitures that diminish buying reduce demand effects upstream owing to enhanced efficiencies ought to 
have little, if any, impact on prices of supplier industries with lower impediments to entry. Since these 
more competitive environments are subject to price-taking behavior. This leads us to my fourth 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. If downstream deconsolidation diminishes buying power, concentrated supplier industries 
with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will enjoy larger increases in selling prices 
following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries. 
3.3.2. Pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis 
Chipty and Snyder (1999) contend that larger buyers negotiate lower prices in the model of one 
seller and multiple buyers. More recently, Adilov and Alexander (2006) extend Chipty and Snyder ’s 
(1999) model and define a buyer as crucial, if the supplier is unable to cover its costs in the absence of 
trading with the customer. Adilov and Alexander argue that firm size can still increase bargaining power 
in the event of a horizontal merger, suggesting that there is a substitution effect between the bargaining 
power effect and pivotal buyer effect, under the assumption of a concentrated supplier.  In contrast, 
Raskovich (2003) postulates that, in cases in which a supplier industry is characterized by high fixed 
costs, low marginal costs and high concentration, a buyer may grow to the extent in which it assumes a 
crucial role to a supplier’s choice to produce due to the supplier need to meet it high fixed costs. 
Consequently, the buyer can no longer, convincingly, relinquish accountability for financing the supplier's 
costs due to the extent the supplier is dependent on its customer. Therefore, a pivotal buyer is less able to 
credibly negotiate with its supplier. Consequently, Raskovich (2003) contends that this circumstance 
leads the pivotal buyer to commit unfairly toward shared costs of production, resulting in cross-
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subsidization of smaller, non-pivotal buyers (given that these non-pivotal buyers can resign responsibility 
for financing the supplier's costs since they are not as crucial to the supplier production choice). 
Overall, these buyer power and pivotal buyer theories imply that a pivotal buyer or customer firm 
will have an incentive to divest (in order to reduce its size and thus its pivotal buyer status) if it is “on the 
hook” for its supplier’s costs and cross-subsidization of non-pivotal buyers, thus reversing the buyer’s 
pivotal position, increasing the firm’s ability to negotiate forcefully with their supplier. The reversal of 
the buyer’s pivotal position may allow the supplier to fairly reassume responsibility for its shared costs, 
improving the customer bargaining position and relieving the customer of cross-subsidization of non-
pivotal buyers, as well. Assuming that the divesting firm’s buying power is inconsequentially reduced, 
this improvement in bargaining position would allow the buyer to negotiate more aggressively and 
credibly post-divestiture, and thus reducing the selling price for its inputs. The notion of a pivotal buyer 
strongly suggests a role for supplier economic dependence. As a result, a dependent supplier may become 
less profitable or experience a drop cash flow margin since the supplier reassumes full responsibility of its 
own financing costs given that the once pivotal buyer is no longer considered as crucial to the supplier’s 
production decision. Thus, my fifth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5. More dependent and concentrated supplier industries experience greater adverse changes 
in abnormal cash flow margins in the two years following an announcement of downstream 
deconsolidation. 
However, if the decline in supplier operating performance is linked to increased customer 
bargaining power, I can anticipate that this effect will be highlighted in the form of reduced selling prices 
by dependent supplier industries relative to non-dependent supplier industries. This leads us to my sixth 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6. Dependent supplier industries experience larger declines in selling prices (real producers’ 
prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation. 
Efficiency-improving divestitures may reduce the ability to distinguish between the pivotal buyer 
repositioning hypothesis and one of efficiency, since production efficiencies arising from the 
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deconsolidated firm can decrease marginal costs of production, resulting in lower selling prices and 
increased production. Increased production levels can stimulate demand for inputs and thus prices by 
suppliers (in contrast to my proposition of pivotal buyer repositioning). Alternatively, if deconsolidation 
permits divesting firms to produce the same output with fewer inputs then the demand for inputs, and 
thus, prices should decline. Efficiency-enhancing divestitures can end in perceived decreases in selling 
prices. The reduction in supplier selling prices would not be explainable by diminished selling power of 
the deconsolidating industry but could be explaining by pivotal buyer repositioning, at least to some 
degree. 
Underlying this argument is the assumption that if the pivotal buyer can relinquish its pivotal 
position, and therefore size, the buyer substitutes more bargaining power at the expense of it pivotal 
position (Adilov and Alexander, 2006). Hence, once the pivotal buyer has reversed its pivotal position, it 
will be more likely to obtain lower selling prices from its suppliers due to its increase bargaining power. 
This reduction of firm size of a pivotal buyer should be more pronounced with respect to a concentrated 
supplier industry. Thus a horizontal divestiture may serve as a mechanism to reverse a customer’s pivotal 
position; as a consequence, I could interpret decreased input prices for the customer as evidence of 
reversing the customer’s pivotal position: restoring the customer’s ability to bargain more aggressively.  
Hence, more concentrated supplier industries prior to deconsolidation should experience a larger decrease 
in selling prices after deconsolidation reflecting the reversal of the pivotal buyer’s position. Consequently, 
my seventh hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 7. If downstream deconsolidation reverses a pivotal buyer’s pivotal position then supplier 
industries with higher concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will undergo a greater 
reduction in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation. 
Given that supplier industries could reduce selling prices as a result of increased efficiencies or 
decreasing industry demand, I must distinguish potential increases in customer industry bargaining 
position from those arising from efficiencies or demand. If downstream deconsolidation allows pivotal 
buyers to reposition themselves, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation 
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will suffer larger declines in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. 
Hence, I present my eighth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8. If downstream deconsolidation allows pivotal buyers to reposition themselves, supplier 
industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will suffer larger declines in selling 
prices following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. 
3.3.3. Waterbed effect hypothesis 
Majumdar (2005) demonstrates how downstream mergers can lead to reduced input prices for the 
newly merged firm, while at the same increasing input prices of the newly merged firm’s rivals, “the 
waterbed bed effect.” In addition, Majumdar finds that pre-existing buying power plays a role in 
enhancing the merging firm’s buying power in addition to making rivals worse off, citing reduced 
demand from independent competitors and increased access to markets that the acquiring firm did not 
initially have. In a related paper, Inderst and Valletti (2011) consider how a given buyer’s power (arising 
from size) vis-à-vis suppliers compares with competing buyers and find that differential/asymmetric 
buyer power among customers may lead to lower prices for more powerful customer while increasing 
wholesale prices to competing customers. The asymmetry in buyer power provides the dominant firm 
with advantageous terms of trade, and an increased competitive position in the retail market. Inderst and 
Valletti (2011) show that if a supplier has the ability to price discriminate in which competing sources of 
supply are uncontested and disparity in downstream firm size differential (buyer market power), the 
potential waterbed effect should be more pronounced. 
A horizontal divestiture potentially induces asymmetry or differential buying power of firms in 
the divesting customer industry by redistributing buying power among the competing firms in that 
industry. For instance, the resultant divesting firm is substantially smaller in size than prior to the 
divestiture event, suggesting a reduced ability to exert the same degree of bargaining power or buying 
power relative to its suppliers. Consequently, this event induces a potential redistribution of bargaining or 
buying power of rivals or competing firms in the same industry vis-à-vis suppliers of crucial inputs. This 
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suggests that more dominant competing rival firms may have improved bargaining position post-
divestiture and possibly negotiate lower input prices with suppliers.  
The waterbed effect suggests that horizontal divestitures may induce redistribution of buying 
power and asymmetric gains in buying power among now dominant industry rivals post-divestiture. 
These now dominant industry rivals potentially seek price concessions from suppliers, who have the 
ability to price discriminate, at the expense of less dominant industry firms that may endure ensuing price 
increase. As a result of these offsetting price increases and decreases, the net change in the supplier 
operating performance is anticipated to be zero. Therefore, my ninth hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 9. Supplier or customer industry dependence has no effect on abnormal cash flow margins in 
the two years following an announcement of downstream deconsolidation. 
Given that supplier dependence and customer dependence should play no role in inducing 
waterbed effects or rival opportunism, supplier dependence and customer dependence should have any 
impact average supplier industry selling price. Accordingly, my tenth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 10. Supplier or customer industry dependence has no impact on supplier selling prices (real 
producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation. 
A large horizontal divestiture event can lead to a redistribution of buying power in a customer 
industry. This redistribution may trigger a differential in buying power among the competing industry 
rivals and divesting firm, resulting in a shift of dominant buyers within an industry. In supplier industries 
in which there exists the ability to price discriminate, suppliers would be able to offer newly dominant 
firms price discounts, while raising prices on newly non-dominant firms in the customer industry subject 
to differential buying power.  Therefore, I present my eleventh hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 11. If downstream deconsolidation induces asymmetric customer buying power, supplier 
industries with higher levels of concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will lead to offsetting 
selling price increases of less powerful customer and decreases in selling prices for more powerful 
customers following downstream deconsolidation. 
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To distinguish from Hypotheses 4 and 8, I must demonstrate that barriers to entry in the 
supplier’s industry exacerbate waterbed effects due to these barriers allowing the supplier to continue 
price discriminating behavior to customer industries. If downstream deconsolidation leads to asymmetric 
customer industry buying power, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation 
will be able to better discriminate selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated 
customer industries, enhancing the waterbed effect of offsetting changes in input price. Next, I present my 
twelfth and final hypothesis with respect to downstream deconsolidation. 
Hypothesis 12. If downstream deconsolidation leads to asymmetric buying power, concentrated supplier 
industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will be able to better discriminate 
selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries. 
3.3.4. Customer opportunism/expropriation hypothesis 
For completeness, this section of the paper explores the implications of an upstream divestiture 
event (upstream deconsolidation or supplier deconsolidation) on downstream firms. Stigler (1964) 
contends that monopolistic collusion permits merging firms to collude with industry rivals and restrict 
production to customers earning monopoly rents. Eckbo and Wier (1985) postulate that events that reduce 
the chance of horizontal mergers would potentially result in lost monopoly rents to merging firms and 
industry rivals. Eckbo (1983) asserts that under collusion brought about by merging firms, monopoly 
rents are harmful to customers. By implication, a large horizontal divestiture may reduce supplier industry 
concentration and diminish potential to collude amongst industry rivals. Assuming decreased industry 
concentration from large horizontal divesture activity, the divesting supplier industry may lose potential 
bargaining power relative to customer industries. Alternatively, divesting suppliers may no longer be able 
to restrict output to monopoly levels, leading to lower input prices that may decline to marginal cost. 
Thus, horizontal divestitures may harm ability of suppliers to bargain for higher input prices vis-à-vis 
customers. Customers industries that have a bargaining advantage relative to supplier industries are in a 
prime position to take advantage of their suppliers reduced ability to demand higher input prices, and 
consequently reduce their (customers’) input prices. 
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 If horizontal divestitures mitigate supplier selling power, I expect that this outcome will be 
discovered in the operating performance of customer industries. If a supplier industry is very reliant on a 
given customer industry for it sales, a substantial divestiture will likely reduce the supplier industry’s 
negotiation power relative to its downstream customer industry. Thus, I posit that customer industries of 
divesting upstream dependent supplier industries will enjoy a greater increase in operating performance 
subsequent to upstream deconsolidation (horizontal divesture event in a customer industry) relative to 
customers of less dependent supplier industries. Hence, my next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 13. Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater favorable changes in 
abnormal cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years subsequent 
to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries. 
Consequently, if an upstream divestiture event weakens the bargaining position of upstream 
firms, dependent supplier industries will be more vulnerable to granting price concessions as a result of 
increased post-divestiture competition relative to less dependent supplier industries. Hence, I postulate 
that customers of divesting upstream dependent supplier industries will experience reduced input costs 
subsequent to the upstream divestiture event relative to less dependent supplier industries. Therefore, I 
test the following conjecture: 
Hypothesis 14. Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in abnormal 
costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to 
customers of less dependent supplier industries 
Countervailing power theories posit that economic power brings about economic power 
(Galbraith, 1952). For instance, the group that is constrained by the economic power of a dominant group 
counters that position by boosting its own economic power in relation to the power of the dominant 
group, thus engendering countervailing power. In this model, a large customer employs its bargaining 
power relative to its suppliers’ bargaining power; consequently, suppliers cut their selling prices to its 
buyers. If countervailing power serves as a medium to keep in check both buying power and selling 
power, then I anticipate that relaxing this restriction will have adverse consequences for upstream 
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suppliers’ selling power. Inherent in this model is the concept that horizontal divestitures of upstream 
firms relax the channel that limits or keeps in check downstream firms’ or customers’ buying power. 
More specifically, upstream horizontal divestitures may reduce bargaining power of supplier industries. 
Potentially, upstream horizontal  divestitures may strengthen the rivalry between colluding suppliers and 
encourage these suppliers to offer lower prices to large buyers in a manner similar in which horizontal 
mergers between buyers increase supplier competition (resulting in lower prices) in Snyder’s (1996, 
1998) theory of dynamic countervailing power. 
If upstream deconsolidation weakens countervailing power for supplier industries, then 
concentrated suppliers, whose market power would be constrained by customer market power prior to 
upstream deconsolidation, should no longer be able to effectively offset customer market power. 
Therefore these customer industries should experience greater input price declines and hence higher cash 
flow margins subsequent to the upstream divestiture. Employing supplier industry concentration as a 
measure of market power, I state my next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 15. If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have 
higher concentration prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable changes in 
cash flow margins (abnormal operating income to market value of assets) in the two years subsequent to 
an announcement of upstream deconsolidation. 
 As noted earlier, oligopoly theory posits that barriers to entry act as a channel to maintain a 
collusive environment, in order to mitigate the risk of entry by new competitors, and is substantiated by 
empirical evidence (Galbraith, 1952; Lustgarten, 1975; Schuacher, 1991; Patatoukas, 2011; 
Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). Upstream divestitures may lead to the increased probability of entry by 
new competitors, and, thus, the threat of competition. Therefore, supplier industries will likely have to 
compete on price and quality post-divestiture to the benefit of their customers. This competition may also 
affect weaken structural barriers to entry within the industry.  
 Additionally, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) document evidence to support countervailing power 
theory, finding that suppliers with pricing power (market and structural) would be “natural targets” of 
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buying power generated by “downstream consolidation” via horizontal acquisitions. Inversely, 
countervailing power theory infers that upstream deconsolidation via horizontal divestitures make 
suppliers with structural sources pricing power, again, “natural targets” due to reduced selling power 
(alternatively, indirectly enhanced buying power) brought about by “deconsolidation upstream.”  This 
leads to my final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 16. If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have 
higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable changes in 
cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years subsequent to an 
announcement of upstream deconsolidation.  
3.4. Data sources, sample selection, and relevant characteristics of the sample 
 In this section, I describe the data sources and sample construction requirements employed to 
identify my final sample of horizontal divestitures. I also present the relevant aspects of my final sample 
of horizontal divestitures. 
3.4.1. Sample Formation  
 I commence by assembling a sample of industries that experienced an identifiable rise in 
deconsolidation activity in order to obtain pre- and post-divestiture periods. I follow Villalonga and 
McGahan (2005) in my initial stage of identifying horizontal divestitures in the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) Platinum database. I obtain my sample of divestitures from SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions 
database that meet the following criteria: (i) all divestitures announced and completed between January 1, 
1979 and December 31, 2010. My next requirement is that the “divestitures” classification incorporates: 
(ii) deals categorized by SDC as divestitures, spin-offs, and carve-outs.15 Following Bhattacharyya and 
                                                     
15 As defined by Villalonga and McGahan (2005), SDC tracks divestitures in the event of a loss of majority control, 
the parent firm loses majority ownership in the target, or the target firm disposes of assets. A spin-off represents the 
tax-free distribution of stock by a firm off a unit, subsidiary, division, or another firm’s stock, or any fraction 
thereof, to its stockholders. SDC follow spin-offs of any proportion. In comparison, a carve-out consists of a new 
firm’s stock being distributed or being put up for sale to the public by way of an initial public offering (IPO). SDC 
follows carve-outs under the condition that the carve-out corresponds to 100 percent of the unit, subsidiary, or 
division or other firm. Following Villalonga and McGahan (2005) I exclude modifications in a firm’s ownership 
structure created by a firm’s Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), or more generally by the acquisition of 
partial or remaining in one of the sample firms (or in a subsidiary) that does correspond to a divestiture. 
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Nain (2011), I also require that the: (iii) parent firm and the target firm (divested unit) to be U.S.-based. I 
identify the parent and target firms’ divesting industries using the following SDC variables “Target 
Ultimate Parent Primary SIC Code” and “Target Primary SIC Code,” respectively. Next, I restrict my 
sample to include cases in which: (iv) the parent and target share the same primary four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In addition, I require that: (v) the transaction value associated with 
each divestiture is available.  
For each four-digit SIC code in the divestiture sample, I measure quarterly divestiture activity as 
the total transaction value of all horizontal divestitures announced in a quarter as a proportion of industry 
total market value of common equity. Consistent with Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I categorize an 
industry as having undergone a divestiture event in a given quarter when the following restrictions are 
met: (i) quarterly divestiture activity in the current quarter exceeds 5% of industry total market 
capitalization and (ii) quarterly divestiture activity in any of the previous 8 quarters did not exceed 1.5% 
industry total market value of common equity.16 My initial restriction, (i), guarantees that the selected 
industries undergo considerable horizontal deconsolidation in a given quarter, while the second 
restriction, (ii), guarantees that I have clean pre-event period in which there was modest horizontal 
divestiture activity. This designation of the divestiture event allows us to identify 137 four-digit SIC 
codes that underwent at least one divestiture event between 1979 and 2010.  
In order to establish customer or supplier relationships, I employ the make and use tables from the 
1992 and 1997 Benchmark I-O accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The make table is 
matrix displaying the industry production, or output, of each commodity in the economy at producer 
prices, whereas, the use table is a matrix displaying the commodities consumed or used, by each industry 
and final consumers at producer prices. Following Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Bhattacharyya and 
Nain (2011), I generate an input-output matrix from the make and use tables. I use Bhattacharyya and 
Nain’s (2011) matching procedure for the 1992 and 1997 input output matrix, since the BEA provides 
                                                     
16 I alter Bhattacharyya and Nain’s (2011) requirement of 12 quarters prior to and after divestiture event to 8 
quarters prior to and after divestiture event in order to maximize the size of my sample. 
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input-output tables every five years. In addition, 1992 is the final year in which the BEA uses the SIC 
codes that can be matched to Compustat data, while 1997 input output matrix uses NAICS codes. 
Therefore, staying consistent with Bhattacharyya and Nain, I must use the Census Bureau’s SIC-NAICS 
correspondence tables for 1997 to match SIC and NAICS codes. I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) 
and assume that this relationship exists for the latter half of my sample. Following Bhattacharyya and 
Nain’s (2011) approach, I use the 1992 input-output matrix to link suppliers to industries deconsolidating 
in or prior to 1994 (the first half of my sample) and the 1997 input-output matrix to match suppliers to 
industries deconsolidating in or following 1995 (the second half of my sample).   
I find 46 downstream industries that I am able to match suppliers to in my sample, whereas, 
Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) are able to match suppliers to 141 industries. This disparity is likely due 
to the frequency of divestiture activity that produces more contaminated matches that we are unable to 
cleanly test. In addition, divestitures in general tend to be approximately one-third to one-half the size of 
acquisitions, on average (Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Panel A of Table 11 identifies these divesting 
industries accompanied by the number of divestitures that contribute to each divestiture event and the 
proportion of the divestiture transaction value to industry total market value of common equity. I invert 
the methodology outlined in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to identify upstream divestitures and match 
up to ten customers industries to the sample of upstream divestiture events. I am able to link 35 upstream 
divesting industries to customer industries in my sample. In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) do 
not examine upstream horizontal merger activity, since these actions are likely to be blocked by antitrust 
authorities given the bias that selling power would likely increase. Panel A of Table 11 identifies 
downstream divesting industries accompanied by the number of divestitures that contribute to each 
divestiture event and the proportion of the divestiture transaction value to industry total market value of 
common equity, while Panel B of Table 11 provides similar information for upstream divesting 
industries. 
 I extend Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in my approach to investigating the role of industry 
dependence, by examining not only supplier dependence for the upstream divestiture sample, but also to 
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investigate the pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis by investigating the interaction of supplier industry 
dependence, supplier high fixed costs, and customer industry concentration. Additionally, I examine the 
role of customer dependence with respect to the supplier opportunism hypothesis. I use the input-output 
matrix in order to compute the fraction, fjm of the deconsolidating customer industry m’s input purchased 
from supplier industry j. Higher values of fjm suggest that the deconsolidating customer industry m is more 
dependent on supplier industry. For every deconsolidating industry, I recognize up to ten supplier 
industries with the largest values of fjm. Working with up to ten suppliers per deconsolidating industry, I 
am able to incorporate industries selling a very small proportion of their output to the divesting industry 
and less likely to be influenced substantially by downstream divestiture activity. This approach increases 
the power of my cross-sectional tests in identifying any linkage between customer dependence and profit 
or price fluctuations undergone by the supplier industry. Since there are only 46 clean downstream and 35 
upstream divestiture events, respectively, I can acquire at most 460 divesting industry-supplier pairs and 
350 divesting industry-customer pairs. Panel A in Table 12 shows the 274 divesting industry-supplier 
industry pairs I obtain during my matching process, which is smaller than the number of merging 
industry-supplier industry pairs (1,155) obtained by Bhattacharyya and Nain (20110 due to the lower 
number events (47 compared to 141) we examine. 
 For the downstream divestiture sample, I characterize suppliers on which customers are 
dependent, customer dependent, as suppliers with value of fjm in the top quintile of the distribution. I 
classify lingering suppliers as non-customer dependent. Also for the downstream divestiture sample, I 
characterize dependent suppliers as those suppliers with fmj in the top tercile (1/3rd) of the distribution. I 
employ terciles rather than quintiles due to the fact that I using an interaction to capture pivotal buyers, 
which reduces the number of observations that meet the criteria without losing substantial variation in the 
sample. I use this delineation of supplier dependence to formulate my pivotal buyer classification. As 
indicated earlier, Raskovich (2003) describes the conditions in which a supplier has a pivotal buyer 
relationship. These conditions include a supplier having high fixed and marginal costs, high supplier 
concentration, and the buyer is crucial to supplier’s production process. Using this depiction of a pivotal 
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buyer relationship, I operationalize the variable, pivotal buyer, concept by meeting the following 
conditions: suppliers with fmj in the top tercile (high supplier dependence), suppliers with pre-divestiture 
abnormal high fixed costs top half of distribution (high fixed costs), and suppliers with average pre-
divestiture industry concentration above 1800 (high concentration). All remaining suppliers that do not 
meet these conditions are classified as having a non-pivotal buyer relationship. 
However in my upstream divestiture sample, I define supplier dependence in a manner similar to 
Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011). I characterize as the variable supplier dependent based on values fmj in 
the top quintile. I also classify lingering suppliers as non-supplier dependent for those that are not 
characterized as supplier dependent. 
Panel A of Table 12 reports the distribution of fjm for dependent and non-dependent customers for 
the downstream divestiture sample. fjm is calculated as the ratio of customer industry inputs purchased 
from a given supplier industry to that customer industry’s total purchases in order to capture customer 
(industry) dependence. Dependent customers in the divesting industry procure, on average, 4.56% of their 
inputs from their suppliers, while non-dependent customers purchase 0.28%. Panel B of Table 12 
represents the distribution of fmj for pivotal and non-pivotal suppliers for the downstream divestiture 
sample. In contrast, fmj is calculated as the ratio of supplier industry output sold to a given customer 
industry to that supplier industry’s total output produced in order to capture supplier (industry) 
dependence. Dependent suppliers deliver, on average, 10.7% of their production to the divesting industry, 
while non-dependent suppliers provide 0.4%. Panel C of Table 12 shows the distribution of fmj for 
dependent and non-dependent suppliers for the upstream divestiture sample. Dependent suppliers supply, 
on average, 10.7% of their production to the divesting industry, while non-dependent suppliers provide 
0.4%. 
3.4.2.  Supplier industry operating performance 
I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) with respect to my analysis of pre-divestiture and post-
divestiture industry operating performance and choice of explanatory variables, but I include a variables 
for customer dependence, pivotal buyers, and both customer and supplier barriers to entry, whereas, they 
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include only on supplier dependence and supplier barriers to entry. I begin my multivariate analysis using 
the subsequent two regression models estimated using a pooled times series panel with clustered standard 
errors by supplier two-digit SIC codes in equations (1) and (2). 
PreDivSuppOperPerfj = α1 + α2 CDj + α3 PBj + α4Supp_HConc_HFCjt + α5SDj + α6cust_herfjt + 
α7cust_ksjt + α8cust_capexjt + α9cust_advertjt + α10supp_herfjt + α11supp_ksjt + α12supp_capex jt + 
α13Supp_advertjt + εjt                                             
(1) 
 
PostDivSuppOperPerfj = γ1 + γ2CDj + γ3PBj + γ4Supp_HConc_HFCjt + γ5SDj + γ6Cust_herfjt + 
γ7Cust_ksjt + γ8cust_capexjt + γ9cust_advertjt + γ10supp_herfjt + γ11supp_ksjt + γ12Supp_capexjt + 
γ13Supp_advertjt +  
εjt                    (2) 
Using these two models, I investigate the effect of downstream deconsolidation on supplier 
industry operating performance to empirically test my first, fifth, and ninth hypotheses. 
PreDivSuppOperPerf and PostDivSuppOperPerfj are pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating 
performances of supplier j, respectively. I employ several measures of supplier operating performance as 
described below. I use two accounting based measures of operating performance, the cash flow-to-sales 
ratio and cash flow-to-total assets, and two value based measures of operating performance, the cash-
flow-to-market value of assets ratio  and cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio.  For my first proxy of 
supplier operating performance, I define the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the median firm in the industry. 
Staying consistent with Fee and Thomas (2004) and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I define the cash 
flow-to-sales ratio as the ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to sales 
(Compustat item 12). I then measure the industry’s abnormal operating performance from that of the 
median industry in the economy, which I define as ACFM. I measure ACFM two years prior to 
divestiture, Pre_ACFM, and two years after divestiture, Post_ACFM.  
I define ROA as the ratio operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total 
assets (Compustat item 6) for the median firm in the industry. I define cash flow-to-total assets as the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total assets (Compustat item 6) for 
the median firm in the industry. The cash flow-to-market value of assets is defined as the ratio of 
operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), 
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market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value of common 
equity (Compustat item 60) for the median firm in the industry. The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is 
defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13) 
to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 
199) * (Compustat item 61), less the sum of book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash 
and short term investments (Compustat item 1) for the median firm in the industry. I define abnormal 
operating performance for the cash flow-to-total assets, cash flow-to-market value assets, and cash flow-
to-enterprise value ratios (AROA, ACFMVA, and ACFEV, respectively) similar to ACFM for the other 
variables. In addition, I define PreDivSuppOperPerf and PostDivSuppOperPerfj for the other variables 
for supplier industries similar to Pre_ACFM and Post_ACFM.  
I regress abnormal operating performance prior to downstream deconsolidation on customer the 
dependence dummy and pivotal buyer dummy. The dummy variable, CD, represents suppliers on which 
customer industries are dependent. The dummy variable, PB, represents suppliers that have a pivotal 
buyer relationship with their customers. I regress, equation (2), abnormal operating performance after 
downstream deconsolidation on customer dependence and pivotal buyer, as well. I proxy for customer 
dependence using an indicator variable, CD, that equals one for suppliers in which the customer is 
dependent and is zero, otherwise. Similarly, I proxy for pivotal buyer using an indicator variable, PB, that 
equals one for suppliers that are dependent on customers, have high fixed costs, and have high industry 
concentration dependent and is zero, otherwise. I also control for supplier dependence using an indicator 
variable, SD, which equals one for suppliers that are dependent and is zero, otherwise, to capture the 
influence of pivotal buyers.17 I employ the same control variables as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) and 
Shumacher (1991) with respect to both customers and suppliers to be consistent with their methodology.18 
In addition, I control for industries that have high fixed costs and high supplier concentration but lack 
                                                     
17Suppliers are dependent by definition of a pivotal buyer such that the buyer is essential to their business decisions. 
18Bhattacharyya and Nain obtain measures of the determinants of industry profitability such as competition, barriers 
to entry, and product differentiation from the work of Shumacher (1991).  
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supplier dependence to unofficially proxy for suppliers that do not have a pivotal buyer relationship but 
have similar fixed costs and industry structure.  
Supplier profitability is positively associated with more concentrated industry conditions, 
increased barriers to entry, and increased product differentiation. Hence, I anticipate that the coefficients 
on these barriers to positive. As stated earlier, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) with respect to my 
choice of explanatory variables and dependent variable. I use the Herfindahl index, a traditional measure 
of industry concentration. The Herfindahl index is sum of the squared market shares of the firms within 
an industry; it is often used to capture industry competitiveness. High barriers to entry make it difficult for 
firms to enter and compete with existing firms in a given industry. I measure barriers to entry using 
capital intensity and capital expenditures to capture the effect of high capital requirements in a given 
industry. I calculate capital intensity as industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry total 
sales (Compustat item 12), for every four-digit SIC in a given year. I calculate capital expenditures as 
industry total capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) divided by industry total assets (Compustat item 
6). Capital intensity gives a scaled measure of the annual total capital stock relative at given point in time. 
In comparison, capital expenditures give a scaled measure of essential annual capital investment in an 
industry. Advertising intensity is used as a substitute measure for product differentiation in an industry. I 
calculate advertising intensity as industry total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by 
industry total sales. Tables 13 and 14 provide us estimates of equations (1) and (2) using OLS with robust 
standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC level. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. 
To examine these results, I utilize a similar interpretation as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in the 
analysis of the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance, predominantly by comparing 
the change in the coefficient/significance of the dependence (or pivotal buyer) variable. In Columns 1 and 
3 Table 13, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier industry abnormal cash flow 
margin and supplier abnormal return on assets prior to the downstream divestiture. The coefficient on the 
customer dependence dummy, α1, is statistically insignificant in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the 
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profitability of suppliers that have dependent customers is unnoticeably different than those which have 
non-dependent customers prior to a horizontal divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer 
dummy, α2, is statistically significant, at the 1% level, and positive in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that 
the profitability of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is significantly higher from non-pivotal buyers 
prior to a horizontal divestiture event.  
In Columns 2 and 4 of Table 13, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier 
industry abnormal cash flow margin and supplier abnormal return on assets subsequent to the downstream 
divestiture. The coefficient on the customer dependence dummy, γ1, is statistically insignificant in 
Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A of Table 13, suggesting that the profitability of suppliers that have dependent 
customers is still indistinguishable from those which have non-dependent customers subsequent to a 
horizontal divestiture event. Thus, abnormal accounting performance for suppliers that have dependent 
customers does not appear to change significantly following a downstream divestiture event, which does 
not support the notion that suppliers act opportunistically and expropriate customers following horizontal 
divestitures. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy, γ2, is now insignificant in Columns 2 and 4, 
suggesting that the profitability of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is not significant and 
indistinguishable from non-pivotal buyers subsequent to a horizontal divestiture event. Therefore the 
difference in the coefficients for α2 and γ2 indicates that abnormal accounting performance for suppliers 
that have a pivotal buyer relationship is at least 10% higher than those that do not have a pivotal buyer 
relationship prior to the divestiture, which disappears subsequent to the horizontal divestiture event. Thus, 
it appears that pivotal buyers seem to be able to use horizontal divestitures as an opportunity to reposition 
themselves, reducing cross-subsidization by suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry. 
Supplier profitability does not appear to be significantly influenced by customer barriers to entry. I 
document that supplier annual capital investment required in an industry appears to be associated with 
higher cash flow margins. Hence, the results indicate that concentrated supplier industries with greater 
barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation do not enjoy larger increases in supplier profitability following 
downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer industries, failing to support the supplier 
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opportunism hypothesis. Also, the evidence fails to support the rival opportunism hypothesis, which 
states that horizontal divestitures will generate an offsetting effect as rivals capture lost market power at 
the expense of divesting firms. 
In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 14, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier 
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets and supplier abnormal cash flow-to-enterprise 
value prior to the downstream divestiture. Similar to the results from Table 13, the coefficient on the 
customer dependence dummy, α1, is statistically insignificant in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the 
value of suppliers that have dependent customers is unremarkably different than those which have non-
dependent customers prior to a horizontal divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy, 
α2, is statistically significant, at the 5% level at least, and positive in Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that the 
value of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is significantly higher from non-pivotal buyers prior to a 
horizontal divestiture event.  
In Columns 2 and 4 of Table 14, the dependent variables are the two-year average of supplier 
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets and supplier abnormal cash flow-to-enterprise 
value subsequent to the downstream divestiture. The coefficient on the customer dependence dummy, γ1, 
is statistically insignificant in Columns 2 and 4, suggesting that the value of suppliers that have dependent 
customers continues to be indistinguishable from those which have non-dependent customers subsequent 
to a horizontal divestiture event. Thus, abnormal value based measures of operating performance for 
suppliers that have dependent customers does not appear to change significantly following a downstream 
divestiture event. The coefficient on the pivotal buyer dummy, γ2, is now insignificant in Columns 2 and 
4, suggesting that the value of suppliers in a pivotal buyer relationship is not significant and 
indistinguishable from non-pivotal buyers subsequent to a horizontal divestiture event. Therefore, the 
difference in the coefficients for α2 and γ2 specifies that abnormal value based operating performance for 
suppliers that have a pivotal buyer relationship is at least 3.5% higher than those that do not have a pivotal 
buyer relationship prior to the divestiture but dissipates subsequent to the divestiture.  
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Supplier profitability does not appear to be significantly influenced by customer barriers to entry 
in general. I document that supplier annual capital investment required in an industry appears to be 
associated with higher cash flow margins. I report that supplier value is higher in industries in which their 
customer industries have higher capital stock. Since customer concentration tends to be associated with 
customer barriers to entry, this suggest that customers with high capital stock prior to horizontal 
divestitures may face a reduction in buying power for subsequent to horizontal divestitures and mildly 
supports the notion of supplier opportunism. I also report that value is higher in supplier industries with 
greater concentration and high annual capital investment requirements. The evidence supports most of the 
findings from the previous paragraphs but also suggest that pivotal buyer repositioning of customers 
subsequent to horizontal divestitures is value relevant for suppliers that cross-subsidize pivotal buyers 
prior to horizontal divestitures. It appears that certain barriers to entry (annual capital investment and 
supplier concentration) are important prior to and subsequent to horizontal divestitures but do not 
decrease significantly subsequent to horizontal divestitures. Therefore, the results fail to support the idea 
that concentrated supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will enjoy 
larger increases in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation of concentrated customer 
industries.  
Qualitatively speaking, the results from Table 14 are suggestive of the pivotal buyer repositioning 
notion that if downstream horizontal divesture events allow pivotal buyers to reposition themselves, then 
supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to the event will suffer greater declines in 
profitability following downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. Yet, these results, with respect 
to supplier barriers to entry, are somewhat supportive of the waterbed effects hypothesis, which indicates 
that if downstream divestiture events lead to asymmetric buying power, concentrated supplier industries 
with greater barriers to entry be better positioned to price discriminate subsequent to downstream 
divestiture events. 
With respect to the supplier opportunism hypothesis that indicates that suppliers will 
opportunistically take advantage of downstream divesting firms subsequent to horizontal divestitures, I 
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expect that the coefficient, α1, will be positive in equation (1) but to be significantly smaller in magnitude 
relative to γ1 in equation (2). With respect to the customer opportunism hypothesis that suggests that 
pivotal buyers use horizontal divestitures to reposition themselves with respect to suppliers, I expect that 
the coefficient, α2, will be significantly smaller in magnitude relative to γ2 in equation (2) to highlight the 
reversal of the buyers’ pivotal position. The waterbed effect hypothesis posits that horizontal divestitures 
generate offsetting changes in input prices in favor of industry rivals (at the expense of divesting firms), 
which suggests that the coefficients, α1 and α2, in equation (1) will not be statistically distinguishable 
from γ1 and γ2, in equation (2), respectively. I fail to reject the null for hypotheses 1 and 9 but reject the 
null for hypothesis 5. Thus, the evidence from Table 14 appears to primarily provide evidence in support 
of the pivotal repositioning hypothesis.  
3.4.3. Supplier industry selling prices 
For every supplier of a deconsolidating industry, I acquire the Producer Price Index (PPI) from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).19 The PPI series permit us to capture the fluctuations in prices 
obtained by domestic producers for their goods and services. I account for inflation the PPI series by 
using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. I delineate the deflated PPI series as the Real 
Producer Price Index (RPPI).  
3.4.4. Univariate analysis 
I conduct independent sample t-tests on the RPPI series for the two years prior to divestiture and 
the two years after divestiture. I test difference in means of the real producer price index series (RPPI) 
prior to and subsequent to downstream deconsolidation; these tests will be conducted for all supplier 
industries, between suppliers on which customers are dependent and not dependent. I test the difference in 
                                                     
19 The Producer Price Index series follows the prices of goods sold by wholesalers. The index represents typical 
changes in prices obtained by domestic producers for their production. Methodical sampling techniques of 
practically every mining through manufacturing industry in the economy are used to calculate producer price 
indexes. In concept, the Producer Price Index is calculated according to the modified Laspeyres formula: 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 =
∑ × 100𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃0 , where It, is the price index in the current period; P0 is the price of a commodity; Pt is the current price 
of the commodity; and Qa represents the quantity shipped during the weight-base period. Additional information can 
be found in Chapter 14, Producers Prices, BLS Handbook of Methods 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch14.pdf. 
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the means of the real producer price index between suppliers on which customers are dependent and 
suppliers on which customers are not dependent, prior to and after downstream deconsolidation. I use the 
univariate analysis to perform initial tests of my second set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2, 6, and 10) 
regarding the impact downstream deconsolidation of supplier’s prices. Table 15 reports descriptive 
statistics of the entire supplier industry RPPI over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture, the 
two years subsequent to the downstream divestiture, and the difference between the two prices. The 
difference is negative and insignificant. Then I split the split the sample into distinct groups: dependent 
customers and non-dependent customers, and pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers. Panel A of Table 15 
illustrates that suppliers with dependent customers pay significantly lower prices than those with non-
dependent customers before and after downstream deconsolidation of at least the 5% level of significance. 
While both groups, dependent and non-dependent customers, experience negative and insignificantly 
lower prices after the downstream divestiture, the difference-in-differences test in the last row of Panel A 
of Table 15 indicates that this decline in prices is not significantly larger for non-dependent customers.  
Panel B of Table 15 illustrates that suppliers with pivotal buyers do not pay significantly lower 
prices than those with non-pivotal buyers before and after downstream deconsolidation at traditional level 
of significance. Both suppliers with pivotal and non-pivotal buyers, fail to experience significantly 
different RPPI after the downstream divestiture and the difference-in-differences test in the last row of 
Panel A of Table 15 indicates that this difference in prices is not significantly larger for pivotal buyer 
relative to non-pivotal buyers before and after the downstream divestiture event. My univariate tests fail 
to reject both the supplier opportunism and pivotal buyer repositioning hypotheses, hence, my univariate 
results support the waterbed effect relative to the supplier opportunism and pivotal buyer repositioning 
hypotheses. 
3.4.5. Multivariate analysis 
 Following Bhattacharyya and Nain’s (2011) multivariate approach with only slight modifications, 
I estimate a pooled OLS model with Newey-West standard errors to continue examining the impact of 
deconsolidation of real producers’ prices in Equation (3). 
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Δrppi jt =  α0 + α1CD j  + α2PBj  + α3Δrppi_inp1 jt + α4 Δrppi_inp2 jt + α5Δwage jt + α6Δtp t + εjt            (3) 
I take the natural logarithm of the RPPI of supplier industry j. The dummy variable, CDj, 
represents the customer industries that are dependent on suppliers. The dummy variable, PBj, represents 
the supplier industries that are characterized by a pivotal buyer relationship. The other explanatory 
variables in the regression control for industry demand conditions, and other factors of production that 
may influence producers’ prices. The control variables rppi_inp1jt and rppi_inp2jt represent the natural 
logarithm of RPPI of supplier industry j’s two primary input factors. I use the I-O tables in order to 
determine supplier industry j’s two primary inputs by calculating weights, wji, that correspond to the share 
that supplier industry i provides for supplier industry j. I rank these weights and take the top two-ranked 
industries i that supply industry j.20 I obtain price data for these inputs from BLS. I also take the natural 
logarithm of the control variable wage, which represents the average hourly earnings of production 
workers in the mining and manufacturing industries. However, these figures on hourly earnings are given 
only at the three-digit SIC level. I apply the correspond three-digit SIC code that matches the four-digit 
SIC code industries. I also control for industry demand conditions using the natural log of the industrial 
production index, tp. Industrial production data are obtained from Federal Reserve Board. The industrial 
production index measures the amount of productivity from the manufacturing, mining, electric and gas 
industries. I incorporate a time trend dummy, industry dummies at the two-digit SIC level, and year 
dummies to control for industry and time-specific factors. 
 I estimate equation (3) for all supplier industries over the 24 months prior to downstream 
deconsolidation in column (1) and then independently over the 24 months subsequent to downstream 
deconsolidation in column (2), disregarding the divestiture-event quarter. Using the input prices and 
industrial production allow us to control for price fluctuations in supplier industries in order to better 
assess the impact of my variables of interest. Table 16 shows results from the multivariate analysis of 
                                                     
20 As in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I too mitigate the potential issue of endogeneity amongst control variable 
input prices and the dependent variable in my regression by confirming that the industries that contribute the 
primary inputs of the supplier maintain no product market association with that of the downstream divesting 
industry. 
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suppliers selling prices. Column 1 in Table 16 shows that the coefficients of customer dependence 
dummy, CD, and pivotal buyer dummy, PBI, are positive and statistically insignificant in the period 
before the downstream divestiture event. Hence, after I take into account factor prices and demand 
conditions, price changes in supplier industries with dependent customers is no longer significantly 
different from those with non-dependent customers prior to the downstream divestiture event. The 
insignificance of the pivotal buyer dummy reiterates the evidence from the univariate test, suggesting that 
there is no significant difference in prices prior to the downstream divestiture event after controlling for 
factor prices.  
Yet, Column 2 in Table 16 shows that the coefficient of customer dependence dummy, CD, is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient of pivotal buyer dummy, PB, is negative 
and significant at the 10% level. Thus after the downstream divestiture event, dependent customers do 
experience significantly adverse increases in input prices relative to non-dependent customers. This 
evidence suggests that supplier industries charge dependent customer industries roughly 0.2% higher 
prices per month relative to non-dependent customer industries subsequent to the downstream 
deconsolidation. In contrast, after the downstream divestiture event, suppliers with pivotal buyers 
experience significantly adverse decline in prices relative to those with non-pivotal buyers. The size of the 
pivotal buyer coefficient suggests that the drop in prices for suppliers with pivotal buyers is about 0.2% 
greater than suppliers with non-pivotal buyers. 
 Again, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) to control for industry demand related factors to 
isolate the impact of our variables of interest on producers’ prices. Once I have controlled for industry 
demand conditions and factor price fluctuations, I must still distinguish whether or not customer 
dependence on a supplier industry and suppliers with pivotal buyers impact sellers’ prices prior to and 
subsequent to divestiture. I estimate equation (4) to make this distinction. 
Δrppijt =  α0 + α1CDj + α2PBj + α3Δrppi_inp1 jt + α4Δrppi_inp2 jt + α5Δwage jt + α6Δtp t + α7PDjt + 
α8CDjPDjt + α9PBjPDjt + εjt                     
(4) 
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I include in equation (4), three additional explanatory variables. I use the original indicator 
variables, CD and PB, in this regression to measure customer dependence on a supplier industry and 
suppliers with a pivotal buyer in equation (4). PD represents the indicator variable for post-divestiture, 
which is equal to one for the period subsequent to the downstream divestiture event, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient for PD, α7 accounts for the variation in average price levels after downstream 
deconsolidation for all suppliers. The coefficient for PD, α7 also accounts for any potential exogenous 
shocks that may influence price levels in the post-deconsolidation period in supplier industries, in 
addition to prompt divestitures in downstream industries. I also include an interaction term, my variables 
of interest, CDjPDjt and PBjPDjt,, determines if there is a differential in average producer prices post 
downstream divestiture for dependent customers and pivotal buyers, respectively. If the coefficient for 
CDjPDjt  (DjPDjt), α8 (α9), is positive (negative) and significant, then it would suggest further evidence in 
line with the customer expropriation (supplier expropriation) hypothesis. I anticipate that the coefficients 
on my control input prices and proxy for industry demand conditions will be positive and significant, 
suggesting that these underlying factors influence suppliers’ prices. Column 3 of Table 16 displays the 
results from the empirical test of equation (4) using the difference-in-differences approach. In Column 3, 
the interaction coefficient, denoting the post-divestiture effect of customer dependence, CDjPDjt, has the 
appropriate sign, positive, but is indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, in Column 3 the interaction 
coefficient identifying the post-divestiture effect on pivotal buyers, PBjPDjt,, has the appropriate sign, 
negative, but is also statistically insignificant. The evidence from Column 3 of Table 16 does not further 
corroborate the findings from Columns 1 and 2. 
As in Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), I attempt to use a differences-in-differences regression 
model to illustrate that the potential difference in effect of downstream deconsolidation on suppliers’ 
prices does not rely upon the regression technique employed. The difference-in-differences approach 
represents the interaction term between the variables of interest (i.e., CDj, PBj) and the post-divestiture 
variable, PD, to isolate the effect of CDj or PBj subsequent to the divestiture event on producers’ prices. I 
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execute the cross-sectional regression using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit 
SIC industry level as shown in equation (5). 
ΔlnRPPIj = α0 + α1CDj +α2PBj+α3ΔlnRPPI_INPj+α4ΔlnRPPI_INP2t+α5ΔlnWAGEt+α6ΔlnTP+εj           (5) 
I drop the time subscript in equation (5).The dependent variable, ∆lnRPPIj, represents supplier j’s 
average natural log of RPPI over the two years after the downstream divestiture less the average natural 
log of RPPI over the two years prior to the downstream divestiture. My control variables take on similar 
meaning. I take the changes in the average factor prices, wages, and total productivity. My variables of 
interest are CDj and PBj, the indicator variables for customer dependence on the supplier industry and 
suppliers with a pivotal buyer, respectively. Column 4 of Table 16 presents the empirical estimates of 
equation (5). The number of observations in Column 4 is fewer than 30 and the results are interpreted 
with caution. The coefficient on the customer dependence variable, CD, has the correct sign (positive) and 
is statistically insignificant. Likewise, the coefficient on pivotal buyer variable, PB, also has the 
appropriate sign (negative) but is statistically insignificant. The evidence from Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
16 does not validate the evidence from Columns 1 and 2, with respect to the variable, CD, results fail to 
demonstrate that suppliers of dependent customer industries undergo greater increases in selling prices 
(real producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream deconsolidation and are, thus, weakly consistent with 
the customer expropriation hypothesis. Similarly, the evidence from Columns 3 and 4 of Table 16 does 
not substantiate the evidence from Columns 1 and 2, with respect to the variable, CD, and thus narrowly 
supports the idea that dependent supplier industries experience larger declines in selling prices (real 
producers’ prices) subsequent to downstream divestiture events, which is not supportive of the customer 
opportunism hypothesis. In contrast, the waterbed effect hypothesis posits that neither supplier nor 
customer industry dependence will have an impact on selling prices (real producers’ prices) subsequent to 
downstream deconsolidation Overall, evidence from real producers’ prices provide mixed evidence at 
best. I document weak evidence in support of the customer expropriation and supplier expropriation 
hypotheses and moderate evidence in support of the waterbed effects hypothesis. 
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3.4.6. Distinguishing amongst diminishing buying power, efficiency, and pivotal buyer reposition 
hypotheses 
The multivariate analyses, so far, should establish whether a (an) decrease (increase) in selling 
prices demonstrates pivotal buyer repositioning (diminishing buying power) amongst horizontally 
divesting downstream industries. Yet, it is not quite clear whether these price effects are explained solely 
by pivotal buyer repositioning or (diminishing buyer power). Highly concentrated industries are likely 
environments for the demonstration of market power in the form collusion, market foreclosure effects, or 
monopsonistic practices, hence, I must distinguish between the impact of efficiency produced by 
deconsolidation and price decreases and any price increases associate with concentrated industries.  
 Customers with pricing power would be the likely subject of diminished buying power (enhanced 
selling power from the perspective of the supplier) as submitted by countervailing power theory. The 
pivotal buyer model conjectures that there are one or few suppliers; hence, I would expect that 
concentrated suppliers would be a likely target for pivotal buyers looking to reposition themselves. Prior 
research indicates that Compustat measures of industry concentration are deficient substitutes of actual 
industry concentration, thus, we  employ Becker and Thomas’s (2011) estimates of the Herfinadahl index 
using the Compustat Segment Database, which I designate as sup_herf for supplier industries and 
cust_herf for customer industries. Ali, Klasa. and Yeung (2008) indicate that the use of Compustat data to 
measure industry concentration may capture some other effect, which may lead to improper inferences. 
To examine my third set of hypotheses, I employ multiple measures of pricing power of both supplier and 
customer industries. I employ estimates of the four-firm concentration ratio following Cremers, Nair, and 
Peyer (2007), which I designate for supplier industries as sup_con and customer industries as cust_con, 
for supplier industries and customer industries respectively. I calculate the four-firm concentration ratio 
by taking the proportion of entire industry sales that is accounted for by the collective sales of the four 
largest firms in the industry. I use only the year prior to the horizontal divestiture to preserve the size of 
my sample to measure capital intensity, capital expenditures, and advertising expenses. I use following 
regression model to measure these relationships in the following equation.  
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ΔlnRPPIj =  α0  + α1Concentration/Barrierj + α2ΔlnRPPI_INP1j + α3ΔlnRPPI_INP2t + α4ΔlnWAGEt  + 
α5ΔlnTP + εj                          (6) 
 
The measures of customer industry structure should allow us to empirically test the supplier 
opportunism hypothesis that suggests if downstream deconsolidation moderates buying power, customer 
industries with greater levels of concentration prior to the downstream divestiture event will experience 
greater increases in selling prices following the downstream divestiture event. Table 17 presents 
relationship between changes in supplier selling prices and customer market power prior to downstream 
deconsolidation in a cross-sectional regression framework. I note that the number of observations for each 
column in my cross-sectional framework in Table 17 is below 30, therefore the results must be interpreted 
with caution and are considered qualitative in nature. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 17 present the regression 
estimates of equation (6) with my measures of customer industry concentration. Both coefficients on 
cust_con and cust_herf are positive and insignificant. Also, Panels A and B of Table 14 document that 
customer industry concentration has no significant of supplier industry abnormal operating performance. 
Collectively, these results indicate that customer concentration has no effect on supplier pricing and 
supplier operating performance. 
The proxies for customer barriers to entry allow me to test hypothesis 4 related to barriers to 
entry. Similarly, I anticipate that the coefficients for the proxies for barriers to entry in the year prior to 
horizontal deconsolidation should result in positive coefficients. Columns 3-5 of Table 17 reports that 
only one of three customer barriers to entry, customer capital intensity, is statistically significant and 
negative. These results provide weak evidence customer structural barriers play a significant role in 
supplier pricing. Moreover, the results from Table 17 fail to substantiate the supplier opportunism 
hypothesis and provide indirect support for the waterbed effects hypothesis, which suggests that 
significant horizontal divestiture activity induces asymmetric input price changes in favor of industry 
rivals. 
The measures of supplier industry structure permit us to empirically assess the customer pivotal 
buyer repositioning hypothesis that suggests if downstream deconsolidation reverses a pivotal buyer’s 
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pivotal position, supplier industries with higher concentration prior to downstream deconsolidation will 
undergo a greater reduction in selling prices following downstream deconsolidation. Table 18 reports the 
relationship between changes in supplier selling prices and supplier pricing power prior to downstream 
deconsolidation in a cross-sectional regression framework. Similar to Table 17, I note that the number of 
observations for each column in my cross-sectional framework in Table 18 is below 30 and that the 
results must be interpreted with caution and are considered qualitative in nature. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 18 indicate that one of two supplier industry concentration measures are significant, sup_con, at the 
1% level. Overall, the evidence is mixed and suggest that downstream horizontal divestitures contribute to 
the reversal of a pivotal buyer’s pivotal position, indicating that supplier industries with higher 
concentration prior to the downstream divestiture event will experience a greater drop in selling prices 
subsequent to the divestiture.  
By the same token, the coefficients for the proxies of barriers to entry allow us to test the pivotal 
buyer hypothesis that postulates if downstream horizontal divestitures allow pivotal buyers to reposition 
themselves, supplier industries with greater barriers to entry prior to deconsolidation will undergo greater 
declines in selling prices subsequent to downstream deconsolidation of customer industries. Similarly, I 
anticipate that the proxies for the barriers to entry in the year prior to horizontal deconsolidation should 
result in negative coefficients. In contrast, the rival opportunism/waterbed effect hypothesis predicts that 
the measures for coefficients of supplier concentration and barriers to entry will only enhance the 
waterbed effect, leading to offsetting price changes, and therefore coefficients indistinguishable from 
zero. Columns 3-5 of Table 18 indicate that one of the three supplier industry barriers to entry are 
significant, sup_ks, at the 10% level, and negative. This provides weak evidence in support of the pivotal 
buyer hypothesis. Overall, Table 18 provides weak to moderate evidence in support of the pivotal buyer 
repositioning hypothesis. 
3.4.7. Customer industry operating performance 
Similar to prior analysis of operating performance, I follow Bhattacharyya and Nain with respect 
to my analysis of pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance of customer industry 
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operating performance. I begin my multivariate analysis of upstream divestitures on customer industry 
operating performance using the following two regression models estimated using a pooled times series 
panel with clustered standard errors by customer two-digit SIC codes. 
PreDivCustOperPerfm = α0 + α1SDj + α2supp_herfjt + α3supp_ksjt + α4supp_capexjt + α5supp_advertjt + 
εjt                    (7) 
 
PostDivCustOperPerfm = α0 + α1SDj + α2supp_herfjt + α3 supp_ksjt + α4supp_capexmt + α5supp_advertjt 
+ εjt                    (8) 
 
Using these two models, I investigate the effect of upstream deconsolidation on customer industry 
operating performance to empirically test the supplier opportunism hypothesis, customer opportunism 
hypothesis, and the waterbed effect hypothesis, with respect to operating performance, industry structure 
concentration, and ruling out industry demand considerations, correspondingly. PreDivCustOperPerf and 
PostDivCustOperPerf are the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performances of customer m, 
respectively. I employ measures of customer operating performance similar to those described above in 
section 3.4.3.2. I use the accounting based measure of operating performance, the cash flow-to-sales ratio 
and the value based measure of operating performance, the cash-flow-to-market value of assets ratio.  
I focus on the supplier dependence dummy, SD, and the continuous variable fmj, to represent 
supplier dependence. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer 
industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the 
downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy, SD, equals one 
if fmj is in the top quintile, and is equal to zero otherwise. The control variables sup_herf, sup_ks, 
sup_capex, and supp_advert take on similar meanings as defined earlier. Table 19 provides us estimates 
of equations (8) and (9) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC 
level and year dummies.  
Once again, I employ a consistent interpretation as Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) in the analysis 
of the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture operating performance, primarily by comparing the change in 
value/significance of the dependence variable. In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 19, the dependent variables is 
the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash-flow margin prior to the upstream divestiture. 
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The coefficients for the proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, are statistically insignificant in 
Columns 1 and 3, suggesting that supplier dependence (or the extent of supplier dependence) on customer 
industries has no effect on customer industry profitability prior to upstream divestitures. In Columns 2 
and 4 of Table 19, the dependent variable is the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash 
flow margin subsequent to the upstream divestiture. However, the coefficients for the proxies for supplier 
dependence, SD and fmj, are, now, both positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level), indicating 
that there is a significant positive association between supplier dependence subsequent to the upstream 
divestiture event. The size of the coefficient for SD in Column 2 suggests that the abnormal cash-flow 
margins of customer industries on which supplier industries are dependent are roughly 4.9% higher than 
those customer industries on which suppliers industries are not dependent. This evidence supports the 
supplier expropriation hypothesis that suggests customers of dependent supplier industries experience 
greater favorable changes in abnormal cash flow margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream 
divestiture event relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries. 
In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 20, the dependent variables is the two-year average of customer 
industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets prior to the upstream divestiture event. The 
coefficients for the proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, reiterate are statistically insignificant in 
Columns 1 and 3, and reiterate the evidence found in Table 19, suggesting that supplier dependence has 
no effect on customer value prior to the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4 of 20, the 
dependent variable is the two-year average of customer industry abnormal cash flow-to-market value of 
assets following the upstream divestiture event. The proxies for supplier dependence, SD and fmj, are, 
again, both positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level), indicating that there is a significant 
positive association between supplier dependence subsequent to the upstream divestiture event. The 
magnitude of the coefficient for SD in Column 2 suggests that the abnormal cash flow-to-market value of 
assets in customer industries on which supplier industries are dependent are roughly 2.3% higher than 
those customer industries on which suppliers industries are not dependent. Therefore, the results from 
Table 20 corroborate those from Table 19, which indicates that customers of dependent supplier 
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industries experience improved changes in accounting performance and value in the two years subsequent 
to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier industries. Again, this 
evidence suggests that customer industries exploit upstream divesting firms in the years subsequent to the 
divestiture via an improved bargaining position. 
Next, I evaluate whether upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power by testing if customers 
whose suppliers have higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater 
favorable changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years 
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation. I test this conjecture using the variable 
supp_herf in Table 19. In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 19, the coefficient is negative (negative t-stat) and 
significant, with respect to its effect on pre-divestiture customer industry profitability. However in 
Columns 2 and 4, the variable supp_herf becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting its effect becomes 
more positive subsequent to the upstream divestiture event. In contrast to the results from Table 19, 
supp_herf is statistically insignificant in Columns 1-4 in Table 20. The results suggests that supplier 
industry concentration has no impact on customer industry value prior to the divestiture event nor 
subsequent to the divesture event. Hence, the results from Table 20 provide mixed evidence in support of 
the supplier expropriation hypothesis, suggesting that higher supplier concentration prior to the divestiture 
is associated with customer improvements in accounting performance but has no long-term implications 
for customer value. 
I, now, focus on determining whether the supplier expropriation effects can be attributed to 
industry demand or whether supplier structural barriers are important to witnessing these effects. I test 
whether significant upstream divestiture activity reduces selling power. If so, I can expect customers 
whose suppliers have higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation to experience greater 
favorable changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years 
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.  I examine the following proxies for 
supplier barriers to entry, supp_ks, supp_capex, and supp_advert in Table 20. I find evidence that one of 
the three barriers to entry, supp_capex is, for the most part, positive and significant, Tables 19 and 20. 
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The evidence is mixed with respect to supp_ks, therefore, I conclude that there is weak evidence to 
suggest that certain supplier barriers to entry influence customer profitability subsequent to upstream 
divestiture activity. Thus, overall supplier pricing power and barriers appears to play to some modest role 
in customer industry profitability subsequent to an upstream divestiture event, which further substantiates 
the supplier expropriation hypothesis. Next, I determine whether customer improvements in profitability 
and value can be attributed to supplier bargaining power by examining the impact customer industry 
abnormal input costs. 
Now, I explore whether customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in 
abnormal costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation 
relative to customers of less dependent supplier industries in Table 21. Table 21 provides us estimates of 
equations (8) and (9) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the supplier two-digit SIC level 
and year dummies to evaluate customer industry pre- and post-divestiture abnormal cost structure. The 
dependent variable in both equations (8) and (9) is abnormal cost-of-goods sold margin, ACGSM. The 
ACGSM of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio minus the 
cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods sold-to-sales 
ratio is defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). I 
consider the supplier expropriation hypothesis and, again, focus on my attention on the supplier 
dependence dummy, SD. In Column 1 of Table 21, the dependent variable is the average ACGSM in 
customer industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 1 of Table 
21, the coefficient on SD is positive and significant, at the 10% level, prior to the upstream divestiture 
event. In Column 2 of Table 21, the dependent variable is the average abnormal cost-of-goods sold 
margin, ACGSM, in customer industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture event. In 
comparison, in Column 2 of Table 21, the coefficient on SD is positive and statistically insignificant. The 
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the average abnormal input costs (cost-of-goods sold margin) 
for customers industries with dependent suppliers decline by about 2.3% relative to customers with non-
dependent supplier industries following an upstream divestiture event. Therefore, the results from Table 
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21 support the conjecture that customers of dependent supplier industries enjoy greater declines in 
abnormal input costs in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of 
less dependent supplier industries. Overall, the evidence from the upstream divestiture sample provides 
moderate to strong evidence in support of the customer opportunism/supplier expropriation hypothesis.  
3.5. Conclusion 
 This study executes the first broad, cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of 
horizontal divestitures on supplier (customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices 
(profitability, value, and input costs). I document moderately strong evidence that upstream divestitures 
erode supplier selling power and impact customer profitability, value, and cost structures. Customers 
exploit suppliers dependent on customers industries for sales in their production process in the years after 
major upstream divestiture activity. Customers of dependent suppliers experience noteworthy increases in 
profitability and value, and significant declines in average input costs in the years subsequent to the 
divestiture event.  I also report that certain supplier barriers to entry, supplier capital expenditures play a 
role in customer profitability. Suppliers with high capital investment requirements contribute to greater 
customer profitability and value, suggesting mild evidence that upstream divestitures reduce upstream 
countervailing power. 
This study also presents modest evidence that corroborates the notion that horizontal 
deconsolidation activity affords pivotal buyers the opportunity to reposition themselves with respect to 
dependent suppliers in concentrated industries with substantial fixed costs. Suppliers with pivotal buyers 
endure considerable drops in profitability and value in the two years following large downstream 
divestiture activity. I document, as well, weak evidence that suppliers with pivotal buyers suffer 
noticeable declines in selling prices, in the two years subsequent to significant downstream divestiture 
activity. 
This study reports little to moderate evidence to support the indication that opportunistic rivals 
take advantage of divesting firms diminished market power, which then generates offsetting within-
industry increases and decreases in input costs. Lastly, this study documents little to no support for the 
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notion that opportunistic suppliers take advantage of the diminished buying power of dependent customer 
industries in the years subsequent to significant downstream divestiture activity. 
To demonstrate that these results are not a repercussion of efficiency enhancements or industry 
demand, I investigate the role of both supplier and customer market structure and power on suppliers’ 
prices and customer profitability and value. I provide mixed qualitative evidence that suppliers with high 
four-firm industry concentration ratios prior to downstream deconsolidation experience greater price 
reductions in the years following the downstream divestiture event. These results indicate that 
downstream divestiture activity potentially creates an opportunity for pivotal buyers to reverse their 
pivotal position and exploit their suppliers’ weakened bargaining position. 
 To my understanding, this is the first study to document that dependent suppliers play an 
important role in customer industry operating performance and cost structure following significant 
upstream divestiture activity. This is also the first paper to develop and report evidence in support of the 
pivotal buyer repositioning hypothesis, in the context of horizontal divestitures, supplementing the work 
of Raskovich (2003) and Adilov and Alexander (2006). Finally, this study complements the findings of 
Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) by reporting that, in 
addition to horizontal consolidation, horizontal deconsolidation activity has implications for supplier 
profitability, value, and pricing power and customer profitability, value, and cost structure.  
102 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation explores the impact of horizontal divestitures on economically linked firms 
exploiting, both, firm and industry level data. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the 
product market effect of a sample of horizontal asset sales from 1988 to 2005 on actual corporate 
customers, suppliers, and industry rivals using a sample of firms that classifies corporate customers, 
suppliers, and industry competitors of firms proposing horizontal asset sales. The second essay of this 
dissertation performs an extensive empirical cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of 
46 downstream (35 upstream) quarterly horizontal divestiture events from 1979-2010 on supplier 
(customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices (profitability, value, and input 
costs). Prior studies examine the product market effects of horizontal acquisitions, vertical acquisitions 
and divestitures, but this stream of literature fails to account for the impact of horizontal divestitures on 
product market relationships. This line of research is important because extant literatures tend to view 
events such as mergers, acquisitions, and other important corporate events in isolation.  
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the firm level effects of horizontal asset sales 
by investigating the wealth effects at announcement and post-divestiture changes in abnormal operating 
performance around divestitures for divesting firms, customers, and suppliers. I document evidence that 
divestiture related wealth effects for divesting parent firms are associated with efficiencies resulting from 
the reduction of firm bureaucracy and financing constraints. I also provide evidence that managers need to 
consider balancing post-divestiture productivity gains with potential declines in profitability due to 
reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Horizontal asset sales are distinct from vertical divestitures, 
since I find evidence that parent firm divestiture gains are not shared by their industry rivals, corporate 
customers and suppliers. In contrast, vertical divestitures generate positive wealth effects for divesting 
firms and are shared by industry rivals, corporate customers, and suppliers.  
The second chapter of this dissertation also finds that horizontal asset sales have negative wealth 
effects for industry rivals, corporate customers, and certain subsamples of suppliers. In addition, the 
evidence suggests that factors such as customer (supplier) switching costs and industry structure tend to 
103 
 
 
 
play an important role in the wealth effects of customers (suppliers) at announcement of upstream 
(downstream) divestitures. I report that customers less reliant on divesting firms experience significantly 
more negative median abnormal returns and more negative than positive abnormal returns than reliant 
customers. However, I find that downstream horizontal asset sales are damaging to suppliers with high 
switching costs but are valuable to supplier portfolios with lower switching costs. 
The third chapter of this dissertation documents the opportunistic behavior of economically 
linked firms, such as customers and suppliers, in the context of horizontal divestitures. I conduct a 
complete empirical cross-industry analysis of the product market effects of horizontal divestitures on 
upstream (downstream) industries by exploring profits, value, and prices (profits, value, and input costs). 
I find that opportunistic customers take advantage of supplier dependence in the years following 
significant upstream divestiture activity. Consequently, these customers enjoy significant increases in 
profitability, value, and a considerable drop in input costs relative to customers of non-dependent 
suppliers.  
Additionally, the third chapter of this dissertation indicates that suppliers with pivotal buyers 
suffer unfavorable changes in profitability and value in the years subsequent to downstream divestiture 
activity relative to suppliers with non-pivotal buyers. The evidence suggests that pivotal buyers capitalize 
on significant downstream divestiture activity to reverse their pivotal position and eliminate cross-
subsidization by suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry. The third chapter of this 
dissertation fails to present sufficient evidence to substantiate supplier and rival opportunism subsequent 
to downstream horizontal deconsolidation.  
Collectively, the second and third chapters of this dissertation indicate that horizontal divestiture 
activity prompts opportunistic behavior. I document, at the firm level, that opportunistic upstream firms 
(supplier) take advantage of divesting downstream firms reduced size to gain a temporary bargaining 
advantage due to reduced countervailing power. In contrast, my cross-industry sample suggests that 
significant downstream activity prompts exploited pivotal buyers, to seize an opportunity to reverse their 
pivotal position, reducing supplier profitability and value. Whereas, significant upstream divestiture 
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activity encourages customer industries to take advantage of dependent suppliers to reduce customer input 
costs and improve customer profitability and value. This evidence complements the findings of Fee and 
Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011), which suggests that horizontal 
divestitures can undermine countervailing power that is increased via horizontal acquisition activity. Also, 
the second chapter of this dissertation reveals that downstream firm level horizontal divestitures can 
reduce buying power, while, the third chapter reveals that significant upstream (supplier) divestiture 
activity can lead to reduced selling power. These findings reiterate the importance of considering 
economic linkages when examining restructuring activities. These findings are of concern for corporate 
executives, financial analysts, investors, and corporate stakeholders of economically linked firms 
undergoing significant restructuring activity.  
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Firm-level Horizontal Asset Sale Definitions 
Horizontal Asset Sale Deal Characteristics 
CASH – An indicator variable that is equal to one if the deal was all cash deal, and equal to zero 
otherwise.  
REL_SIZE – The net transaction value of the asset sale scaled by the prior year’s market value of equity.  
SAME_INDUSTRY – An indicator variable that is equal to one if the division/segment/business unit was 
sold to an acquirer with same 4-digit SIC code and equal to zero, otherwise. 
Definitions of Firm-level Characteristics 
ALTMAN_Z_SCORE – The sum of 3.3 * earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, 0.99 * 
net sales scaled by total assets, 0.6 * market capitalization at fiscal year-end scaled by total liabilities, 1.2 
* current assets scaled by total assets, and 1.4* retained earnings scaled by total assets. 
Cash flow-to-sales – The ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12) 
Costs of goods sold-to-sales (COGSSALE) – The ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales 
(Compustat item 12).  
Employees – The number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) 
Employee-to-sales (EMPSALE) – The ratio of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) to 
sales. (Compustat item 12).  
NEED_FOR_FUNDS – The difference between capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) and the sum 
of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) and change in net working capital 
(Compustat item 4 less Compustat item 5).  
Selling, General, & Administrative expense-to-sales (SGASALE) – The ratio of selling, general, and 
administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item 12). 
TOBINS_Q – The ratio of the firm’s market value of assets to the book value of firm assets: (price at 
fiscal year-end close (item 199) * common shares outstanding (item 25) plus total assets (item 6) less 
book value of common equity (item 60)) scaled by total assets (item 6). 
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Wage-to-sales (WAGESALE) – The product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) and 
the national average wage in a given year obtained from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu 
and Tüzel, 2014) divided by sales (Compustat item 12). 
Definitions of Firm-level Industry Characteristics 
Ind. Herf – Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry 
calculated from Compustat business segments. 
 Ind. Herf > 1800 – Deals that occurred in industries (4-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture 
Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800.  
Ind. Herf <= 1800 – Deals that occurred in industries (4-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture 
Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800.  
∆ Ind. Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were 
below -100.  
∆ Ind. Herf. >= -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were 
greater than or equal to -100.  
Definition of Firm-level Customer Characteristics 
Reliant – Customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the market value 
of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is greater than 2.5%.  
Non-reliant – classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the 
market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or equal to 2.5%. 
Non-concentrated customers – Corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl Index that is 
less than or equal to1800.  
Concentrated customers – Corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl Index that is 
greater than 1800. 
Definitions of Firm-level Supplier Characteristics 
Non-concentrated suppliers – Suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to 
1800.  
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Concentrated suppliers – Suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800. 
Retained suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers before and after a deal. Terminated 
suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers before a deal but not after.  
Suppliers w/multiple large customers – Suppliers that disclose more than one large public customer in the 
Compustat Customer Segment Database.  
Suppliers w/single large customer – Suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the 
Compustat Customer Segment Database. 
Industry-level Horizontal Divestiture Definitions 
Industry-Level Characteristics 
Abnormal Cash Flow to Enterprise Value (ACFEV) – The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is defined as 
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13) to the sum 
of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * 
(Compustat item 61), less the sum of book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash and 
short term investments (Compustat item 1). 
Abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) – Industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flow-
to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of 
operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12).  
Abnormal Cash Flow-to-Market Value of Assets (ACFMVA) – Industry’s median cash flow-to-market 
value of assets ratio minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the 
economy. The cash flow-to-market value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat 
item 13) to the sum of the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity 
(Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value of common equity (Compustat item 
60). 
Abnormal Cost-of-Goods Sold Margins (ACGSM) – Industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio 
minus the cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods 
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sold-to-sales ratio is defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat 
item 12). 
Abnormal Fixed Costs (AFCS) – Industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-to-
sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, 
general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). 
Abnormal Return on Assets (AROA) – Industry’s median return on assets minus the return on assets of the 
median industry in the economy. The return on assets is defined as the ratio of operating income 
(Compustat item 13) to the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6). 
Advertising Expense – Industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s 
total sales. 
Capital intensity – Industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 
12).  
Capital expenditure – Industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s 
total assets (Compustat item 6).  
Customer Dependence (CD) – Dummy variable that equals one if the supplier’s customer industry 
belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from the 
upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise. 
fmj – The percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher 
values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream 
(customer) industry for buying its output.  
fjm – The percentage of supplier industry m’s input purchased by the divesting customer industry for the 
sample of downstream divestitures. 
Four-firm concentration ratio – Sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales. 
Herfindahl Index – Sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated from 
Compustat business segments.  
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Real PPI (RPPI) – Producer Price Index (PPI) data for supplier industries are obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). The PPI for each supplier is deflated using the GDP price deflator.  
Pivotal buyer (PB) – Dummy variable that equals one if supplier industry belongs to the top tercile (1/3rd) 
of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s average 
Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed costs-
to-sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration and 
high fixed costs dummy equals one if the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the 
divestiture is greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, 
and zero otherwise. 
rppi – Log differences of RPPI.  
rppi_inp1 – real PPI of the supplier industry’s top input. 
rppi_inp2 – real PPI of the supplier industry’s second top input. 
Supplier Dependence (SD) – Dummy variable that equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with 
fmj in the top quintile and zero otherwise. 
TV/TMVE – Total SDC divestiture deal transaction value less value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions 
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the 
total value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the 
total market capitalization (in millions) MVE is csho* prcc_f (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 
61) in a given quarter of a year. 
wage – Log differences of average hourly earnings of production workers compiled by the BLS.  
Economy Characteristics Definitions 
tp – Obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, measures log differences of the real output of the 
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries. 
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APPENDIX B: FILES AND DATABASES  
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1992 and 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Tables 
Federal Reserve Board 
U.S. Census Bureau’s SIC-NAICS Correspondence Tables 
Compustat Name File 
Compustat Fundamentals Table 
Compustat (Business) Segment Database  
Compustat (Customer) Segment Database 
CRSP Stockname File 
CRSP Daily Price File 
CRSP Daily Stock Index File 
Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database 
SEC Edgar Database 
Lexis/Nexis Academic 
Wall Street Journal Newswire 
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APPENDIX C: TABLES  
Table 1 
Summary of empirical predictions of a divestiture on divesting firms, rivals, customers, and suppliers 
 
These effects apply to anticipated changes in operating performance that follow divestitures as well stock market 
reactions to events that increase the probability of divestiture. Panel A presents the hypotheses for the entire 
sample of divestiture deals. Panel B presents hypotheses for subsamples of divestiture deals with product market 
considerations. 
 
 Divesting firms Rivals Customers Suppliers 
Panel A: Primary Hypotheses     
     
Positive industry demand shock: 
Transfer ownership of less 
productive assets to those who 
can put the assets to better use 
Positive Positive or Negative 
(information or 
competitive 
advantage) 
Positive Zero to Positive 
(suppliers 
unaffected or 
more valuable 
customer 
generates greater 
demand for 
inputs) 
Financing Positive Positive or negative 
(more pronounced 
amongst financially 
constrained firms) 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Diseconomies of scale / 
Efficiency 
 
Positive Positive or Negative 
(Positive 
information or 
competitive 
advantage) 
(More pronounced 
among larger rivals 
firms (assets or 
employees) 
Zero to 
negative  
(firm seeks 
additional 
efficiencies 
gains from 
customers or  
improved 
coordination 
from 
decreased 
size results in 
net effect of 
zero) 
Zero to negative 
(suppliers 
unaffected, 
reduced size 
engenders fewer 
orders, or firm 
seeks additional 
efficiency gains 
via reduced 
contracting 
costs) 
Financial distress Negative to Zero Positive or negative 
(more pronounced 
amongst distressed 
firms) 
Negative 
(more 
pronounced 
among 
customers of 
distressed 
firms) 
Negative 
(more 
pronounced 
among suppliers 
of distressed 
firms) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 Divesting firms Rivals Customers Suppliers 
Panel B: Product Market Considerations (Balance tradeoff with motive) 
 
Monopolistic collusion: 
Decreased ability of 
industry competitors to 
coordinate a reduction in 
output and higher prices 
Negative (reduced 
monopoly rents) 
More/less pronounced 
among concentrated / 
Non concentrated firms 
Negative 
(Decreased 
monopoly rents) 
 
Positive  (Lower 
Prices and 
quantity 
increased) 
Zero, positive, 
or negative 
(Higher input 
prices or 
decreased size 
engenders 
fewer orders) 
Monopsonistic collusion:  
Decreased ability of 
industry competitors to 
coordinate lower input 
prices 
Negative 
(reduced monopsony 
rents) 
More/less pronounced 
among concentrated / 
Non concentrated firms 
Negative 
(Decreased 
monopsony 
rents) 
Zero to positive 
(customers 
unaffected or 
higher quantity 
and decreased 
prices) 
Positive  
(higher prices) 
More 
pronounced 
among 
concentrated 
supplier 
industries and 
concentrated 
deals 
Purchasing inefficiencies / 
countervailing power 
considerations:  
Inability to switch to more 
efficient suppliers 
Negative (higher input 
costs) 
More/less pronounced 
among concentrated / 
Non concentrated firms 
Positive or 
negative (higher 
input costs or 
competitive 
advantage) 
Zero to negative 
(customers 
unaffected or cost 
increase passed 
along in higher 
prices) 
More pronounced 
for customers 
with higher 
switching costs 
or lower 
relationship-
specific 
investments 
Positive, 
negative, or 
zero  
(higher prices 
but conceivably 
lower quantity 
for retained 
suppliers) 
More 
pronounced for 
more 
concentrated 
suppliers or 
suppliers with 
lower 
switching costs 
Product market 
competition: increased 
susceptibility to 
competition for less 
competitive industries 
Positive 
(decreased probability 
of living quiet life) 
More pronounced in 
more concentrated 
industries 
Positive or 
negative  
(Rivals w/less 
leverage vs. 
Rivals w/more 
leverage) 
Positive, Zero, or 
negative 
Negative 
More 
pronounced for 
suppliers with 
higher 
switching costs 
or less supplier 
concentration 
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Table 2 
Sample description of divesting firms 
 
The sample includes all proposed divestitures initiated between 1988 and 2005 that are covered in the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database and that also meet the following criteria: Parent was seeking to divest a majority 
interest through the transaction; announcement date of the deal can be determined via a search of Lexis Nexis and 
Wall Street Journal newswire. The sample includes all proposed divestitures initiated between 1988 and 2005 that 
are covered in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database and that also do not meet the following criteria: (1) 
parent firms are private firms, limited partnerships, financial and regulated firms [Compustat historical Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000-6999, 4000-4099, 4500-4599, or 4800-4999], Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), foreign firms, or joint ventures, (2) information on the parent firm is not accessible on Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) directly following the divestiture, (3) concurrent announcements are made such 
as quarterly earnings; issues of equity, preferred stock or warrants; mergers and acquisitions; termination of 
technical agreements; share repurchases; private placements, dividends; and executive turnover (4) parent firms 
simultaneously announce an intent to spin off or carve out a unit in addition to divesting assets, (5) the 
announcement date of the proposed divestiture cannot be determined via a search of newswires and newspapers 
archived in Lexis-Nexis and WSJ, (6) parent does not have data available in Compustat on both a consolidated and 
industry –segment basis (7) parent and proposed divestiture target (subsidiary or unit) are not U.S. based, (8) the 
parent and divestiture target do not have matching SIC codes in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. NTV is 
the Net Transaction Value of the deal (exclude deal fees). Parent TA is total value of assets in prior calendar year 
obtained from Compustat and is reported in 2003 dollars.  MVE is market value of equity in the prior calendar year 
obtained from Compustat (calculated as the share price of common stock at fiscal year-end * number common 
shares outstanding) and is reported in 2003 dollars. Industries in Panel B are defined as in Fama and French (1997).  
Year Deals Percentage Average 
Parent MVE  
($ millions) 
Average 
Parent TA 
 ($ millions) 
Average  
NTV 
($ millions) 
Relative 
NTV / 
Parent TA 
Employees 
(thousands) 
Panel A: frequency of deals by Year 
1988 1  1.23   331.57   50.07   54.45   0.03   9.40  
1989 1  1.23   36.95   38.57   2.49   0.07   0.40  
1991 5  6.17   6,041.11   5,922.24   238.93   0.04   11.06  
1992 5  6.17   571.06   1,673.47   53.17   0.06   7.81  
1993 2  2.47   3,126.04   6,780.67   154.05   0.02   36.88  
1994 1  1.23   939.92   2,530.83   67.02   0.03   2.57  
1996 2  2.47   465.63   865.64   46.78   0.15   1.30  
1997 4  4.94   10,489.62   7,248.09   99.78   0.15   37.31  
1998 1  1.23   329.09   857.67   31.52   0.04   0.23  
1999 9  11.11   5,254.68   7,190.47   69.11   0.07   36.66  
2000 3  3.70   460.60   467.17   30.19   0.21   1.81  
2001 5  6.17   9,345.28   6,380.51   255.62   0.05   66.56  
2002 6  7.41   8,639.27   4,447.30   134.66   0.02   53.57  
2003 10  12.35   25,234.59   11,581.49   262.34   0.94   73.11  
2004 6  7.41   3,225.37   5,512.67   89.57   0.03   31.72  
2005 14  17.28   13,794.63   9,370.32   185.96   0.06   36.33  
All deals 81 100.00  10,801.58   7,399.85   172.87   0.17   37.54  
        
Panel B: frequency of deals by industry 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
24 29.63 4,668.98 6,619.70 236.25 0.08 4.79 
Healthcare 10 12.35 2,742.99 5,821.20 87.27 0.07 58.06 
Electronic 
Equipment 
10 12.35 24,803.23 13,934.61 170.86 0.92 48.58 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
8 9.88 42,087.53 13,247.41 112.29 0.03 26.55 
Restaurants, 
Hotels, Motels 
7 8.64 9,570.20 8,651.47 126.40 0.01 141.57 
Business Services 6 7.41 586.49 443.28 57.70 0.10 1.78 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Retail 5 6.14 10,621.74 8,229.74 474.07 0.10 90.40 
Other 11 13.58 2,462.80 2,964.47 113.76 0.08 17.58 
        
Panel C: frequency of deals by deal characteristics 
Method of payment 
Cash 31 38.27  7,776.74   7,016.98   226.17   0.34   35.72  
Stock 3 3.70  618.38   387.55   8.15   0.08   0.42  
Mixed 3 3.70  1,937.59   1,661.90   238.04   0.26   6.74  
Unknown 44 54.32  14,231.39   8,538.94   142.10   0.06   43.45  
        
Intra vs inter industry transaction 
Intra-industry 
transaction 
43 53.09  13,736.25   8,051.02   190.65   0.07   27.63  
Inter-industry 
transaction 
38 46.91  7,480.76   6,663.01   152.74   0.29   48.75  
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Table 3 
Sample description of corporate customers and suppliers of divesting firms by industry 
 
Customer and supplier market value of equity are calculated two trading days prior to the announcement date. MVE 
is the market value of equity obtained from CRSP and is reported in 2003 dollars. Industries are defined as in Fama 
and French (1997). 
 
Industry 
Number 
with 
customer 
or 
supplier 
as  match 
Percentage 
Number 
with 
customer 
as match 
Average 
Customer 
MVE 
($ millions) 
Number 
with 
supplier as 
match 
Average 
Supplier  
MVE  
($ millions) 
Electronic Equipment 
 22 15.71% 3 23,295.29 19 315.45 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 
 21 15.00% 10 56,244.00 11 872.31 
Wholesale 11 7.86% 6 9,122.41 5 513.06 
Computers 
 10 7.14% 4 41,921.97 6 122.59 
Machinery 
 10 7.14% - - 10 223.73 
Communication 
 10 7.14% 2 58,959.02 8 10,604.83 
Business Services 
 6 4.29% - - 6 123.79 
Pharmaceutical Products 6 4.29% - - 6 1,853.50 
Measuring and Control 
Equipment 5 3.57% 1 13,548.67 4 428.72 
Retail 
 5 3.57% 5 100,609.06 - - 
Automobiles and Trucks 4 2.86% 4 35,458.67 - - 
Trading 
 4 2.86% - - 4 3,158.05 
Utilities 4 2.86% 4 14,711.55 - - 
Other 22 15.71% 3 
                      
2,288.49  
 
19 549.09 
       
Total 140 100.00% 42 41,148.41 98 1,472.00 
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Table 4 
Mean (median) abnormal returns for divesting firms, industry rivals, corporate customers and suppliers 
 
Abnormal return is the abnormal return for a three-day window centered on the divestiture announcement date and 
calculated from a market model estimated over the period from 240 to 41 days before the divestiture announcement. 
I require at least 100 trading days over the estimation window to calculate abnormal returns. Industry Herf > 1800 
are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was 
greater than 1800. Industry Herf <= 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which 
the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that 
resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= -100 are those deals 
that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100. t-statistics for 
abnormal returns are based on tests that the standardized prediction errors are equal to zero. Significance of the 
number of positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of the median abnormal 
return is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
  Subsample of deals 
 All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel A: abnormal returns to divesting parent firms 
Mean abnormal return 1.58% 2.32% 1.15% 2.50% 1.04% 
t-statistic 2.50** 2.51** 1.31 2.04* 1.41 
Median abnormal return 0.79%** 1.04%** 0.71% 1.19%* 0.75% 
Positive, negative 50, 31** 19, 11 31, 20 18, 12 32, 19* 
      
Panel B: Abnormal returns on announcement for rival portfolios: single-segment only 
Mean abnormal return -1.09% -1.99% -0.58% -1.87% -0.63% 
t-statistic -1.85* -1.80* -0.86 -1.93* -0.84 
Median abnormal return -0.59% -2.01%* -0.17% -0.89% -0.32% 
Positive, negative 36, 44 11, 18 25, 26 13, 17 23, 27 
      
Panel C: Abnormal returns on announcement for rival portfolios: single- and multiple-segment 
Mean abnormal return -1.49% -1.45% -1.51% -1.28% -1.62% 
t-statistic -1.87** -1.27 -1.90* 1.28 -1.76* 
Median abnormal return -0.52%** -1.67% -0.45%* -0.52% -0.89%* 
Positive, negative 33, 47 12, 17 21, 30 14, 16 19, 31 
      
Panel D: abnormal returns to individual customers 
Mean abnormal return -0.58% 0.09% -0.81% -0.92% -0.29% 
t-statistic -1.00 0.09 -1.13 -1.49 -0.32 
Median abnormal return -0.96%* -1.00% -0.79% -1.07%** -0.75% 
Positive, negative 14, 28** 4, 7 10, 21* 5, 14* 9, 14 
      
Panel E: abnormal returns to customer portfolios 
Abnormal return -0.59% 0.09% -0.89% -0.92% -0.23% 
t-statistic -0.94 0.09 -1.08 -1.49 -0.19 
Median abnormal return -1.03% -1.00% -1.06% -1.07** -0.77% 
Positive, negative 12, 24* 4, 7 8, 17 5, 14* 7, 10 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 4 (continued)  
 All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel F: abnormal returns to individual suppliers 
Mean abnormal return 0.34% 1.95% -0.56% 1.66% -0.58% 
t-statistic 0.41 1.24 -0.59 1.31 -0.53 
Median abnormal return -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% 0.22% -0.60% 
Positive, negative 47, 51 16, 19 31, 32 21, 19 26, 32 
 
Panel G: abnormal returns to supplier portfolios 
Mean abnormal return 0.68% 2.44% -0.60% 1.46% 0.29% 
t-statistic 0.64 1.21 -0.56 0.72 0.23 
Median abnormal return -0.32% 0.28% -0.72% 0.41% -0.60% 
Positive, negative 20, 25 10, 9 10, 16 8, 7 12, 18 
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Table 5 
Changes in abnormal operating performance of divesting firms, corporate customers and suppliers 
 
Changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance are calculated as post-divestiture industry-adjusted 
operating performance minus year –1 industry-adjusted operating performance. Cash-flow to sales is defined as the 
ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12). Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals 
that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. 
Industry Herf <= 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture 
Herfindahl Index was less than or equal to 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that resulted in a change in 
the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= -100 are those deals that resulted in a 
change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100. Significance of the number of 
positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of changes in median industry-
adjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
  Subsample of deals 
 All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel A: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -2.51% -2.53%* -2.47% -1.39% -2.75% 
Positive, negative 24, 45** 8, 21** 16, 24 8, 17 16, 28* 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -2.08% -1.58% -2.92% -0.56% -3.45% 
Positive, negative 20, 41** 7, 19** 13, 22 7, 15 13, 26* 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -0.94% -2.80% 0.25% -6.62% 0.25% 
Positive, negative 22, 30 6, 16* 16, 14 4, 14** 18, 16 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -1.07% -1.39%** -0.43% -0.96% -1.42% 
Positive, negative 27, 42* 7, 22*** 20, 20 7, 18** 20, 24 
      
Panel B: changes in individual customer median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.65% 2.11% -0.93% 0.48% -2.00% 
Positive, negative 12, 16 4, 3 8, 13 8, 7 4, 9 
      
Year –1 to year +2 0.78% 0.74% 0.78% 0.74% 0.78% 
Positive, negative 17, 10 4, 2 13, 8 8, 6 9, 4 
      
Year –1 to year +3 0.41% -0.42% 1.31% 0.43% 0.40% 
Positive, negative 15, 11 3, 3 12, 8 7, 6 8, 5 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture 0.88% 1.06% 0.78% 1.06% 0.78% 
Positive, negative 17, 11 4, 3 13, 8 8, 7 9, 4 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel C: changes in customer portfolio median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.19% 2.11% -0.37% 0.48% -2.00% 
Positive, negative 11, 13 4, 3 7, 10 8, 7 3, 6 
      
Year –1 to year +2 0.78% 0.74% 0.78% 0.74% 0.78% 
Positive, negative 14, 9 4, 2 10, 7 8, 6 6, 3 
      
Year –1 to year +3 0.41% -0.42% 1.31% 0.43% 0.39% 
Positive, negative 12, 10 3, 3 9, 7 7, 6 5, 4 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture 0.88% 1.06% 0.78% 1.06% 0.78% 
Positive, negative 14, 10 4, 3 10, 7 8, 7 6, 3 
      
Panel D: changes in individual supplier median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 3.75%* -2.66% 5.91%** -2.66% 11.19%*** 
Positive, negative 35, 23 10, 11 25, 12** 12, 15 23, 8** 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -4.32% -3.33% -5.71% -11.03% -0.64% 
Positive, negative 15, 25 4, 10 11, 15 4, 14** 11, 11 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -1.62% -2.64% -0.59% -7.60% 2.14% 
Positive, negative 18, 20 6, 7 12, 13 6, 10 12, 10 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture 1.55% -2.83% 9.07%* -4.12% 5.91% 
Positive, negative 31, 27 9, 12 22, 15 11, 16 20, 11 
      
Panel E: changes in supplier portfolio median industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 4.01%* 0.11% 5.48%** 1.61% 8.55%** 
Positive, negative 21, 8** 5, 4 16, 4** 5, 4 16, 4** 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -4.53% -4.53% -4.35% -6.84% -4.10% 
Positive, negative 9, 14 2, 5 7, 9 2, 6 7, 8 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -1.02% -1.02% -1.73% -6.67% 0.87% 
Positive, negative 9, 13 2, 5 8, 8 2, 6 8, 7 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture 4.01% -2.64% 5.06%* 4.01% 4.47% 
Positive, negative 19, 10 3, 6 16, 4** 6, 3 13, 7 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Sources of losses/gains in abnormal returns and changes in abnormal operating performance 
 
Changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance are calculated as post-divestiture industry-adjusted 
operating performance minus year –1 industry-adjusted operating performance. Cost of goods sold-to-sales is 
defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). SG&A to sales is 
defined as the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales (Compustat item 
12). Employee to sales is defined as the ratio of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) to sales 
(Compustat item 12). Wage-to-sales is defined as the product of the number of firm employees (Compustat item 29) 
and the national average wage in a given year obtained from the Social Security Administration (Imrohoroglu and 
Tüzel, 2014) divided by sales (Compustat item 12). Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries 
(four-digit SIC code) in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 
are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. ∆ Industry Herf. >= -
100 are those deals that resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were greater than or equal to -100. 
Significance of the number of positive versus number of negative is calculated using a sign test. Significance of 
changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
  Subsample of deals 
 All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel A: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted cost of goods sold-to-sales 
Year –1 to year +1 1.22% 1.33% 1.10% 2.98%* 1.00% 
Positive, negative 43, 27* 18, 11 25, 16 18, 7** 25, 20 
      
Year –1 to year +2 1.54% 1.84% 1.23% 2.45% 0.76% 
Positive, negative 36, 25 16, 9 20, 16 15, 7 21, 18 
      
Year –1 to year +3 2.40% 2.02% 2.92% 4.85%* 0.38% 
Positive, negative 30, 21 14, 10 16, 11 15, 6* 15, 15 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture 1.60% 1.33% 1.67% 3.71%* 1.10% 
Positive, negative 43, 27* 18, 11 25, 16 19, 6** 24, 21 
      
Panel B: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted SG&A expenses to sales for divesting firms 
Year –1 to year +1 0.30% -0.24% 0.69% -0.17% 0.56% 
Positive, negative 30, 28 10, 15 20, 13 11, 13 19, 15 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -0.15% -2.17% 2.00%** -2.14% 1.88% 
Positive, negative 23, 26 5, 17** 18, 9 7, 14 16, 12* 
      
Year –1 to year +3 1.15%* -0.69% 6.97%*** -0.39% 1.59%** 
Positive, negative 24. 19 7, 13 17, 6** 8, 10 16, 19 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -0.25% -0.39%* 1.59%* -0.39% 0.45% 
Positive, negative 27, 31 7, 18** 20, 13 10, 14 17, 17 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
 
All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ 
Industry 
Herf. 
>=  
-100 
Panel C: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted employees to sales (thousands per million ($)) * 100 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.03* -0.04* -0.01 -0.02* -0.04 
Positive, negative 29, 41 10, 19 19, 22 9, 16 20, 25 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -0.02 -0.08 -0.00 -0.07 0.01 
Positive, negative 27, 33 10, 17 17, 26 8, 15 19, 18 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
Positive, negative 24, 28 9, 15 15, 13 6, 12 17, 16 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -0.01 -0.06* 0.00 -0.04** 0.01 
Positive, negative 30, 40 10, 19 20, 21 6, 19** 24, 21 
      
Panel D: changes in divesting firm median industry-adjusted wage to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.38% -1.19%** -0.03% -0.37% -0.38% 
Positive, negative 30, 40 9, 20* 21, 20 10, 15 20, 25 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -0.79% -1.98% 0.06% -1.58% -0.60% 
Positive, negative 27, 35 9, 18 18, 17 8, 15 19, 20 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -0.53% -0.72% -0.01% -0.82% -0.24% 
Positive, negative 23, 31 8, 16 15, 15 6, 13 17, 18 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -0.28% -1.35%* -0.29% -0.39%* 0.30% 
Positive, negative 30, 40 9, 20* 21, 20 5, 19** 23, 22 
      
Panel E: changes in individual customer cost of goods sold to sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.22% -1.39% -0.14% -0.93% 0.99% 
Positive, negative 13, 15 3, 4 10, 11 6, 9 7, 6 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -1.05% 1.03% -1.05% -0.65% -1.05% 
Positive, negative 12, 16 4, 3 8, 13 7, 8 5, 8 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -0.30% 1.59%** -1.17% 0.74% -1.14% 
Positive, negative 11, 14 6, 1 5, 13* 8, 6 3, 8 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -0.57% 1.03% -1.00% -1.00% 0.99% 
Positive, negative 13, 15 4, 3 9, 12 6, 9 7, 6 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
All Industry 
Her. >1800 
Industry 
Herf. 
<=1800 
∆ Industry 
Herf. <  
-100 
∆ Industry 
Herf. >=  
-100 
Panel F: changes in customer portfolio cost of goods sold-to-sales 
Year –1 to year +1 -0.22% -1.39% -0.14% -0.93% 0.99% 
Positive, negative 11, 13 3, 4 8, 9 6, 9 5, 4 
      
Year –1 to year +2 -0.85% 1.03% -1.05% -0.65% -1.05% 
Positive, negative 11, 13 4, 3 7, 10 7, 8 4, 5 
      
Year –1 to year +3 -0.29% 1.59%** -1.14% 0.74% -1.04% 
Positive, negative 10, 12 6, 1 4, 11 8, 6 2, 6 
      
Year –1 to median post-divestiture -0.57% 1.03% -1.00% -1.00% 0.99% 
Positive, negative 11, 13 4, 3 7, 10 6, 9 5, 4 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Performance differences for customer subsamples 
 
Non-concentrated customers classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal 
to1800. Concentrated customers classifies corporate customers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800. 
Reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer 
firm two days prior to the event that is greater than 2.5%. Non-reliant classifies customers that have a ratio of customer sales (to 
the divesting firm) divided by the market value of the customer firm two days prior to the event that is less than or equal to 2.5%. 
Abnormal return is the abnormal return for supplier firms over a three day window centered on the merger announcement date. 
Changes in median supplier industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales are calculated as median post-divestiture industry-adjusted cash-
flow to sales minus year –1 industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Significance of differences in abnormal returns is assessed using 
a t-test. Significance of differences in median abnormal returns and changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance 
is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Panel A: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated individual customers 
 Non-concentrated 
customers 
Concentrated 
customers 
Difference 
Mean abnormal returns -0.45% -0.85% -0.40% 
t-statistic -0.68 -0.74 0.32 
Median abnormal returns -1.07%* 0.40% 1.47% 
Positive, negative 7, 22*** 7, 6  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-
flow to sales 
1.06% 0.18% -0.88% 
Positive, negative 13, 8 4, 3  
    
Panel B: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for customer portfolios 
Mean abnormal returns -0.32% -1.18% -0.87% 
t-statistic -0.43 -0.99 0.64 
Median abnormal returns -1.07% 0.12% 1.19% 
Positive, negative 7, 19** 6, 6  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-
flow to sales 
1.06% -0.10% -1.16% 
Positive, negative 12, 7 3, 3  
    
Panel C: performance differences between reliant and non-reliant individual customers 
 Reliant Non-reliant Difference 
Mean abnormal returns -0.47% -0.64% -0.17% 
t-statistic -0.59 -0.80 0.14 
Median abnormal returns -0.47% -1.08%* -0.61% 
Positive, negative  7, 9 7, 19**  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-
flow to sales 
1.41% 0.48% -0.93% 
Positive, negative  5, 3 12, 8  
    
Panel D: performance differences between reliant and non-reliant customer portfolios 
Mean abnormal returns -0.76% -0.60% 0.16% 
t-statistic -0.97 -0.69 0.13 
Median abnormal returns -0.79% -1.07%* -0.28% 
Positive, negative  6, 9 6, 17**  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-
flow to sales 
1.41% 0.88% 
 
-0.53% 
Positive, negative  4, 3 11, 7  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Supplier termination decision and performance differences for supplier subsamples 
 
Panel A presents the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if a supplier is 
terminated in year after divestiture and zero otherwise. The sample for this analysis consists of suppliers with non-
missing 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around completed divestitures. Divesting firm abnormal returns are the 
3-day mean cumulative abnormal returns centered on the divestiture announcement for divesting firm using market-
model. Suppliers with single large customer is defined as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in 
the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Supplier industry concentration is a binary variable which is equal to 
one if the supplier industry Herfindahl is greater than 1800 and zero otherwise. Relative deal size is the ratio of deal 
transaction value to the market value of common equity in the year prior to the divestiture. Relationship Duration is 
the number of years in which there has been a consistent reported customer-supplier relationship in the Compustat 
Customer Segment Database. Industry Herf > 1800 are those deals that occurred in industries (four-digit SIC code) 
in which the pre-divestiture Herfindahl Index was greater than 1800. ∆ Industry Herf. < -100 are those deals that 
resulted in a change in the industry Herfindahl Index that were below -100. Cash is a binary variable that is equal to 
one if the method of payment was cash and is equal to zero otherwise.  Non-concentrated suppliers classifies 
suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is less than or equal to 1800. Concentrated suppliers classifies 
suppliers that have a 4-digit industry Herfindahl that is greater than 1800. Retained suppliers are those suppliers that 
were listed as suppliers before and after a deal. Terminated suppliers are those suppliers that were listed as suppliers 
before a deal but not after. Suppliers w/multiple large customers is defined as suppliers that disclose more than one 
large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Suppliers w/single large customer is defined 
as suppliers that disclose only one large public customer in the Compustat Customer Segment Database. Abnormal 
return is the abnormal return for supplier firms over a three day window centered on the merger announcement date. 
Changes in median supplier industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales are calculated as median post-divestiture industry-
adjusted cash-flow to sales minus year –1 industry-adjusted cash-flow to sales. Chi-squared statistics are reported in 
parentheses to determine significance of logit regression coefficients. Significance of differences in abnormal 
returns is assessed using a t-test. Significance of differences in median abnormal returns and changes in median 
industry-adjusted operating performance is assessed using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
Panel A: logit regression analysis of supplier termination decision 
 Dependent variable:  
Supplier Terminated 
Intercept -4.252*** 
 (11.27) 
Divesting firm abnormal returns 0.260** 
 (4.38) 
Supplier with single large customer 1.975* 
 (3.19) 
Relative deal size -6.237 
 (0.17) 
Supplier industry concentration -0.477 
 (0.18) 
Relationship Duration 1.027** 
 (5.84) 
Industry Herf > 1800 -1.228 
 (1.01) 
Δ Industry Herf < -100 2.450** 
 (4.87) 
Cash -3.667* 
 (5.37) 
  
Pseudo R2 0.431 
Observations 71 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel B: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for individual suppliers 
 Non-
concentrated 
suppliers 
Concentrated 
suppliers 
Difference 
Mean abnormal returns -0.69% 1.55% 2.25% 
t-statistic -0.67 1.17 1.35 
Median abnormal returns -0.95%* 1.85% 2.80% 
Positive, negative 21, 32 26, 19  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
2.96% 1.54% -1.42% 
Positive, negative 14, 12 16, 15  
   
Panel C: performance differences between non-concentrated and concentrated for supplier portfolios 
Mean abnormal returns -1.15% 2.20% 3.35% 
t-statistic -0.98 1.27 1.66 
Median abnormal returns -0.76% 1.33% 2.09%* 
Positive, negative 12, 21 16, 7*  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
4.47% 1.57% -2.90% 
Positive, negative 12, 6 9, 7  
    
Panel D: performance differences between terminated and retained individual suppliers 
 Terminated Retained Difference 
Mean abnormal returns -1.76% 1.13% 2.89% 
t-statistic -1.29 1.12 1.57 
Median abnormal returns -1.39% 0.04% 1.43% 
Positive, negative  11, 16 36, 35  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
-12.08%** 5.46%** 17.54%*** 
Positive, negative  4, 11 26, 16  
    
Panel E: performance differences between terminated and retained supplier portfolios 
 Terminated Retained Difference 
Mean abnormal returns -3.36% 1.44% 4.80% 
t-statistic -2.10* 1.16 2.26** 
Median abnormal returns -1.83%** 0.27% 1.59%** 
Positive, negative  4, 13** 20, 17  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
-7.03% 5.91%** 12.94%** 
Positive, negative  4, 7 15, 6*  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 Suppliers 
w/single large 
customer 
Suppliers 
w/multiple 
customers 
Difference 
Panel F: performance differences between individual suppliers with a single large customer and multiple large 
customers 
Mean abnormal returns -2.16% 1.29% 3.44% 
t-statistic -1.90* 1.23 2.23** 
Median abnormal returns -1.77%* 0.19% 1.96%** 
Positive, negative  10, 17 37, 34  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
-0.59% 4.22% 4.81% 
Positive, negative  8, 9 22, 18  
    
Panel G: performance differences between supplier portfolios with a single large customer and multiple large 
customers 
Mean abnormal returns -1.90% 1.54% 3.44% 
t-statistic -1.93* 1.27 2.21** 
Median abnormal returns -2.27%* 0.20% 2.47% 
Positive, negative  7, 10 20, 18  
    
Change in median industry-adjusted cash-flow to 
sales 
-2.94% 5.91%* 8.85% 
Positive, negative  5, 7 15, 8  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Summary of hypotheses and empirical predictions for quarterly horizontal divestiture events 
 
Panel A: Summary of downstream divestiture hypotheses and empirical predictions   
 Hypotheses 
 (1) 
Supplier Opportunism / 
Customer Expropriation 
Hypothesis 
(2) 
Customer Opportunism /  
Pivotal Buyer Repositioning 
Hypothesis 
(3) 
Rival Opportunism / 
Waterbed Effect Hypothesis 
Operating 
Performance 
H1 Suppliers of dependent 
customer industries experience 
greater favorable changes in 
abnormal cash flow margins 
(cash flow-to-market value) in 
the two years following an 
announcement of downstream 
deconsolidation 
H5 More dependent and 
concentrated supplier 
industries experience greater 
adverse changes in abnormal 
cash flow margins (cash flow-
to-market value) in the two 
years following an 
announcement of downstream 
deconsolidation 
H9 Supplier or customer 
dependence has no effect on 
abnormal cash flow margins 
(cash flow-to-market value) in 
the two years following an 
announcement of downstream 
deconsolidation 
Producers’ 
Prices 
H2 Suppliers of dependent 
customer industries experience 
larger increases in selling 
prices (real producers’ prices) 
subsequent to downstream 
deconsolidation 
H6 Dependent supplier 
industries experience larger 
declines in selling prices (real 
producers’ prices) subsequent 
to downstream 
deconsolidation 
H10 Neither supplier nor 
customer industry dependence 
have an impact on selling 
prices (real producers’ prices) 
subsequent to downstream 
deconsolidation 
Industry 
Structure 
Concentration 
H3 If downstream 
deconsolidation diminishes 
buying power, customer 
industries with higher levels of 
concentration prior to 
downstream deconsolidation 
will undergo larger price 
increases in selling prices 
following downstream 
deconsolidation 
H7 If downstream 
deconsolidation reverses a 
pivotal buyer’s pivotal 
position, supplier industries 
with higher concentration 
prior to downstream 
deconsolidation will undergo 
a greater reduction in selling 
prices following downstream 
deconsolidation 
H11 If downstream 
deconsolidation induces 
asymmetric customer buying 
power, supplier industries with 
higher levels of concentration 
prior to downstream 
deconsolidation will lead to 
offsetting selling price 
increases of less powerful 
customer and decreases in 
selling prices for more powerful 
customers following 
downstream deconsolidation 
Efficiency and 
Industry 
Demand 
Considerations 
H4 If downstream 
deconsolidation diminishes 
buying power, concentrated 
supplier industries with greater 
barriers to entry prior to 
deconsolidation will enjoy 
larger increases in selling 
prices following downstream 
deconsolidation of concentrated 
customer industries 
H8 If downstream 
deconsolidation allows 
pivotal buyers to reposition 
themselves, supplier 
industries with greater 
barriers to entry prior to 
deconsolidation will suffer 
larger declines in selling 
prices following downstream 
deconsolidation of customer 
industries 
H12 If downstream 
deconsolidation leads to 
asymmetric buying power, 
concentrated supplier 
industries with greater barriers 
to entry prior to 
deconsolidation will be able to 
better discriminate selling 
prices following downstream 
deconsolidation of concentrated 
customer industries 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Summary of Upstream Divestiture Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions 
 
 Hypotheses 
 (4) 
Customer opportunism /  
Supplier expropriation hypothesis 
Operating 
Performance 
H13 Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater favorable changes in 
abnormal cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years 
subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation relative to customers of non-dependent supplier 
industries. 
Producers’ 
Prices 
H14 Customers of dependent supplier industries experience greater declines in abnormal 
costs-of-goods sold margins in the two years subsequent to an upstream deconsolidation 
relative to customers of less dependent supplier industries. 
Industry 
Structure 
Concentration 
H15 If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have 
higher concentration prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable 
changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years 
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation. 
Industry 
Demand 
Considerations 
H16 If upstream deconsolidation reduces selling power, customers whose suppliers have 
higher barriers to entry prior to upstream deconsolidation will experience greater favorable 
changes in cash flow margins (abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets) in the two years 
subsequent to an announcement of upstream deconsolidation.  
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Table 11 
Description of industries that experience a horizontal divestiture event 
 
Panel A lists the industries that experience a downstream horizontal divestiture event between 1979 and 2010, the 
Fama and French 48 industry classification, the year and quarter of the divestiture event, the size of the divestiture 
event, and the number of deals contributing to the divestiture event. A horizontal divestiture is defined as a 
divestiture between two firms within the same primary four-digit SIC code. An industry is classified as having 
experienced a divestiture event in a given quarter if the total transaction value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions 
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the total 
value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the total market 
capitalization (in millions). 
 
SIC Fama and French 48-Industry 
Description 
Year Quarter TV/TMVE No. of deals 
2086 Soda 1981 4 2.019 1 
3559 Mach 1981 4 0.083 1 
3585 Mach 1982 3 0.089 1 
3949 Toys 1982 4 0.776 1 
3845 MedEq 1983 2 1.713 1 
3537 Autos 1984 3 0.129 1 
3442 BldMt 1984 4 0.131 1 
3613 ElcEq 1985 4 0.061 1 
3448 BldMt 1986 1 0.588 1 
3585 Mach 1986 2 0.053 1 
3821 LabEq 1986 2 0.343 1 
3532 Mach 1987 1 0.139 1 
3555 Mach 1988 2 0.101 1 
3564 Mach 1988 2 0.289 1 
3715 Autos 1989 1 0.422 1 
3845 MedEq 1989 3 0.074 1 
3821 LabEq 1990 2 2.050 1 
3533 Mach 1990 3 0.084 2 
3843 MedEq 1991 3 0.055 1 
3845 MedEq 1992 1 0.052 1 
3564 Mach 1992 3 0.050 1 
2086 Soda 1993 2 0.081 1 
3334 Steel 1993 2 0.075 1 
2511 Hshld 1993 4 0.306 1 
7819 Fun 1994 1 0.056 1 
2013 Food 1995 2 0.147 1 
3579 Comps 1995 2 0.060 1 
2732 Books 1996 1 0.057 1 
3448 BldMt 1996 1 0.067 1 
3751 Hshld 1996 3 0.089 1 
2851 Chems 1996 4 0.061 1 
3715 Autos 1997 1 0.065 1 
3724 Aero 1997 1 0.057 1 
3532 Mach 1997 2 0.681 1 
2721 Books 1997 4 0.150 1 
3334 Steel 1997 4 0.197 1 
3743 Ships 1997 4 0.115 1 
2741 Books 2000 1 3.998 1 
2891 Chems 2000 2 0.431 1 
3743 Ships 2001 3 0.268 1 
2273 Txtls 2003 3 0.061 1 
3715 Autos 2003 3 0.107 1 
7371 BusSv 2004 1 0.128 1 
2211 Txtls 2005 1 0.059 1 
3272 BldMt 2010 1 1.183 1 
2842 Hshld 2010 3 0.061 1 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
Panel B lists the industries that experience an upstream horizontal divestiture event between 1979 and 2010, the 
Fama and French 48 industry classification, the year and quarter of the divestiture event, the size of the divestiture 
event, and the number of deals contributing to the divestiture event. A horizontal divestiture is defined as a 
divestiture between two firms within the same primary four-digit SIC code. An industry is classified as having 
experienced a divestiture event in a given quarter if the total transaction value (TV) of all horizontal acquisitions 
announced in that quarter exceeds five percent of industry total market value of equity (TMVE). TV is the total 
value of consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses (in millions). TMVE is the total market 
capitalization (in millions). 
 
SIC Fama and French 
48-Industry 
Description 
Year Quarter TV/TMVE No. of Deals 
2086 Soda 1981 4 2.019 1 
3559 Mach 1981 4 0.083 1 
3585 Mach 1982 3 0.089 1 
3949 Toys 1982 4 0.776 1 
3537 Autos 1984 3 0.129 1 
3442 BldMt 1984 4 0.131 1 
3613 ElcEq 1985 4 0.061 1 
3448 BldMt 1986 1 0.588 1 
3585 Mach 1986 2 0.068 1 
3532 Mach 1987 1 0.139 1 
3555 Mach 1988 2 0.101 1 
3564 Mach 1988 2 0.289 1 
3715 Autos 1989 1 0.422 1 
3845 MedEq 1989 3 0.078 1 
3821 LabEq 1990 2 0.170 1 
3533 Mach 1990 3 0.084 2 
3843 MedEq 1991 3 0.055 1 
3845 MedEq 1992 1 0.068 1 
3564 Mach 1992 3 0.064 1 
2086 Soda 1993 2 0.100 1 
3334 Steel 1993 2 0.075 1 
2013 Food 1995 2 0.147 1 
3579 Comps 1995 2 0.060 1 
2732 Books 1996 1 0.057 1 
3448 BldMt 1996 1 0.082 1 
2851 Chems 1996 4 0.061 1 
3715 Autos 1997 1 0.065 1 
3724 Aero 1997 1 0.057 1 
3532 Mach 1997 2 0.681 1 
3334 Steel 1997 4 0.059 1 
3743 Ships 1997 4 0.115 1 
2741 Books 2000 1 3.998 1 
3743 Ships 2001 3 0.360 1 
2273 Txtls 2003 3 0.061 1 
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Table 12 
Distributions of dependent and non-dependent customers, pivotal and non-pivotal buyers, dependent and 
non-dependent suppliers 
 
Panel A of this table describes the fraction of customer input purchased by divesting industry for dependent and 
non-dependent customers and provides the distribution of fjm, the percentage of supplier industry m’s input 
purchased by the divesting customer industry for the sample of downstream divestitures. Panel B of this table 
describes the fraction of supplier output sold to the divesting industry for pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers and 
provides the distribution of fmj, the percentage of supplier industry j’s output sold to the divesting industry m. Panel 
C provides the distribution of fmj, the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer 
industry m for dependent suppliers and non-dependent suppliers of customer industries for upstream divestitures. 
Higher values of fjm indicate that the divesting customer industry is more dependent on the supplier industry, m, for 
purchasing its input. Dependent customers are defined as those with suppliers with fjm in the top quintile. Remaining 
suppliers are classified as those with non-dependent customers. Higher values of fmj indicate that the supplier 
industry j is more dependent on the divesting industry for buying its output. Pivotal buyers identify those suppliers 
with high fixed costs, (above median abnormal selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales), high pre-
divestiture supplier concentration (pre-divestiture supplier Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1800), and with 
fmj in the top tercile (upper one-third). Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal buyers. Remaining suppliers 
are classified as non-pivotal buyers. 
 
Panel A       
fjm N Minimum (%) Maximum (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Dependent customers 51 0.87 23.71 4.56 2.67 
Non-dependent customers 223 0.00 2.18 0.28 0.03 
All 274 0.00 23.71 1.07 0.19 
Panel B      
fmj N Minimum (%) Maximum (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Pivotal buyers 34 0.04 13.63 1.57 0.39 
Non-pivotal buyers 240 0.00 22.08 0.52 0.00 
All 274 0.00 22.08 0.65 0.03 
Panel C      
fmj N Minimum (%) Maximum (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
Dependent suppliers 7 6.3 22.1 11.5 9.2 
Non-dependent suppliers 28 0.1 5.2 1.4 0.8 
All 35 0.1 22.1 3.5 1.1 
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Table 13 
Supplier accounting based abnormal operating performance 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of accounting based measures of supplier industry abnormal operating 
performance: abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) and abnormal return on of assets (AROA). ACFM of an 
industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the median 
industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) 
to sales (Compustat item 12). The return on assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to 
the book value of total assets (Compustat item 6). In Column 1, the dependent variable is the average ACFM in 
supplier industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent 
variable is the average ACFM in supplier industries over the two years following downstream divestiture. In 
Column 3, the dependent variable is the average AROA in supplier industries over the two years preceding the 
downstream divestiture event. In Column 4, the dependent variable is the average AROA in supplier industries over 
the two years following downstream divestiture. The customer dependence dummy equals one if the supplier’s 
customer industry belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from 
the upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise. The Pivotal buyer dummy equals one if supplier industry belongs to the 
top tercile (1/3rd) of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s 
average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed costs-to-
sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration / HFC  (high 
fixed costs) dummy, equals one if the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is 
greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. 
Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed 
costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, 
general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). The supplier 
dependence dummy equals one if the supplier industry belongs to the top tercile of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s 
output sold to the downstream divesting industry and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared 
sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is 
industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the 
industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6). 
Advertising expense is the industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total 
sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year 
dummy variables used in regression (not shown). All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 
Dependent 
variable:  
Supplier ACFM 
before 
 downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable:  
Supplier ACFM 
after  
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable:  
Supplier AROA 
before  
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable:  
Supplier AROA 
after  
downstream 
divestiture 
Intercept -0.035 -0.052b 0.000 -0.036 
 (-1.28) (-1.91) (-0.01) (-1.10) 
Customer dependence dummy 0.010 -0.016 0.018 -0.003 
 (0.79) (-1.21) (1.31) (-0.20) 
Pivotal buyer dummy 0.100a 0.022 0.101a 0.019 
 (5.63) (1.17) (4.29) (0.88) 
Supplier high concentration/ HFC dummy -0.063a -0.031c -0.059a -0.027b 
 (-9.04) (-3.11) 
 
(-11.37) (-2.60) 
Supplier dependence dummy -0.014 -0.012 -0.026c --0.011 
 (-0.89) (-0.94) (-1.88) (-0.51) 
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Table 13 (continued)  
 
  
Customer Herfindahl index -0.000 0.000c 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.19) (1.82) (0.10) (1.08) 
Customer capital intensity 0.007 0.016 0.004 0.010 
 (0.65) (1.28) (0.47) (0.77) 
Customer capital expenditure 0.062 -0.068 0.062 -0.068 
 (0.45) (-0.53) (0.43) (-0.64) 
Customer advertising expense 0.128 0.251 -0.042 0.213 
 (0.18) (0.47) (-0.07) (0.64) 
Supplier Herfindahl index -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000c 
 (-0.97) (0.17) (-0.98) (1.90) 
Supplier capital intensity 0.023 0.025b -0.019 -0.007 
 (1.10) (2.17) (-1.17) (-0.54) 
Supplier capital expenditure 0.472c 0.229 0.454b 0.351 
 (1.95) (1.45) (2.57) (1.11) 
Supplier advertising expense -1.136b -0.586 -0.289 -0.540 
 (-2.75) (-1.50) (-1.01) (-1.16) 
     
R-squared 0.28 0.10 0.32 0.11 
F-statistic 8.98a 2.30b 11.23a 2.70a 
Observations 293 272 293 272 
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Table 14 
Supplier market value based abnormal operating performance 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of value based measures of supplier industry abnormal operating 
performance: abnormal cash flow to market value of assets (ACFMVA) and abnormal cash flow to enterprise value 
(ACFEV). ACFMVA of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio 
minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-market 
value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total 
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value 
of common equity (Compustat item 60). The cash flow-to-enterprise value ratio is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total 
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the sum of 
book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and cash and short term investments (Compustat item 1). In 
Column 1, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in supplier industries over the two years preceding the 
downstream divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in supplier industries 
over the two years following downstream divestiture. In Column 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFEV in 
supplier industries over the two years preceding the downstream divestiture event. In Column 4, the dependent 
variable is the average ACFEV in supplier industries over the two years following downstream divestiture. The 
customer dependence dummy equals one if the supplier’s customer industry belongs to the top quintile of fjm, the 
percentage of customer industry m’s inputs purchased from the upstream industry, j, and zero otherwise. The Pivotal 
buyer dummy equals one if supplier industry belongs to the top tercile (1/3rd) of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s 
output sold to the downstream divesting industry, the supplier’s average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to 
the divestiture is greater than 1800, and abnormal fixed costs-to-sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and 
zero otherwise. The Supplier high concentration / HFC (high fixed costs) dummy equals one if the supplier’s 
average Herfindahl index in the two years prior to the divestiture is greater than 1800 and abnormal fixed costs to 
sales ratio is in the top half of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as 
that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the 
economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 
189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the supplier industry belongs 
to the top tercile of fmj, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting industry and zero 
otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the given industry calculated 
from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry 
sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) 
divided by the industry’s total assets (Compustat item 6). Advertising expense is the industry’s total advertising 
expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in regression (not shown). All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 1 2 3 4 
 Dependent 
variable:  
Supplier 
ACFMVA before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Supplier 
ACFMVA after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Supplier 
ACFEV before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Supplier ACFEV 
after downstream 
divestiture 
Intercept -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 -0.018 
 (-0.36) (-0.75) (-0.20) (-0.77) 
Customer dependence dummy 0.014 0.004 0.015 -0.003 
 (1.50) (0.37) (1.41) (-0.22) 
Pivotal buyer dummy 0.035c -0.002 0.047b -0.001 
 (1.97) (-0.24) (2.79) (-0.08) 
Supplier high concentration / HFC dummy -0.036a -0.019b -0.043a -0.019b 
 (-5.39) (-3.08) (-11.21) (-2.70) 
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Table 14 (continued) 
  
Supplier dependence dummy -0.009 0.001 -0.013 0.006 
 (-0.91) (0.01) (-1.13) (0.03) 
Customer Herfindahl index -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.03) (1.21) (0.77) (1.39) 
Customer capital intensity 0.014c 0.003 0.015c 0.004 
 (1.87) (0.56) (1.97) (0.77) 
Customer capital expenditure 0.094 -0.031 0.051 -0.058 
 (1.16) (-0.36) (0.60) (-0.69) 
Customer advertising expense -0.170 0.090 -0.179 0.122 
 (-0.49) (0.66) (-0.47) (0.87) 
Supplier Herfindahl index 0.000c 0.000a 0.000a 0.000c 
 (2.05) (3.03) (2.41) (1.97) 
Supplier capital intensity -0.022b -0.014 -0.027a -0.018c 
 (-2.90) (-1.67) (-2.99) (-2.02) 
Supplier capital expenditure 0.192c 0.126 0.270a 0.201 
 (2.03) (0.66) (2.52) (0.96) 
Supplier advertising expense -0.367 -0.207 -0.449b -0.320 
 (-1.72) (-0.86) (-2.47) (-1.06) 
     
R-squared 0.32 0.21 0.39 0.19 
F-statistic 10.90a 5.89a 14.79a 4.91a 
Observations 293 272 293 272 
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Table 15 
Supplier selling prices: Univariate analysis 
 
Panel A of this table compares prices in supplier industries during the two years before and two years following 
divestiture in a downstream industry for all supplier industries, dependent customers and non-dependent customer 
groups. Panel B of this table compares prices in supplier industries during the two years before and two years 
following divestiture in a downstream industry for suppliers with pivotal buyers and non-pivotal buyers. Producer 
Price Index (PPI) data for supplier industries are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The PPI for 
each supplier is deflated using the GDP price deflator to obtain the Real PPI (RPPI). The table includes all 
divestiture industry-supplier industry pairs for which RPPI data are available. Dependent customers are supplier 
industries with the top 1/5th of values for fjm, the fraction of industry j’s output sold to the downstream divesting 
industry. Non-dependent customers of supplier industries include all remaining supplier industries. U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 1992 and 1997 benchmark Input-Output tables are used to calculate customer dependence. T-statistics are 
provided in parentheses. Pivotal buyers identify those suppliers with high fixed costs, (above median abnormal 
selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales), high pre-divestiture supplier concentration (pre-divestiture 
supplier Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1800), and as dependent (those suppliers with fmj in the top 
tercile). Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal buyers. Remaining suppliers are classified as non-pivotal 
buyers. U.S. Census Bureau’s 1992 and 1997 benchmark Input-Output tables are used to calculate supplier 
dependence. T-statistics are provided in parentheses. Bold font indicates significance at least at the 10% percent 
level. The superscripts a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 
Panel A       
  1  2  3 
  Before downstream divestiture  After downstream divestiture  Change 
  
N RPPI 
 
N RPPI 
 
Δ RPPI 
All supplier industries 
 
172 176.2 
 
159 173.2 
 
-3.0 
        
(-0.43) 
Dependent customers 
 
33 158.1 
 
27 156.7 
 
-1.4 
        
(-0.18) 
Non-dependent customers 
 
139 180.5 
 
132 176.6 
 
-3.9 
        
(-0.47) 
Difference 
  
-22.4a 
  
-19.9b 
 
2.5 
   
(-2.87) 
  
(-2.45) 
 
(0.22) 
   
Panel B       
  1  2  3 
  Before downstream divestiture  After downstream divestiture  Change 
  
N RPPI 
 
N RPPI  Δ RPPI 
Pivotal buyers 19 171.2 18 173.6  2.4 
        (0.24) 
Non-pivotal buyers  153 176.8  141 173.2  -3.6 
        (-0.47) 
Difference   -5.6   0.4  6.0 
   (-0.64)   (0.04)  (0.49) 
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Table 16 
Supplier selling prices: Multivariate analysis 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of selling prices in the supplier industry during the four years surrounding 
the downstream divestiture event. For each supplier of a deconsolidating industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index 
(PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years before the downstream divestiture event to 
two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are adjusted for inflation using the GDP price 
deflator to obtain RPPI. Columns 1-3 contain estimates of panel regressions. In Column 1 (Column 2) the data are 
restricted to the 24 months preceding (following) the downstream divestiture event. Column 3 contains estimates of 
the full panel of the 48-month period. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is the monthly RPPI in log-
differences. The dummy variable, CD, identifies divesting downstream industries that are highly dependent on 
suppliers for inputs: CD equals 1 if the fraction of customer input, fjm, purchased by the downstream industry lies in 
the top quintile and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable, PB, identifies supplier industries that are characterized as 
having a pivotal buyer crucial to their production process: PB equals 1 if suppliers have above median abnormal 
selling, general, and administrative expense-to-sales, an average pre-divestiture supplier Herfindahl index greater 
than 1800, and suppliers with fmj in the top tercile; 0 otherwise.  Abnormal fixed costs of an industry is defined as 
that industry’s median fixed costs-to-sales ratio minus the fixed costs-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the 
economy. The fixed costs-to-sales ratio is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat item 
189) to sales ratio (Compustat item 12). For a given supplier, the Post-Divestiture Dummy (PD) equals 1 in the 
months following the downstream event and 0 for the months preceding. The control variables rppi_inp1 and 
rppi_inp2 represent the real PPI of the supplier industry’s two primary inputs, again in log differences. The variable 
wage represents log differences of average hourly earnings of production workers compiled by the BLS. tp, obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Board, measures log differences of the real output of the manufacturing, mining, and 
electric and gas utilities industries. The panel regression includes a time trend, industry dummies at the two-digit 
SIC level and year dummies. T-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. Column 4 presents estimates of 
a cross-sectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two 
years after the downstream divestiture minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior to the downstream 
divestiture. For control variables, I calculate the change in average input prices, wages and total production in the 
same manner. The explanatory variables of interest is the customer dependence dummy, CD, and pivotal buyer 
dummy, PB. In Columns 4, t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit 
SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates significance at least at the 10% percent level. The superscripts a, b, 
and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable: change in supplier 
RPPI 
Panel: before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Panel: after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Full Panel 
(difference-in 
difference) 
Cross-sectional 
Intercept -0.045 -0.242a -0.151b -0.010 
 (-0.58) (-2.79) (-2.32) (-0.78) 
Customer dependence dummy (CD) 0.000 0.002b 0.001 - 0.098 
 (0.18) (2.14) (0.68) (-1.01) 
Pivotal buyer dummy (PB) 0.002 -0.002c 0.000 -0.039 
 (1.19) (-1.76) (0.00) (-0.65) 
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1) 0.559a 0.228a 0.310a -1.828 
 (5.49) (3.10) (4.28) (-0.27) 
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2) 0.077b 0.062c 0.062b -0.459 
 (2.15) (1.74) (2.28) (-0.44) 
Wages (wage) 0.023 0.065b 0.060a 12.047a 
 (0.89) (2.29) (2.67) (17.19) 
Total production (tp) 0.139b 0.370a 0.305 -0.144 
 (2.02) (7.07) (6.49) (-0.34) 
Post-divestiture (PD)   -0.001  
   (-0.96)  
CD x PD   0.001  
   (0.39)  
PB x PD   -0.001  
   (-0.82)  
R-squared .21 0.35 0.38 .54 
Observations 1,871 2,524 4,395 29 
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Table 17 
Changes in supplier selling prices and customer market power prior to downstream deconsolidation 
 
This table investigates the linkage between the change in supplier selling prices post-downstream deconsolidation 
and several measures of customer pricing power. I identify the 10 most dependent suppliers of each of the 46 
industries that underwent a divestiture event between 1979 and 2010. For each supplier to a deconsolidating 
industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index (PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years 
prior the downstream divestiture event to two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are 
adjusted for inflation using the GDP price deflator to obtain RPPI. All six columns present estimates of the cross-
sectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two years’ 
post-downstream deconsolidation minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior. The change in average input 
prices (rppi_inp1 and rppi_inp2), wages (wage), and total production (tp) are calculated in a similar fashion. 
cust_con is the four-firm concentration ratio of the customer industry prior to the downstream divestiture and 
cust_herf its Herfindahl index. The following variables are obtained from Compustat as of the year prior to 
downstream deconsolidation: cust_con is sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales for the 
customer industry, cust_herf is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the customer industry 
calculated from Compustat business segments, cust_ks is customer industry total assets divided by customer industry 
total sales, cust_capex is equal to customer industry capital expenditures divided by customer industry assets, 
cust_advert is customer advertising expenses divided by customer industry total sales. t-Statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates 
significance at least at the 10% level. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -0.029 -0.067 0.382c -0.056 -0.031 
 (-0.60) (-0.91) (1.85) (-0.74) (-0.49) 
Customer 4-firm concentration ratio (cust_con) 0.001     
 (0.84)     
Customer Herfindahl index (cust_herf)  0.000    
  (1.12)    
Customer capital intensity (cust_ks)   -0.379c   
   (-2.00)   
Customer capital expenditures (cust_capex)    0.632  
    (1.00)  
Customer advertising expenses (cust_advert)     1.468 
     (0.61) 
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1) -6.616 -5.830 -3.394 -6.494 -7.007 
 (-1.22) (-1.14) (-0.83) (-1.14) (-0.85) 
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2) -0.442 -0.409 -1.794 -0.480 -0.651 
 (-0.41) (-0.40) (-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.59) 
Wages (wage) 11.429c 11.277c 4.126 11.325c 11.161 
 (1.82) (1.82) (0.60) (1.73) (1.56) 
Total production (tp) 0.675 0.759 -1.707 0.321 1.142 
 (0.69) (0.89) (-1.20) (0.29) (1.18) 
      
Observations 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.39 0.25 0.23 
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Table 18 
Changes in supplier selling prices and supplier pricing power prior to downstream deconsolidation 
 
This table investigates the linkage between the change in supplier selling prices post-downstream deconsolidation 
and several measures of supplier pricing power. I identify the 10 most dependent suppliers of each of the 46 
industries that underwent a divestiture event between 1979 and 2010. For each supplier to a deconsolidating 
industry, I obtain the Producer Price Index (PPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) starting from two years 
prior the downstream divestiture event to two years after the downstream divestiture event. The PPI series are 
adjusted for inflation using the GDP price deflator to obtain RPPI. All six columns present estimates of the cross-
sectional regression in which the dependent variable is a supplier industry’s average log RPPI over the two years’ 
post-downstream deconsolidation minus the average log RPPI over the two years prior. The change in average input 
prices (rppi_inp1 and rppi_inp2), wages (wage), and total production (tp) are calculated in a similar fashion. sup_con 
is the four-firm concentration ratio of the supplier industry prior to the downstream divestiture and sup_herf is its 
Herfindahl index. The following variables are obtained from Compustat as of the year prior to downstream 
deconsolidation: sup_con is sum of sales for the top four-firms divided by industry total sales for the supplier 
industry, sup_herf is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated from 
Compustat business segments, sup_ks is supplier industry total assets divided by supplier industry total sales, 
sup_capex is equal to supplier industry capital expenditures divided by supplier industry assets, sup_advert is 
supplier advertising expenses divided by supplier industry total sales. t-Statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level. In all regressions, bold font indicates significance at least 
at the 10% level. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -0.017 0.076 0.165 -0.048 -0.076 
 (-0.45) (0.66) (1.49) (-.0.53) (-1.38) 
Supplier 4-firm concentration ratio (sup_con) -0.008a     
 (-2.82)     
Supplier Herfindahl index (sup_herf)  -0.000    
  (-1.33)    
Supplier capital intensity (sup_ks)   -0.154c   
   (-1.73)   
Supplier capital expenditures (sup_capex)    0.717  
    (0.42)  
Supplier advertising expenses (sup_advert)     8.521 
     (1.66) 
Input price 1 (rppi_inp1) -10.612c -7.253c -7.867 -5.586 -9.425c 
 (-2.01) (-1.77) (-1.63) (-0.94) (-1.77) 
Input price 2 (rppi_inp2) 0.279 -1.016 -0.466 -0.957 0.362 
 (0.26) (-0.87) (-0.42) (-0.91) (0.34) 
Wages (wage) 36.836a 15.138b 26.409b 10.649 13.813b 
 (3.08) (2.34) (2.20) (1.57) (2.15) 
Total production (tp) 0.363 0.706 0.460 1.046 0.283 
 (0.36) (0.70) (0.45) (1.15) (0.24) 
      
Observations 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.53 0.32 0.36 0.23 0.37 
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Table 19 
Customer accounting based abnormal operating performance 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cash flow margins (ACFM) customer industries. ACFM of 
an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-sales ratio minus the cash flow-to-sales ratio of the 
median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-sales ratio of a firm is the ratio of operating income (Compustat 
item 13) to sales (Compustat item 12). In Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFM in supplier 
industries over the two years preceding the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4, the dependent variable 
is the average ACFM in supplier industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture event. fmj, is the 
percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that 
the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The 
supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with fmj in the top quintile and zero 
otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated 
from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry 
sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the supplier industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 
128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising expense is the supplier industry’s total advertising expense 
(Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in regression (not shown).  The superscripts a, b, 
c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFM before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFM after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer  
ACFM before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFM after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Intercept -0.034 -0.150 -0.056a -0.175c 
 (-1.63) (-1.82) (-4.12) (-2.12) 
Supplier dependence dummy 0.005 0.049c   
 (0.12) (2.13)   
fmj   0.003 0.005c 
   (1.53) (1.97) 
Supplier Herfindahl index -0.000b 0.000 -0.000b 0.000 
 (-2.49) (1.12) (-2.58) (1.20) 
Supplier capital intensity 0.050a 0.041 0.054 0.047c 
 (4.31) (1.59) (4.90) (2.09) 
Supplier capital expenditure 0.249c 0.382 0.313 0.542b 
 (1.87) (1.39) (2.76) (2.81) 
Supplier advertising expense -3.036 0.288 -2.356 0.661 
 (-0.93) (0.12) (-0.73) (0.25) 
     
R-squared 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.32 
F-statistic 9.03a 160.06a 9.46a 10.69a 
Observations 51 38 51 38 
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Table 20 
Customer market valued based abnormal operating performance 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cash flow-to-market value of assets (ACFMVA) of customer 
industries. ACFMVA of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio 
minus the cash flow-to-market value of assets ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cash flow-to-market 
value of assets is defined as the ratio of operating income (Compustat item 13) to the sum of the book value of total 
assets (Compustat item 6), market value of equity (Compustat item 199) * (Compustat item 61), less the book value 
of common equity (Compustat item 60). In Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable is the average ACFMVA in 
customer industries over the two years preceding the upstream divestiture event. In Columns 2 and 4, the dependent 
variable is the average ACFMVA in customer industries over the two years following the upstream divestiture 
event. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the customer industry m. Higher values 
of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the downstream (customer) industry for 
buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer industry has a supplier with fmj in the 
top quintile and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared sales market shares of firms in the 
supplier industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity is industry total assets (Compustat 
item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the supplier industry’s total capital 
expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising expense is the supplier 
industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy variables used in 
regression (not shown).  The superscripts a, b, c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFMVA 
before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFMVA 
after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFMVA before 
downstream 
divestiture 
Dependent 
variable: 
Customer 
ACFMVA 
after 
downstream 
divestiture 
Intercept -0.033 -0.106c -0.046c -0.122 
 (-1.38) (-2.31) (-2.17) (-2.64) 
Supplier dependence dummy 0.002 0.023c   
 (0.07) (1.95)   
fmj   0.002 0.003c 
   (1.18) (2.22) 
Supplier Herfindahl index -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.36) (1.19) (0.25) (1.34) 
Supplier capital intensity 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.005 
 (0.50) (0.04) (0.66) (0.18) 
Supplier capital expenditure 0.547a 1.254a 0.588a 1.346a 
 (5.43) (7.62) (5.83) (8.28) 
Supplier advertising expense -2.033 -0.738 -1.602 -0.447 
 (-0.93) (-0.48) (-0.78) (-0.29) 
     
R-squared 0.26 0.33 0.28 0.35 
F-statistic 8.68a 17.17a 9.03a 34.53a 
Observations 51 38 51 38 
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Table 21 
Customer abnormal input cost structure 
 
This table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal cost-of-goods sold margins (ACGSM) of customer 
industries. ACGSM of an industry is defined as that industry’s median cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio minus the 
cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio of the median industry in the economy. The cost-of-goods sold-to-sales ratio is 
defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold (Compustat item 30) to sales (Compustat item 12). In Column 1, the 
dependent variable is the average ACGSM in customer industries over the two years preceding the upstream 
divestiture event. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the average ACGSM in customer industries over the two 
years following upstream divestiture event. fmj, is the percentage of divesting supplier industry j’s output sold to the 
customer industry m. Higher values of fmj indicate that the divesting supplier industry j is more dependent on the 
downstream (customer) industry for buying its output. The supplier dependence dummy equals one if the customer 
industry has a supplier with fmj in the top quintile and zero otherwise. Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared 
sales market shares of firms in the supplier industry calculated from Compustat business segments. Capital intensity 
is industry total assets (Compustat item 6) divided by industry sales (Compustat item 12). Capital expenditure is the 
supplier industry’s total capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) divided by the industry’s total assets. Advertising 
expense is the supplier industry’s total advertising expense (Compustat item 45) divided by the industry’s total sales. 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC level are in parentheses. Year dummy 
variables used in regression (not shown).  The superscripts a, b, c and indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 
 1 2 
 Dependent variable: 
Customer ACGSM before 
downstream divestiture 
Dependent variable: 
Customer ACGSM after 
downstream divestiture 
Intercept -0.106c -0.050 
 (-2.31) (-0.41) 
Supplier dependence dummy 0.023c 0.091 
 (1.95) (0.99) 
Supplier Herfindahl index 0.000 0.000 
 (1.19) (1.19) 
Supplier capital intensity 0.001 -0.041 
 (0.04) (-0.98) 
Supplier capital expenditure 1.254a 1.015 
 (7.62) (1.34) 
Supplier advertising expense -0.738 -9.444c 
 (-0.48) (-1.94) 
   
R-squared 0.33 0.35 
F-statistic 17.17a 5.19b 
Observations 51 38 
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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON HORIZONTAL DIVESTITURES AND PRODUCT MARKET RELATIONSHIPS 
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Major: Business Administration (Finance) 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
 This dissertation is the first to study the product effect of horizontal divestitures on upstream and 
downstream firms. This first essay examines product market impact of a sample of horizontal asset sales 
from 1988 to 2005 on corporate customers, suppliers, and industry rivals. I create a sample of firms that 
classifies corporate customers, suppliers, and industry competitors of firms proposing horizontal asset 
sales, and employ this data set to investigate the wealth effects at announcement. This study also 
considers post-divestiture changes in abnormal operating performance for divesting firms, customers, and 
suppliers.  
I document evidence that divestiture related wealth effects for divesting parent firms are 
associated with efficiencies resulting from the reduction of firm bureaucracy I provide evidence that 
managers must balance post-divestiture productivity gains with potential declines in profitability due to 
reduced bargaining power with suppliers. Unlike prior evidence from vertical divestitures (Jain, Kini, and 
Shenoy, 2011), this study documents that parent firm divestiture gains are not shared by their industry 
rivals, corporate customers and suppliers. I also find that these events have negative implications for the 
valuation of industry rivals, corporate customers, and certain subsamples of suppliers. In addition, the 
evidence suggests that factors such as customer (supplier) switching costs and industry structure tend to 
play an important role in the wealth effects of customers (suppliers) at announcement of upstream 
(downstream) divestitures.  
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The second essay of my dissertation investigates this topic by exploring quarterly horizontal 
divestiture activity at the industry level by aggregating firm level divestitures by industry using a sample 
of horizontal divestitures from 1979-2010. This essay documents the opportunistic behavior of certain 
product market participants, such as customers and suppliers, in the context of horizontal divestitures. I 
perform an extensive empirical cross-industry investigation of the product market effects of horizontal 
divestitures on supplier (customer) industries via their impact on profitability, value, and prices 
(profitability, value, and input costs).  
The second essay presents evidence that opportunistic customers exploit supplier dependence in 
the years following significant upstream divestiture activity. As a result, these customers enjoy significant 
increases in profitability, value, and a considerable decline in input costs relative to customers of non-
dependent suppliers. Additionally, I also find that suppliers with pivotal buyers suffer unfavorable 
changes in profitability and value in the years subsequent to downstream divestiture activity relative to 
suppliers with non-pivotal buyers.  This evidence suggests that pivotal buyers capitalize on significant 
downstream divestiture activity to reverse their pivotal position and eliminate cross-subsidization by 
suppliers and non-pivotal buyers within their industry. 
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